

## QUESTION 11

### Enjoying as an Act of the Will

Next, we have to consider the act of enjoying (*fruitio*). On this topic there are four questions: (1) Is enjoying an act of an appetitive power? (2) Does the act of enjoying belong only to rational creatures, or does it belong to brute animals as well? (3) Is the act of enjoying directed only toward the ultimate end? (4) Is the act of enjoying directed only toward an end that is possessed?

#### Article 1

##### Does the act of enjoying belong only to an appetitive power?

It seems that act of enjoying (*frui*) does not belong only to an appetitive power:

**Objection 1:** To enjoy seems to be nothing other than to partake of the fruit (*fructum capere*). But as was shown above (q. 3, a. 4), the fruit of human life, i.e., beatitude, is partaken of by the intellect, an act of which beatitude consists in. Therefore, the act of enjoying belongs to the intellect and not to an appetitive power.

**Objection 2:** Every power has its proper end, viz., its own perfection; for instance, the end of the visual power is to have cognition of the visible, and the end of the auditory power is to perceive sounds, and so on for the others. But a thing's end is its 'fruit'. Therefore, the act of enjoying belongs to every power and not just to an appetitive power.

**Objection 3:** The act of enjoying implies a certain delight (*delectatio*). But sentient delight belongs to the senses, which take delight in their object; and, for the same reason, intellectual delight belongs to the intellect. Therefore, the act of enjoying belongs to an apprehensive power and not to an appetitive power.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 and in *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, "To enjoy is to adhere to a thing with love for its own sake." But love involves an appetitive power. Therefore, enjoying is likewise an act of an appetitive power.

**I respond:** The act of enjoying (*fruitio*) and the fruit (*fructus*) have to do, it seems, with the same thing, and the one is derived from the other. For our present purposes, it makes no difference which is derived from which—except that it seems likely that the one that is more manifest was also the one that was named first.

Now what is manifest to us in the first place are things that are more able to be sensed. Hence, the name '*fruitio*' seems to have been derived from sensible fruits (*a sensibilibus fructibus*). But a sensible fruit is the ultimate thing that one looks forward to from a tree, and it is perceived with a certain gratification (*quadam suavitate*). Hence, the act of enjoying (*fruitio*) has to do, it seems, with someone's love for, or delight in, the ultimate thing that he looks forward to, viz., the end. But the end or the good is the object of an appetitive power. Hence, it is clear that the act of enjoying is an act of an appetitive power.

**Reply to objection 1:** Nothing prevents one and the same thing, thought of in different ways (*secundum diversas rationes*), from belonging to different powers. Thus, the very vision of God, insofar as it is a vision, is an act of the intellect. But insofar as it is a good and an end, it is an object of the will, and it is in this respect that there is enjoyment of it. And so the intellect attains to this end as an active power (*tamquam potentia agens*), whereas the will pursues it as a power that (a) effects movement toward the end and that (b) enjoys the end once it is attained.

**Reply to objection 2:** As was explained above (q. 9, a. 1), the perfection and end of every other power is included in the end of the appetitive power, in the way that what is particular (*proprium*) is included in what is general (*commune*). Hence, insofar as the perfection and end of any power is a certain good, it pertains to the appetitive power. This is why the appetitive power moves the other powers to their own ends, and the appetitive power itself attains to its end when all the other powers

reach their end.

**Reply to objection 3:** There are two elements in delight, viz., (a) the perception of what is fitting, which belongs to an apprehensive power, and (b) being pleased with that which is proposed as fitting (*complacentia eius quod offerter ut conveniens*). The latter belongs to an appetitive power, in which the nature of delight is brought to completion.

## Article 2

### Does the act of enjoying belong only to men?

It seems that the act of enjoying belongs only to men:

**Objection 1:** In *De Doctrina Christiana* 1 Augustine says, “It is we men who enjoy and use.” Therefore, it is not the case that other animals are capable of the act of enjoying.

**Objection 2:** The act of enjoying is directed toward the ultimate end. But brute animals are unable to reach the ultimate end. Therefore, the act of enjoying does not belong to them.

**Objection 3:** A natural appetite is subordinate to a sentient appetite in the same way that a sentient appetite is subordinate to an intellective appetite. Therefore, if the act of enjoying belongs to a sentient appetite, then it seems, by parity of reasoning, that it can belong to a natural appetite. But this is clearly false, since the act of delight does not belong to a natural appetite.

**But contrary to this:** In 83 *Quaestiones* Augustine says, “It is not absurd to think that even beasts enjoy food and bodily pleasure.”

**I respond:** As is established by what has already been said (a. 1), the act of enjoying is not the act of a power that reaches the end in the sense of *executing* it (*sicut exequentis*), but is instead the act of a power that *commands* this execution (*imperantis executionem*); for it has been explained that the power in question is an appetitive power.

Now in things that lack cognition there is a power that arrives at the end by way of *executing* it, e.g., the power by which something heavy tends downward, and the power by which something lightweight tends upward. But the power that reaches the end in the sense of *commanding* it (*potentia ad quam pertinet finis per modum imperantis*) is found not in these things themselves, but instead in a higher nature that by its command moves their whole nature in the way that, in things with cognition, the appetite moves the other powers to their acts. Hence, it is clear that in the case of things that lack cognition, even though they might attain their end, there is no act of enjoying the end; instead, the act of enjoying is found only in things that have cognition.

However, there are two sorts of cognition of the end, *perfect* and *imperfect*. *Perfect* cognition is that by which there is a cognition not only of that which is the end and the good, but of the *universal* notion of the end and the good; this sort of cognition belongs only to a rational nature. By contrast, *imperfect* cognition is that by which there is a *particularized* cognition of the end and the good (*qua cognoscitur particulariter finis et bonum*); and this is the sort of cognition that exists in brute animals. In addition, the appetitive powers (*virtutes appetitivae*) in brute animals are not powers that command *freely*, but are instead powers that are moved by *natural instinct* toward the things that are apprehended.

Hence, a rational nature has the act of enjoying in the *perfect* sense (*secundum rationem perfectam*), whereas brute animals have it in an *imperfect* sense, and other creatures do not have it in any way at all.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is talking here about a perfect act of enjoying.

**Reply to objection 2:** The act of enjoying need not be directed toward the ultimate end absolutely speaking, but is instead directed toward what each thing has as its ultimate end (*eius quod habetur ab unoquoque pro ultimo fine*).

**Reply to objection 3:** Sentient appetite follows upon some sort of cognition, but natural appetite does not, especially as it exists in things that lack cognition.

**Reply to the argument for the contrary:** Augustine is here talking about an act of enjoying in the imperfect sense (*de fruitione imperfecta*). This is clear from his manner of speaking. For he says, “It is not all that absurd (*non adeo absurde*) to think that even beasts enjoy .....”—in the way that it *would* be altogether absurd (*absurdissime*) to say that they have the act of using (cf. q. 16, a. 2 below).

### Article 3

#### Is the act of enjoying directed only toward the ultimate end?

It seems that the act of enjoying is not directed only toward the ultimate end:

**Objection 1:** In *Philemon*, verse 20, the Apostle says, “Brother, I so enjoy you in the Lord.” But it is manifest that Paul had not placed his ultimate end in a man. Therefore, the act of enjoying is not directed only toward the ultimate end.

**Objection 2:** A fruit (*fructus*) is what someone enjoys. But in Galatians 5:22 the Apostle says, “The fruits of the Spirit are love, joy, peace, etc.”—which do not have the character of an ultimate end. Therefore, it is not the case that the act of enjoying is directed only toward the ultimate end.

**Objection 3:** Acts of will are self-reflective; for example, I will that I will, and I love that I love. But to enjoy is an act of the will, since, as Augustine puts it in *De Trinitate* 10, “It is the will through which we enjoy.” Therefore, someone enjoys his own act of enjoying. But it is not an act of enjoying that is man’s ultimate end; instead, it is an uncreated good alone, viz., God. Therefore, the act of enjoying is not directed only toward the ultimate end.

**But contrary to this:** In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, “There is no act of enjoying if it is for the sake of something else that one desires what he takes into the faculty of the will.” But it is the ultimate end alone which is not desired for the sake of something else. Therefore, it is the ultimate end alone that the act of enjoying is directed toward.

**I respond:** As has been explained (a. 1), two things are relevant to the notion of a fruit, viz., (a) that it be something ultimate and (b) that it put the appetite to rest with a certain sweetness or delight (*quadam dulcedine vel delectatione*).

Now something is ultimate either *absolutely speaking* or *relatively speaking*. A thing is ultimate absolutely speaking when it is not referred to anything further (*ad aliud non refertur*), whereas a thing is ultimate relatively speaking when it is the last with respect to certain things (*ultimum aliquorum*).

Thus, what is ultimate absolutely speaking is such that someone takes delight in it as in an ultimate end; and this is what is properly called a ‘fruit’ and what someone is properly said to enjoy.

By contrast, what is not delightful in itself, but is desired only in relation to something else, e.g., a bitter drink for the sake of health, can in no way be called a fruit.

On the other hand, what has a certain delight in itself and is such that certain preceding things are referred to it can in some sense be called a fruit—even if not properly speaking or in accord with the perfect notion of a fruit (*secundum completam rationem fructus*)—and we are said to enjoy it. Hence, in *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, “We enjoy things which we have cognition of and in which the delighted will finds rest.” To be sure, the will does not rest in anything absolutely speaking except the ultimate end, since as long as there is still something to look forward to, the will’s movement remains uncertain (*in suspensa*), even if it has already arrived at something. It is like a case of local motion: Even though a point in the middle of a magnitude is a beginning and an end, it is nonetheless not taken as an *actual* end except when the thing comes to rest in it.

**Reply to objection 1:** As Augustine says in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1, “If he had said ‘I enjoy

you' and had not added 'in the Lord', then he would have seemed to place the end of love in him. But because he added that phrase, he signified that he was placing his end in the Lord and that it was Him whom he was enjoying." So he was saying that he enjoyed his brother not as a terminus, but as an intermediate.

**Reply to objection 2:** A fruit is related in one way to the tree that produces it and in another way to the man who enjoys it. It is related to the tree that produces it as an effect to a cause, whereas it is related to the man who enjoys it in the way that the ultimate thing looked forward to is related to the one who delights in it. Therefore, the things that the Apostle enumerates in this passage are called fruits because they are certain effects of the Holy Spirit in us; hence, they are called "the fruits of the Spirit," but not in such a way that we enjoy them as the ultimate end.

An alternative reply is that, according to Ambrose, they are called fruits "because they are sought for their own sake"—not, to be sure, in the sense that they are not referred to beatitude, but in the sense that they possess in themselves something that should please us.

**Reply to objection 3:** As was explained above (q. 1, a. 8 and q. 2, a. 7), there are two senses of 'end', viz., (a) the thing itself and (b) our attainment of it. These are not two ends, but rather a single end that is (a) thought of in itself and (b) applied to something else.

Therefore, God is the ultimate end in the sense of the thing that is ultimately sought, whereas the act of enjoying is like the attainment of this ultimate end. Therefore, just as God is not an end different from the enjoyment of God, so it is the same notion of enjoyment by which we enjoy God and by which we enjoy our enjoying God. And the same line of reasoning applies to created beatitude, which consists in the act of enjoying.

#### Article 4

##### Is the act of enjoying directed only toward an end that is possessed?

It seems that the act of enjoying is directed only toward an end that is possessed (*non sit nisi finis habiti*):

**Objection 1:** In *De Trinitate* 10 Augustine says, "To enjoy is to make use of with joy (*frui est cum gaudio uti*)—no longer with the joy of hope, but now with the joy of the thing itself." But as long as the thing is not possessed, there is the "joy of hope" and not "the joy of the thing itself." Therefore, the act of enjoying is directed only toward an end that is possessed.

**Objection 2:** As has been explained (a. 3), the act of enjoying is directed, properly speaking, only toward the ultimate end, since the ultimate end alone brings the appetite to rest. But the appetite is brought to rest only in an end that is already possessed. Therefore, the act of enjoying is directed, properly speaking, only toward an end that is possessed.

**Objection 3:** To enjoy is to partake of the fruit (*fructum capere*). But the fruit is partaken of only when the end is already possessed. Therefore, the act of enjoying is directed only toward an end that is possessed.

**But contrary to this:** As Augustine says, "To enjoy is to adhere to a thing with love for its own sake." But this can be done even with respect to an end that is not possessed. Therefore, the act of enjoying can be directed even toward an end that is not possessed.

**I respond:** 'To enjoy' implies a certain relation of the will to an ultimate end insofar as the will has something as its ultimate end.

Now there are two ways in which an end is possessed: (a) *perfectly* and (b) *imperfectly*. The end is *perfectly* possessed when it is had not only in one's thought (*in intentione*) but also in reality (*in re*), whereas it is *imperfectly* possessed when it is had only in one's thought.

Therefore, there is a *perfect* act of enjoying an end which is already possessed in reality. But there is also an *imperfect* act of enjoying an end which is possessed only in thought and not in reality.

**Reply to objection 1:** Augustine is talking about a perfect act of enjoying.

**Reply to objection 2:** There are two ways in which the will's rest is impeded: (a) on the part of the object, viz., because it is not the ultimate end but is ordered toward something else; and (b) on the part of the one who desires the end but who has not yet attained to the end.

Now the *object* is what gives an act its *species*, whereas the *manner of acting* depends on the agent, with the result that the act is *perfect* or *imperfect* depending on the agent's condition. And so when the end in question is not the ultimate end, the act of enjoying is *improper* in the sense of falling short of the species *enjoyment*. And when the ultimate end is not possessed, then there is a *proper* act of enjoying but an *imperfect* one, because of the imperfect mode of possessing the ultimate end.

**Reply to objection 3:** As has been explained, someone is said to receive or possess an end not only in reality but also in thought.