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Later Medieval Perspectives on Intentionality
Prospettive tardo-medievali sull'intenzionalità

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BREPOLS

Abstract: Wilfrid Sellars charged that mediaeval philosophers confused the genuine intentionality of thinking with what he called the “pseudo-intentionality” of sensing. I argue that Sellars’s charge rests on importing a form of mind/body dualism that was foreign to the Middle Ages, but that he does touch on a genuine difficulty for mediaeval theories, namely whether they have the conceptual resources to distinguish between intentionality as a feature of consciousness and mere discriminative responses to the environment. In the end, it seems, intentionality cannot be “the mark of the mental” as contemporary philosophy usually takes it.

Key words: Intentionality; Mental; Dualism; Sellars; Brentano.

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**On the Intentionality of the Emotions
(and of Other Appetitive Acts)**

I. In this short contribution I intend to explore how philosophers in the later Middle Ages accounted for the fact that our emotions, such as love, hate, anger, fear, hope, despair and the like, are intentional mental states, states that are ‘of’ or ‘about something’, whether their objects exist in reality or simply imagined. I say ‘explore’, because in stark contrast to the interest medieval philosophers show regarding the emotions and their importance for human agency, there is, to my knowledge, no medieval text that explicitly addresses the intentionality of our emotions¹. My method will thus be to extract from the various statements medieval philosophers make about the nature of the emotions what these authors would have said had they been pressed by someone to explain how our emotions are about something.

The intentional character of the emotions is central to modern philosophical debates. Robert Solomon, for instance, describes the relationship between an emotion and its intentional object as a particularly tight one:

«[T]he object of my anger is not the same as the object of my relief. The distinction between the emotion and its object begins to collapse. The emotion is determined by its object just as it is the emotion that constitutes its object [...]. There are not two components, my anger and the object of my anger. Borrowing a clumsy but effective device from the translators of more difficult German philosophical concatenations, we might say that every emotion has the unitary form of “my-emoting-about...,” “my-being-angry-about...,” “my-loving...” I will not attempt to maintain this typesetter’s nightmare in the text, but it must be kept in mind when attempting to understand the intentionality of the emotions; there are no ultimately intelligible distinctions between the emotion and its object. The emotion is distinguished by its object; there is noth-

¹ For general information on emotions as an object of philosophical speculation in the middle ages see S. KNUUTTILA, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004; P. KING, *Emotions in Medieval Thought*, in P. GOLDIE (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010, pp. 167-187.

ing to it besides its object. But neither is there any such object at all without the emotion»².

According to Solomon, there is an essential connection between the emotion and its object. The intentionality of an emotion is not exhausted by the fact that an emotion is about something, the object also determines what kind of emotion we are in. An exceedingly dangerous object will necessarily come with the emotion of fear, an object that appears to us as exceedingly good will cause in us love, and so forth.

In more prosaic language than Solomon's, Thomas Aquinas expresses similar ideas about the interconnectedness between emotions and their objects in various passages of his works. Here are two examples:

(1) «Emotions (*passiones animae*) are determined in type (*species*) by their objects. A specific emotion thus has a specific object. Fear has such a specific object, just as hope does»³.

(2) «The species and the nature of an emotion is taken from the object»⁴.

But does the essential intentionality of the emotions tell us something about the nature of the emotions, about what emotions exactly are? Since we usually consider cognitive mental states as the prime examples of intentional states, it wouldn't be too farfetched to infer that emotions too must be cognitive mental states, or in other words: that emotions are nothing else than certain forms of cognition. Solomon makes this inference because he thinks that emotions are essentially judgments or sets of judgments⁵. Whether this is true or not, I want to use the idea behind this inference as a guiding principle of my exploration and pursue the question whether later medieval philosophers too thought that the intentionality of the emotions entails that emotions must be considered as cognitions or judgments and if not, what else they have to say about the intentionality of the emotions. Yet, a quick look in the extant texts reveals that it is impossible to explore these questions without broadening our focus a bit. In many cas-

² R.C. SOLOMON, *The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life*, Hackett, Indianapolis 1993, p. 117.

³ THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 41, a. 2: «Passiones animae recipiunt speciem ex obiectis. Unde specialis passio est quae habet speciale obiectum. Timor autem habet speciale obiectum, sicut et spes».

⁴ THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 46, a. 6: «Species passionis et ratio ipsius ex obiecto pensatur».

⁵ See SOLOMON, *The Passions* cit., pp. 125-126: «What is an emotion? An emotion is a *judgment* (or a set of judgments), something we *do*. An emotion is a (set of) judgment(s) which constitute our world, our surreality, and its "intentional objects"». See also R.C. SOLOMON, *On Emotions as Judgments*, «American Philosophical Quarterly», 25 (1988), pp. 183-191.

es medieval authors touch on the intentionality of the emotions when they talk about the intentionality of a wider class of mental acts, the class of appetitive acts, i.e. acts of the higher and lower appetites (of the will and the sensitive appetite, respectively). What I shall examine in the following will therefore often go beyond the emotions. But I will try my best not to get too far off track.

Yet before I start I want to address quickly an important objection to my project. For someone might point out that the short quotes from Thomas Aquinas do not talk about emotions at all but about «passions of the soul» (*passiones animae*). Moreover, we cannot be sure that what we call an emotion is what many medieval authors refer to as 'passion of the soul'. This move is common in the recent literature on Aquinas's theory of the emotions. Maybe out of embarrassment about the idea that passions, according to Aquinas, are essentially acts of the so-called sensitive appetite, i.e. conative states, Shawn Floyd, for instance, insists that «what we call emotion consists, for Aquinas, in two separate acts: an act of cognition and a passion»⁶.

Not only do I believe that this interpretation of Aquinas is highly anachronistic, because it starts from a certain modern conception of what an emotion is supposed to be; I also think it is plainly wrong. For sure, no medieval author uses the term 'emotion'; the term will make its first appearance in the 17th century. Yet, we ascribe certain functions and roles to the emotions. We say, for example, that a virtuous person has dispositions, i.e. virtues, which make her predisposed towards having certain emotions, and we also say, for instance, that emotions can color perception. These roles are according to Aquinas and his contemporaries occupied by what they call 'passions of the soul'. Hence, I see no reason why we shouldn't read medieval statements about the passions as statements about emotions. If we rule out right from the start that a philosopher might have a different view about the nature of the emotions, then there seems to be no point of examining that author's view in the first place.

II. It may be a good idea to begin this exploration by looking at Thomas Aquinas since the treatment of the emotions in his *Summa theologiae* (I-II, qq. 22-48) is the longest and most detailed treatment of the emotions in any medieval philosophical work⁷. Aquinas's account of the emotions is guided by the insight that

⁶ S.D. FLOYD, *Aquinas on Emotion: A Response to Some Recent Interpretations*, «History of Philosophy Quarterly», 15 (1998), pp. 160-175 at p. 160f. See also C. EISEN MURPHY, *Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions*, «Medieval Philosophy and Theology», 8 (1999), pp. 163-205 at p. 168.

⁷ For Aquinas's account of the emotion in general see R. MINER, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae I-II 22-48*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009; A. BRUNGS, *Die passiones animae*, in A. SPEER (Hrsg.), *Thomas von Aquin: Die Summa Theologiae*, De Gruyter, Berlin 2005, pp. 198-222; A. BRUNGS, *Metaphysik der Sinnlichkeit: das System der Passiones Animae bei Thomas von Aquin*, Halescher Verlag, Halle/Saale 2002; E. UFFENHEIMER-LIPPENS, *Rationalized Passions and Pas-*

emotions are not states we can consciously bring about, but on the contrary states with respect to which we are passive. An emotion is something we are overcome by; and this is pointed at in the expression 'passion of the soul' (*passio animae*). There are, however, different degrees of passivity. We are, for instance, also passive with respect to most of the objects of cognition. The objects of vision affect the eye and the seeing agent and are also not something the agent brings about actively. For Aquinas, the passivity relevant to our emotions is of a different sort and one which involves a bodily change; for him, the blushing when we are ashamed and the change of blood pressure when we are angry do not merely coincide with or accompany occurrent emotional states; they are essential components of the respective emotions. This leads Aquinas to conclude that emotions are acts of the sensitive appetite, because the sensitive appetite is the only power of the sensitive and rational soul that essentially involves bodily changes⁸.

In Aquinas we can also find another way to explain why emotions belong to the sensitive appetite rather than to our cognitive powers: When we are in an emotional state, we are somewhat under the spell of the object to which our emotion is directed. When we are in love, for instance, we are attracted by the object of our love, and when we are disgusted, we are repelled by the object. This basic tendency exhibited by our emotions corresponds more to our appetitive faculties than our apprehensive ones. And because emotions can also be found in non-rational animals, they must be located in the appetite of the sensitive soul, i.e. in the sensitive appetite⁹.

Like his contemporaries, Aquinas thus considers emotions primarily as conative states. Emotional episodes, especially cases of strong emotional reactions in human agents, might involve perceptions, judgments, external actions, feelings etc., but strictly speaking an emotion is an act of the sensitive appetite; cognitions, feelings, actions etc. relate to the emotion itself as something antecedent, merely concomitant, or as a consequence.

sionate Rationality: Thomas Aquinas on the Relation between Reason and the Passions, «Review of Metaphysics», 56 (2003), pp. 525-558; P. KING, *Aquinas on the Passions*, in B. DAVIES (ed.), *Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives*, Oxford University Press, New York 2002, pp. 353-384.

⁸ See THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 76; I-II, q. 22, aa. 1-2; III, q. 15, a. 4; *Scriptum in III Sententiarum*, d. 15, q. 2, a. 1, q. 1a 2; *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 26, a. 1 and a. 2. The other faculties of the sensitive and intellectual soul are either never accompanied by a change in the body (will and intellect) or only accidentally so (the sensory apprehensive powers). That the sensitive and the intellectual faculties are the only ones that matter when we want to determine the exact seat of the emotions is clear from the fact that lower living beings (i.e. plants) are not capable of emotions. Strictly speaking a human being has two sensitive appetites, the so-called irascible appetite and the concupiscible appetite. Since this further distinction is of no importance for my argument I will talk about the sensitive appetite in the singular.

⁹ For this line of argument see, for instance, THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 22, a. 2; q. 23, a. 4.

Not all medieval authors followed Aquinas in his insistence on the bodily character of human emotions. Peter Auriol, for instance, agrees with Aquinas that emotions are acts of the sensitive appetites, yet he seems to deny that they essentially involve bodily changes¹⁰. John Duns Scotus, to give another example, locates emotions in the rational appetite, the will. For Duns Scotus human emotions have nothing to do with the animal-like acts of the lower appetites, and he places them therefore in the will, the higher appetitive power¹¹. But it is important that none of these authors held that emotions are cognitions.

Suppose for a moment that acts of cognition are essentially intentional: then, what explains the fact that emotions are intentional, if they are not cognitions? Aquinas could respond to this question by referring to the nature of the human appetites. For an appetite is strictly speaking nothing else than an inclination toward something¹². Such a response, however, does not explain why particular occurrent emotions are about particular objects, say, why my love is about my wife. That an emotion is directed towards this or that object, and also that we have this or that emotion in the first place, is for Aquinas due to the sensory cognition that causes an emotion to occur. The following text deals with some of the ways in which we can, according to Aquinas, exercise control over our emotions, but it also gives some hints as to how Aquinas imagines the relationship between sensory cognition and emotions:

«[I]n order to understand how the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason one has to consider how it is in our power [...]. An act of the sensitive appetite does not only depend on the appetitive power, but also on the disposition of the body. Now that which is on the side of the power of the soul follows apprehension. And the apprehension of the imagination, which is a particular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of reason, which is universal; just as a particular active power is regulated by a universal active power. From this side the act of the sensitive appetite is therefore subject to the command of reason. But the condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the command of reason: and consequently from that other side, the movement of the sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to the command of reason. Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the imagination or sense (*apprehensio imaginationis vel sensus*). And then such movement

¹⁰ PETRUS AUREOLUS, *Scriptum in III Sententiarum*, d. 15, q. unica, a. 1, ed. Romae 1605, pp. 439-442.

¹¹ For Duns Scotus' account of the emotions see O. BOULNOIS, *Duns Scot: existe-t-il des passions de la volonté?*, in B. BÉDIER / P.-F. MOREAU / L. RENAULT (éds.), *Les passions antiques et médiévales: théories et critiques des passions*, vol. I, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 2003, pp. 281-295.

¹² See, e.g., THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 8, a. 1: «Omnis autem appetitus non est nisi boni. Cuius ratio est quia appetitus nihil aliud est quam inclinatio appetentis in aliquid. Nihil autem inclinatur nisi in aliquid simile et conveniens».

occurs without the command of reason, although it could have been impeded by reason, had reason foreseen it»¹³.

All sorts of sensory cognition, both of the interior and the exterior senses, can give rise to emotions, although emotions are, as the passage makes clear, usually caused by acts of the imaginative power. And this, as Aquinas points out, allows us to exercise a certain amount of control over them. However, what is required to trigger an emotion is not a simple apprehension of an object, but a sensory apprehension of an object as something good or bad¹⁴. This also explains why different people can have different emotional reactions towards the same thing. Imagine me and a biologist friend looking at the same spider. In me the apprehension of the spider causes fears, because I perceive spiders as something bad; in the biologist (imagine someone writing a dissertation on spiders) the vision of the spider may arouse desire or pleasure. We might therefore say that emotions depend on intentional object and not the material objects themselves, for in both cases the material objects is exactly the same. It is also clear that on this account the intentionality of the emotion piggybacks on the act of cognition, which provides the sensitive appetite with its object. And since we tend to take sensory experience as intentional experience we may want to say that emotions derive their intentionality from the intentionality of the sensory cognitions immediately causing them¹⁵.

III. Unfortunately Aquinas does not say much about how exactly emotions derive their intentionality from the antecedent acts of (sensory) cognitions triggering the emotion. Maybe he thinks that the fact that the cognitive faculties of the sensitive soul and the sensitive appetite are rooted in the same soul is enough to explain how the acts of the latter acquire their particular directedness from the acts of the former, how there can be this sort of shared or ‘borrowed intentionality’¹⁶. That there must have been other ways to explain the intentionality of the

¹³ THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 17, a. 7. See also *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 81, a. 3; *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 25, a. 4.

¹⁴ For this reason, emotions are usually triggered by high-level sensory faculties. When Aquinas says in the quotation above that emotions are aroused as consequence of an apprehension of a sense (as opposed to imagination), this must mean that because of the way we are ‘hardwired’ some sensory apprehension (such as the apprehension of sweetness) can immediately trigger an emotional response (for instance, pleasure).

¹⁵ On this point see also M.P. DROST, *Intentionality in Aquinas’s Theory of Emotions*, «International Philosophical Quarterly», 31 (1991), pp. 449-460, esp. p. 452.

¹⁶ ‘Borrowed intentionality’ is Peter Goldie’s expression, but he uses it to explain a very different phenomenon. See P. GOLDIE, *The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2000, p. 54 sqq.

emotions can be gathered from a passage in Henry of Ghent’s works. In one of his many quodlibetal questions on the will, Henry writes that the will

«does in no way depend on reason, except for presenting it with the object. But this happens without that the will suffers something from the object or that the will is altered in itself, so that it would be moved by the object by receiving an impression in it from the object, before it moves itself and brings about its proper act regarding the object, in the way in which the appetite of the animals is moved when it is determined by the desired object, before it moves itself and brings about its proper act regarding the object»¹⁷.

In this passage, the will is contrasted with the sensitive appetite, the non-rational appetite we share with animals. Whereas the will moves towards its acts without any real impression (*impressio*) made on it, requiring reason only to be concomitantly active to present it with the (intentional) object of the act of volition, the passage implies that the sensitive appetite, the seat of the emotions, receives an impression from its object and is through this impression determined towards the object. It is reasonable to assume that such an impression on the sensitive appetite leaves the sensitive appetite with a form of the appetible object impressed in it like in a subject, and that this form then in turn determines the act of the appetite. Since the animal cannot desire or flee anything without having it grasped first, we can further assume that the immediate source of this form impressed in the appetite is an act of sensory apprehension.

Henry does not expand on this account (the ‘impression model’) of how emotions as acts of the sensitive appetite are directed at particular objects; in particular it is unclear whether he only uses it in a dialectical context – after all, his aim is to make a point about the freedom of the will – or whether it is his considered view of the intentionality of acts of the sensitive appetite. However this may be, his remarks also give voice to a rival account. For acts of the will to be about certain objects it is not necessary that the will as the relevant psycholog-

¹⁷ HENRICUS DE GANDAVO, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, a. XLV, q. 4, ed. L. Hödl, Leuven University Press, Leuven 1998 («Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia», 29), p. 123, ll. 59-64: «[...] quemadmodum voluntas in sua actione in nullo dependet a ratione, nisi quod ei praeponat obiectum, absque hoc quod quidquam patiatur ab obiecto aut alteretur in se ipso, ut sic moveatur ab obiecto aliquam impressionem recipiendo in se ab ipso, priusquam moveat et agat actionem propriam circa obiectum, quemadmodum movetur appetitus brutorum, cum determinatur per appetibile, priusquam moveat et actionem propriam agat circa obiectum». Henry frequently repeats this idea that, unlike the sensitive appetite, the will does never receive an impression of any kind from the side of the object or the cognitive powers representing the object. See, for instance, HENRICUS DE GANDAVO, *Quodlibet*, I, q. 17, ed. R. Macken, Leuven University Press, Leuven 1979 («Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia», 5), pp. 126-127; *Quodlibet*, IX, q. 5, ed. R. Macken, Leuven University Press, Leuven 1983 («Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia», 13), pp. 122-123.

ical power have to receive a form of the object, here it is enough that the corresponding cognition in the intellect presents the will with an object. Volitions are about something in virtue of the intellect presenting the will with an object of volition. Any impression on the will from the side of the object would jeopardize the will's freedom, but on this 'cooperation model', no impression is required to assure the directedness of appetitive acts.

The intentionality of volitional acts is also the topic of a quodlibetal question ascribed to Thomas de Bailly¹⁸. In answering the question «Whether God could make an act of the will without any act of apprehension», Thomas explores different ways in which God could or could not interfere in the arousal of an act of the will. Notwithstanding the various distinctions Thomas draws, he clearly holds that God could not make a volitional act in the absence of an actual apprehension. His reasons why this is so show that Thomas worries about the intentionality of volitional acts and that he defends the 'cooperation model' of intentionality. God cannot create a volitional act directly and in the absence of an act of apprehension

«because if God were to make any such volition immediately (*immediate*) by himself, then this volition should be of the same nature and power as the one that he makes by means of the object (*mediante obiecto*), such as Adam, whom he made immediately, is of the same nature as Abel, whom he made by means of Adam. But it is clear that the volition that is naturally caused by the object cannot reach out to the object and terminate in it, unless the object is present through an apprehension in the intellect»¹⁹.

In other words, it belongs to the nature of a volition that it has an object that is presented by the intellect. And therefore God cannot, without doing the impossible, bring about a volition in the absence of a cognitive act on the side of the intellect. In the background of Thomas' argument is the conviction that volitional acts cannot be intentional in virtue of their intrinsic properties (whether they result from an impression or not). This background assumption also shines through

¹⁸The question has been edited as question 3 of the fourth Quodlibet of Thomas of Bailly by P. Glorieux in THOMAS DE BAILLY, *Quodlibets*, ed. P. Glorieux, Vrin, Paris 1960 («Textes philosophiques du moyen âge», 9). But even before Glorieux' edition, C. Stroick raised serious doubts as to whether Thomas' third and fourth Quodlibet are really authentic. See C. STROICK, *Heinrich von Friemar: Leben, Werke, philosophisch-theologische Stellung in der Scholastik*, Herder, Freiburg 1954, pp. 112-116. However, for the sake of convenience I will continue to refer to the author of the relevant question as Thomas of Bailly.

¹⁹THOMAS DE BAILLY, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 3, ed. Glorieux, p. 250: «[...] et sic non potest Deus facere quia si Deus aliquam uolitionem faciat immediate per se ipsum, illa erit eiusdem rationis et uirtutis cum illa quam facit mediante obiecto, sicut Adam quem fecit immediate est eiusdem rationis cum Abel quem fecit mediante Adam. Sed constat quod uolitione naturaliter facta per obiectum non posset attingere obiectum uel terminari ad ipsum nisi obiectum esset presens aliqua apprehensione apud intellectum».

in two further arguments employed by him. After the passage quoted above, Thomas continues:

«Moreover, even if God could make immediately whatever can be made by means of a particular agent, because God contains in itself the total active power, nevertheless God could not make a thing except in the way in which it can exist; and this means that it exists together with those things which from its nature happen to be in its existence. And because a volition also requires that an object that it has as an endpoint (*terminus*) coexist with it, and not just as an object that brings the volition about efficiently, God cannot bring about a volition unless an object coexists under that aspect under which the volition requires it and is directed to it as to an endpoint (*terminus*). But this cannot happen unless the object exists under an apprehension in the intellect»²⁰.

And in the following passage Thomas hammers his point home by going so far as to say that a volition without an object (presented by the intellect) is not a volition at all. For if God were to create a volition immediately in the absence of an apprehended object as its endpoint, this would

«imply a contradiction, for this would then be a volition and not a volition. It would be a volition, because you posit it to be brought about by God, and it wouldn't be a volition because its nature is taken away through the fact that its endpoint is taken away».

It is true that in the absence of the act of apprehension God could produce something in the will that is similar to a volition, insofar as it is an act of the will, but this something is not a volition, because a volition cannot exist without being about an object to which it is directed. In the same way, to use Thomas' example, God can create a white piece of wood, but God will never be able to create a white piece of wood with the property of being similar if there is not also something to which it is similar²¹.

²⁰THOMAS DE BAILLY, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 3, ed. Glorieux, p. 250: «Item et si Deus possit facere immediate quicquid potest mediante particulari agente, cum in se continet omnem virtutem actiuam, tamen non potest rem facere nisi modo quo potest existere; et sic cum illis que de sua ratione contingit in suo esse; et ideo cum uolitione coexistat obiectum ut terminum sibi coexistentem, et non solum ut ipsam efficiens, non potest Deus eam efficere nisi coexistente obiecto sub illa ratione sub qua uolitione ipsum exigit uel respicit ut terminum; hoc autem non est nisi cum obiectum fuerit sub aliqua apprehensione apud intellectum».

²¹THOMAS DE BAILLY, *Quodlibet IV*, q. 3, ed. Glorieux, p. 251: «Quinto modo potest sic intelligi quod efficiat Deus uolitionem sine apprehensione quia suspensa efficacia obiecti presentis apud intellectum per sui apprehensionem, efficiatur immediate a Deo illius obiecti uolitione sic quod non respiciat obiectum apprehensum ut terminum suum; et constat quod sic non potest, quia implicat contradictionem; esset enim uolitione et non; esset quidem, quia ponis eam effici a Deo, et non esset quia ratio eius tollitur per hoc quod eius terminus subtrahitur. Posset tamen Deus facere id realitatis actus uolitionis quod est in uolitione preter ordinem determinatum secundum quem respicit obiectum ut terminum, sed illud non esset

None of Thomas of Bailly's reflections, so someone might object, have to do with emotions, i.e. acts of the sensitive appetites. But whether or not this quodlibetal question has to be ascribed to Thomas, it seems to have been debated and written at a time when some important philosophers (such as John Duns Scotus) locate human emotions in the will²². And for these philosophers, an account of the intentionality of volitions is also an account of the intentionality of human emotions.

IV. It looks as if what I label the 'impression model' and the 'cooperation model' respectively are not the only ways in which medieval philosophers accounted for the intentionality of our emotions. There seems to have been a tendency among early 14th-century philosophers to consider emotions and other appetitive acts as certain forms of cognitions and to reduce the question of the intentionality of appetitive mental acts to the general problem of the intentionality of cognitive mental acts. Walter Chatton is to my knowledge the first to discuss explicitly whether appetitive acts are themselves cognitions. He does so in responding to the question «Whether the love of an angel is distinct from the angel's cognition». And although Chatton's answer is affirmative, his treatment lists an interesting series of arguments for identifying angelic love (and love in general) with a cognition²³. Chatton's editors have attributed these arguments, which Chatton himself simply ascribes to «some» (*aliqui*), to William of Ockham, but there is no evidence that they actually are Ockham's²⁴.

A philosopher who explicitly defends the idea that love and other appetitive acts are cognitions is Chatton's younger contemporary Adam Wodeham²⁵. In his *Lectura secunda* on the *Sentences*, Adam writes:

«I say – not by way of expressing an assertion, but by way of expressing an opinion – that every act of desiring and hating, and so enjoyment, is some sort of cognition

uolito, quia uolito de sua ratione hunc ordinem includit; sicut Deus posset facere lignum album, non existente alio albo, sed non posset facere lignum album simile si non esset aliud album quod respicit secundum quod simile ut suum terninum, quia simile coexigit illud in suo esse».

²² Whoever the author is, the text is obviously from the end of the 13th or the first decades of the 14th century.

²³ GUALTERUS DE CHATTON, *Reportatio super Sententias*, II, d. 5, q. 1, dub. 3, ed. J.C. Wey / G.J. Etzkorn, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto 2004, pp. 238-242; for the arguments in favor of identifying appetitive acts and cognitions see p. 239.

²⁴ The passages to which the editors refer (i.e., GUILIELMUS DE OCKHAM, *Quaestiones in II Sententiarum*, q. 20) are inconclusive, because they deal with an entirely different problem.

²⁵ Wodeham's teaching on the emotions has recently been discussed by various scholars. See KNUUTTILA, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* cit., pp. 275-282; D. PERLER, *Emotions and Cognitions: Fourteenth-Century Discussions on the Passions of the Soul*, «Vivarium», 43 (2005), pp. 250-274; S.V. KRIVANOV, *Beatific Enjoyment in Scholastic Theology and Philosophy*, Ph.D. dissertation, Helsinki 2006, pp. 136-149.

(*quaedam cognitio*) and some sort of apprehension (*quaedam apprehensio*), because every experience of some object is also a cognition of the same object. But every appetitive act is an experience of its object, i.e., it is an act by which such an object is experienced»²⁶.

Although the context of this passage is strictly speaking a discussion of the enjoyment that is part of the beatific vision, Wodeham's claims are not restricted to a theological issue. Note also that Wodeham does not here restrict himself to emotions. All appetitive acts are said to be cognitions. But since emotions – for obvious reasons he mentions only love and hate – are acts of an appetite, the broader claim includes emotions, and not only emotions in the will, but also emotions in the sensitive appetite²⁷.

A puzzling aspect of the passage just quoted is the disclaimer at its beginning. Wodeham seems to be aware that his view is somewhat uncommon; elsewhere he refers to the opposite view, the traditional view that appetitive acts are not cognitions, as «the common way» (*communis via*)²⁸. But it is difficult to say whether he considers his own view as novel. In any case, he seems to have some doubts as to whether or not his theory can be established demonstratively.

Before I examine some of the arguments that Wodeham puts forward for his view that emotions are cognitions and how this relates to the issue of intentionality, I want to clarify first what kind of cognition emotions are on his account. Wodeham's claim that appetitive acts are cognitions does, of course, not entail the reverse: not all cognitions are appetitive acts. Moreover, according to him, an appetitive act is not identical with the cognition that is normally said to precede and cause it. It is not this aspect of the traditional view that Wodeham wants to question. Since our appetitive faculties are not able to elicit appetitive acts in the absence of cognitions, we have to admit the existence of cognitions that are distinct from these appetitive acts and that can be called their partial efficient causes²⁹. So on Wodeham's view, an occurrent volitional act comes with two cog-

²⁶ ADAMUS DE WODEHAM, *Lectura secunda in primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 5, § 4, ed. R. Wood / G. Gál, The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, New York 1990, p. 278, ll. 27-31: «Secundo dico – non asserendo sed opinando – quod omnis actus appetendi et odiendi, et ita frui, est quaedam cognitio et quaedam apprehensio, quia omnis experientia alicuius obiecti est quaedam cognitio eiusdem. Sed omnis actus appetitivus est quaedam experientia sui obiecti, id est quo experitur tale obiectum».

²⁷ Like his teacher William of Ockham, Wodeham seems to hold that there are both emotions in the sensitive and the intellectual powers of the soul (for *amor sensualis* and *odium sensitivum*, see ADAMUS DE WODEHAM, *Lectura secunda in primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 4, ed. Wood / Gál, p. 263). There is no indication anywhere in the text that his identification of appetitive acts and cognitions is limited to the will.

²⁸ ADAMUS DE WODEHAM, *Lectura secunda in primum librum Sententiarum*, prolog., q. 6, ed. Wood / Gál, p. 173.

²⁹ See ADAMUS DE WODEHAM, *Lectura secunda in primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 5, § 4, ed. Wood / Gál, p. 277, ll. 4-11: «Circa secundum articulum prima conclusio sit ista quod prima notitia

nitions: one first cognition, which is the partial efficient cause of the volitional act, and a second cognition, which is nothing else than the volitional act itself. However, between these two cognitions exists an intimate relation. For the volitional act, i.e., the second cognition, is «a cognition of that thing or of those things without a previous cognition of which no act of willing or nilling could have been caused naturally»³⁰. In other words: although the first and the second cognition are numerically distinct, they are cognitions about the same object (or objects). Or in modern parlance: they share the same content.

Yet, what is the content of the volitional act? Is it a proposition or a simple object? In medieval jargon: Is the volitional act a complex or an incomplex cognition? Because emotions and volitions can be caused by either the cognition of a state of affairs or by the cognition of a particular object, Wodeham concludes that the cognitive content of volitional acts can be equally either a proposition or a simple object.

«I say, therefore, that one volitional act is an incomplex cognition, both in being and in signifying [...] But another volitional act is complex with respect to its object and on account of representation or natural signification, even though it is incomplex in being»³¹.

Loving a person is an example of the first kind of cognition, hoping that someone will become a bishop (Wodeham's example!) illustrates the second case. What matters in this distinction is not so much the ontological nature of the objects of our volitions and emotions, but the ways in which our cognitive powers refer to them. That which our cognition represents by a complex cognition may in fact be a simple object.

On the basis of the principle that volitional acts and the cognitions co-causing them share the same content, Wodeham also concludes that some volitional

fruibilis, sive intuitiva sive abstractiva, realiter distinguitur a fruitione eiusdem, et econtra ista fruitio ab illa cognitione. Et hoc dico de fruitione causata partialiter ab anima effective. Deus autem non necessitatur ad talem ordinem in causando. Probatio: nam sicut tactum est praecedenti quaestione, effectus quicumque causabilis a voluntate, ad hoc quod sit ab ea, necessario requirit cognitionem pro causa partiali effective. Igitur omnis amor causabilis a voluntate, ad hoc quod sit ab ea, necessario requirit cognitionem realiter distinctam ab amore, quia nihil causat se».

³⁰ ADAMUS DE WODEHAM, *Lectura secunda in primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 5, § 5, ed. Wood / Gál, p. 281, ll. 27-30: «Et cum quaeritur, utrum [ista volitio est cognitio] complexa vel incomplexa, dicendum est, quod est notitia apprehensiva illius vel illorum sine cuius vel quorum apprehensione praevia non posset volitio vel nolitio per naturam causari nec virtuose nec vitiose nec indifferenter nec aliquo modo».

³¹ ADAMUS DE WODEHAM, *Lectura secunda in primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 5, § 5, ed. Wood / Gál, p. 281, ll. 30-36: «Et ideo dico quod aliqua volitio est apprehensio incomplexa tam in essendo quam in significando [...]. Aliqua autem est complexa obiective et in repraesentando seu naturaliter significando, quantumcumque sit incomplexa in essendo».

acts are judgments, or in his terminology, acts of assent or dissent (*assensus vel dissensus*). But he denies that all volitional acts are judgments, and he would thus also have rejected Solomon's view according to which emotions are essentially judgments. The joy about the death of an enemy is for example a judgment, but that's because the antecedent cognition is also a judgment. For such joy cannot occur in the agent if she does not judge it to be the case that her enemy is dead³².

V. But how does Adam Wodeham arrive at his cognitivist understanding of appetitive acts and what does this tell us about his views regarding the intentionality of such acts? The first thing to notice is that Wodeham basically copies and extends the initial list of arguments drawn up by Chatton in favor of the identity of volitional acts and cognitions³³. But now unlike Chatton, who rejects them, Wodeham endorses and defends these arguments. I want to focus on four of Wodeham's arguments. In the initial statement of Wodeham's position, we have already encountered one of his arguments, one that is not part of the list taken over from Chatton. Let me repeat the crucial passage:

«I say – not by way of expressing an assertion, but by way of expressing an opinion – that every act of desiring and hating, and so enjoyment, is some sort of cognition and some sort of apprehension, because every experience of some object (*quaedam experientia alicuius obiecti*) is also a cognition of the same object (*quaedam cognitio eiusdem*). But every appetitive act is an experience of its object»³⁴.

The syllogism runs like this: (1) Every experience of an object is a cognition. (2) Every appetitive act of desiring, hating etc. is an experience of an object. Conclusion: Every appetitive act of desiring, hating etc. is a cognition. Despite the caveat in the first line, Wodeham is clearly presenting an argument here, so we should assume it is was meant to work. It would be good to know a bit more about what he means by having an experience (*experientia*) of something. One obvious way to agree with the minor premise (2) is to read it as saying that every appetitive act of the mentioned kind is about an object; there is indeed no act of de-

³² ADAMUS DE WODEHAM, *Lectura secunda in primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 5, § 5, ed. Wood / Gál, p. 282, ll. 40-48: «Sed tunc remanet dubium, utrum aliqua volitio vel nolitio sit assensus vel dissensus. Et dico quod sic. Et haec sit quarta conclusio. Illa enim laetitia, qua quis gaudet de morte vel de adversitate inimici nota vel firmiter credita et quae non possit per naturam aliter causari, est assensus quod inimicus mortuus est vel angustiatus et similiter de similibus. Nam qua ratione ideo volitio est apprehensio illius vel illorum sine cuius vel quorum apprehensione praevia naturaliter causari non posset, eadem ratione est assensus vel dissensus quod ita est vel non est, de quo non gauderet nec gaudere posset secundum naturam nisi praessentiret quod sic esset vel non esset».

³³ ADAMUS DE WODEHAM, *Lectura secunda in primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 5, § 2, ed. Wood / Gál, pp. 273-275. For the parallel text in Chatton's *Sentences* commentary see n. 23 above.

³⁴ See n. 26 above.

siring, hating etc. which is not «the experience of an object» (*experientia alicuius obiecti*) in this sense. Who would deny this? But for the conclusion to follow from the premises, the major premise (1) then simply assumes that all intentional mental acts are also cognitions. In other words: Wodeham's argument presupposes the identification of being intentional with being a cognition.

That this identification is exactly what is on Wodeham's mind is confirmed by the other arguments. The one to which Wodeham refers to as the second argument goes like this:

«Again, if [an appetitive act and a cognition] were distinct, then the soul could love something unknown, and that doesn't seem true. And the falsity of the consequent is shown by St. Augustine [...]: "For the mind cannot love itself unless it also knows itself. For how can someone love what he does not know?" [...] The [truth of the] conditional is clear, because if they were distinct, God could make the one without the other»³⁵.

This line of reasoning is a textbook application of *modus tollens*. Yes, we cannot desire, love, hate etc. what we do not know. But does it follow that appetitive acts are identical with cognitions? The last line of the quotation is meant to establish the truth of the conditional (*consequentia*) in the major premise. Thomas of Bailly would have denied its truth. According to him it is true that appetitive acts and cognitions are two distinct things, but nevertheless God cannot make the one without the other. For Wodeham such a view is untenable. Either something is distinct and thus separable, or it is not. Now Wodeham clearly admits that the initial cognition triggering an appetitive act is distinct from the consecutive appetitive act³⁶. For how else could the cognition be the latter's efficient cause? So the present argument is not meant by Wodeham to establish the identity between those two. For even according to Wodeham, God could create an appetitive act without previously creating the cognitive act that normally triggers such an act. However, everyone agrees that it would be deeply problematic if God were able

³⁵ ADAMUS DE WODEHAM, *Lectura secunda in primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 5, § 2, ed. Wood / Gál, pp. 273-274, ll. 15-22: «Item, si distinguerentur, tunc anima posset amare incognitum quod non videtur verum. Et probatur falsitas consequentis per beatum Augustinum IX De Trinitate, cap. 4, [...] "Mens enim [...] amare se ipsam non potest nisi etiam noverit se. Nam quomodo amat quod nescit?" [...] Consequentia patet, quia si esset absoluta realiter distincta, Deus posset facere utrumque sine reliquo». Although he first presents this argument in a somewhat neutral way, he later fully endorses it. See also § 4, p. 279, ll. 45-46: «Item, per secundum [argumentum] et quartum supra ad primam partem et quintum etiam»; § 8, p. 286, ll. 11-12: «Secundum est pro conclusione mea secunda et concederem quod inferitur si tenerem oppositum».

³⁶ ADAMUS DE WODEHAM, *Lectura secunda in primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 5, § 4, ed. Wood / Gál, p. 277, ll. 4-6: «Prima notitia fruibilis, sive intuitiva sive abstractiva, realiter distinguitur a fruitione eiusdem, et e contra ista fruio ab illa cognitione».

to create an appetitive act without the appropriate object. But as the reference to Augustine shows, this latter impossibility seems for Wodeham to be identical with the existence of an appetitive act without it being a cognition of its object. So we see him again equating being intentional with being a cognition.

A similar picture emerges from the other arguments Wodeham endorses. In some respects they are mere variations of the two arguments just mentioned:

«(1) Again, then the will would be blind since it is distinct from the intellect [...]. (2) Again, it is impossible that something simply unknown pleases the will. But when the act of loving alone is posited and everything else is set aside, the object of love pleases the will»³⁷.

The first argument starts with the unchallenged distinction between intellect and will. But given this distinction, so the line of reasoning, the will would be blind if its acts were not themselves some kind of cognition. Again, much depends on what is meant by this 'blindness'. If it means 'has no object', then this would indeed be a problem. And since Wodeham considers the argument to support the cognitive nature of appetitive acts, it once more testifies to his identification of being a cognition with having an intentional object.

The second argument is incomplete insofar as it is left to the reader to draw the obvious conclusion. Together with the suppressed conclusion the argument runs like this: (1) It is impossible that something simply unknown pleases the will. (2) When the act of loving alone is posited and everything else is set aside, the object of love pleases the will. Conclusion: It is impossible that under the circumstances mentioned the object of love is simply unknown to the will. But since according to the circumstances there is only the (appetitive) act of loving in the will and no act of the intellect or of the cognitive powers of the senses, the will has to know the object; in other words: the volitional act is also a cognition. Whereas, as we have seen, some of Wodeham's other arguments seem to what presuppose that all intentional mental states are cognitions, one might think that the present argument actually intends to provide a reason for the claim that the will itself knows its objects and that acts of the will are cognitions.

But I am doubtful as to whether the argument is successful. One might agree to the second premise (2) on the grounds that intellect and will are distinct and that the premise simply says that volitions, such as the act of loving, must have an object, an object pleasing the will. However, an uncontroversial reading of the

³⁷ ADAMUS DE WODEHAM, *Lectura secunda in primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 5, § 2, ed. Wood / Gál, p. 274, ll. 23-27: «Item, tunc voluntas esset caeca secundum quod distinguitur ab intellectu [...] Item, impossibile est simpliciter incognitum placere voluntati. Sed posito solo actu amandi, quocumque alio circumscripto, placet obiectum dilectionis». See also § 4, p. 279, ll. 45-46 and § 8, p. 286, ll. 13-16.

first premise (1), a reading that could be adopted by an opponent, just takes the premise to say that nothing completely unknown can cause an act of volition. The expression ‘what pleases the will’ is thus used differently in each premise, once as designating that which can cause a volitional act and once as designating that which is the object of the will. So for an opponent of Wodeham, the argument simply commits a fallacy of equivocation. Yet, from Wodeham’s perspective the argument does not commit a fallacy; but that is only the case when one again assumes the identity of being cognitive and being intentional and runs the argument accordingly.

Whatever one might think about the strength of his arguments, Wodeham’s account of the intentionality of appetitive acts – emotions included – emerges clearly from them. Appetitive acts are intentional not because of an impression or due to the simultaneous action of a cognitive faculty, but because emotions are themselves cognitions.

VI. Adam Wodeham’s peculiar doctrine of the nature of appetitive acts and emotions has not gone unnoticed by his contemporaries. Gregory of Rimini in particular engages in a lengthy refutation of Wodeham’s view. His strategy against Wodeham is twofold: first, he argues in general that volitional acts cannot be cognitions; second, he intends to show that Wodeham’s arguments are unsuccessful. I shall only comment on the first part of his attack on Wodeham, for it is there where their diverging views on the intentionality of appetitive acts is most obvious.

Gregory can see no obvious reason why volitions (and other appetitive acts) have to be cognitions too, nor do these volitional cognitions play any role in what we experience (or could experience), nor are there any authorities who unambiguously evoke these cognitions. So we better reject them as superfluous³⁸. Gregory is especially puzzled by Wodeham’s idea that volitional acts are cognitions about exactly the same objects as those antecedent cognitions by which the volitions are caused. But since these objects seem to be equally well cognized by a ‘normal’ cognition and since such a ‘normal’ cognition does in any case have to precede the volition, why do we need these additional cognitions?³⁹

³⁸ GREGORIUS DE ARIMINI, *Lectura super primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 2, ed. A.D. Trapp / V. Marcolino, De Gruyter, Berlin 1981, p. 213: «Cum igitur per nullam experientiam possit convinci talis multitudo notitiarum seu quod sint tales plures notitiae aut quod volitio sit notitia, nec aliqua ratio evidens [...] nec aliqua auctoritas ad intellectum auctoris [...] relinquatur quod superflue et absque ratione ponitur».

³⁹ GREGORIUS DE ARIMINI, *Lectura super primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 2, ed. Trapp / Marcolino, p. 212: «Superflue ponit pluralitatem notitiarum et inutiliter seu superflue ponit aliquam rem esse notitiam [...] Nam secundum hanc opinionem cuiuscumque cognoscibilis sive complexe sive incomplexe significabilis aliqua volitio vel nolitio est notitia eiusdem, in eodem subiecto est alia notitia omnino idem

However this may be, Gregory is also skeptical whether volitional acts are cognitions. For we do not experience volitional acts in the same way as we experience cognitions. When we acquire new cognition we normally get to know something we didn’t know before or we get to know something differently than before. Gregory explains the second case with the following example: When I grasp the figure of an object by my sense of touch and later see the very same object, I experience that I know this object now differently than before. The distinction between knowing something new vs. knowing something differently might not be clear cut, but what matters here is only that new cognitions have an effect which we can be aware of. Yet, the case of emotions and other volitional acts seems different. When I begin to be angry about someone this alleged cognition does not add anything to my preceding cognition causing my anger. And it would be too good if I can simply add to my knowledge by willing something I didn’t will before⁴⁰.

From Wodeham’s perspective, Gregory’s argument from experience begs the question. A volitional cognition does of course not add anything that we could experience as knowledge acquisition, for such an experience only occurs in the case of non-volitional cognition. In making this criterion a requirement for all kind of cognition, Gregory presupposes in Wodeham’s view that there is no such thing as volitional cognition⁴¹. Yet, Gregory would very likely respond to this accusation by turning it against Wodeham himself. If these volitional cognitions have no phenomenological similarities to other – more familiar – forms of cognition, what reason is there to consider them as cognitions in the first place?

Gregory’s insistence that there is no good reason to accept volitional cognitions shows at least that he does not think that appetitive acts have to be cognitions to be ‘of’ and ‘about something’. But does he have a positive account of their intentionality? He says extremely little about this issue, but his response to one of Wodeham’s arguments gives us some hints. There he writes:

significans quae non est volitio nec nolitio. Et cum hoc illud aequae perfecte cognoscitur per solam notitiam quae non est volitio sicut per illam et volitionem simul, et per volitionem numquam absque alia notitia cognoscitur nec cognosci potest saltem naturaliter, ut ipsimet fatentur, igitur superflue prorsus illa foret notitia. Ut quid ergo ponitur?».

⁴⁰ GREGORIUS DE ARIMINI, *Lectura super primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 2, ed. Trapp / Marcolino, p. 213: «Si volitio esset secundum se quaedam notitia, cum de novo aliquid volumus quod prius cognoscebamus sed non volebamus, experiremur vel experiri possemus nos novam notitiam habere de illo seu nos aliter nosse quam prius, consequens autem falsum est. Nam, si video aliquid nec diligo nec odio et postea stante eadem notitia diligam, bene experiar me noviter diligere, sed non experiar aliter nosse aut aliam habere notitiam».

⁴¹ I reconstruct this response from Wodeham’s response to a similar challenge, namely to the objection that volitional acts are not cognitions because they are experienced differently than cognitions. See ADAMUS DE WODEHAM, *Lectura secunda in primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 5, § 3, ed. Wood / Gál, p. 277, ll. 30-33 and § 6, p. 284, ll. 36-38.

«But because God can take the place of all extrinsic causes, God can cause an act of vision without object and a volition without a cognition. And no more should it be called impossible for God that someone wills something unknown than that someone sees something non-existent»⁴².

The comparison with the vision of a non-existent object makes clear what Gregory has in mind. Under normal circumstances an extra-mental object is a (partial) cause of an act of seeing. However, thanks to his absolute power (*potentia Dei absoluta*) God could take up the causal role of the object and cause the act of vision directly. In the same way, God could take up the causal role played by the cognition that under normal circumstances causes the volition to occur. Gregory does not claim that God could cause acts of vision and volitions that are not of something (and have objects in this non-causal sense of object)⁴³. To say this would be extremely odd, for what is an act of seeing without something seen and what is a volition without something willed. Yet, if, as the divine intervention scenario makes clear, appetitive acts can at least in principle exist without cognitions, then the antecedent cognitions cannot, as on Thomas of Bailly's 'cooperation model', account for the intentionality these volitional acts.

From an ontological point of view, Gregory, like many other later medieval philosophers, considers mental acts of whatever kind as accidents of the category of quality. When I now see, for instance, a tree or a coffee cup, my soul (or its respective psychological power) has now acquired something that it didn't have before and that it will lose once I stop seeing the tree or the coffee cup. Such an act of vision behaves like an accident in the soul, for it can be present or absent without changing the nature of the underlying subject. Despite the fact that mental acts are about something and look therefore like relations, these later medieval authors insist that mental acts are absolute (i.e., non-relative) entities in general and qualities in particular⁴⁴. However, if we consider mental acts of any kind as simple accidental items, then we can only account for their intentional features in terms of the intrinsic or extrinsic properties of these accidents or,

⁴² GREGORIUS DE RIMINI, *Lectura super primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 2, ed. Trapp / Marcolino, p. 216: «Sed, quia deus omnem causalitatem extrinsecam supplere potest, ideo et sine obiecto visionem et sine notitiam volitionem potest causare nec magis reputari impossibile deo debet quod quis velit incognitum quam quod quis videat non existens».

⁴³ For medieval authors (as is also true for modern English) the term 'object' sometimes denotes the thing that causes a cognition and sometimes that to which a mental act is directed. In the passage mentioned above, Gregory uses the term 'object' only in the first sense.

⁴⁴ See, for instance, IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Quodlibet*, q. 13, ed. L. Wadding, XII, Lyon 1639 (repr. Olms, Hildesheim 1969), pp. 301-347. In this text Duns Scotus explicitly says that the although he's mainly dealing with the ontological nature of cognitive acts, his conclusions also apply to appetitive acts.

maybe, in terms of something primitive and non-reducible. At this point we can see that despite the obvious differences between Adam Wodeham and Gregory of Rimini, for Gregory too the question of the intentionality of the emotions and other appetitive acts collapses into a more general problem, namely the problem of how mental acts in general are about something. But how Gregory and others deal with this broader problem exceeds the scope of the present contribution⁴⁵.

Abstract: In recent philosophical debates about the nature of human emotions the intentionality of emotions plays a key part. The article explores how medieval philosophers of the late 13th and early 14th centuries accounted for the fact that our emotions, such as love, hate, anger and the like, are intentional mental states, states that are 'of' or 'about something'. Since medieval philosophers agree that emotions (passions of the soul) are essentially movements of the appetitive powers, the intentionality of emotions is part of the broader problem of the intentionality of our appetitive acts. Do emotions and other appetitive acts derive their intentionality from the relevant cognitive acts on which their occurrence depends? And if so, how? Are appetitive acts intrinsically intentional states? The contribution discusses these and similar questions, while special attention is given to authors such as Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, (Ps-)Thomas of Bailly, Adam Wodeham and Gregory of Rimini.

Key words: Emotions; Passions of the Soul; Intentionality; Appetitive Acts; Thomas Aquinas; Henry of Ghent; Thomas of Bailly; Adam Wodeham; Gregory of Rimini; Object of an Emotion; Imagination; *Potentia Dei absoluta*.

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⁴⁵ On this broader question see, e.g., D. PERLER, *Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter*, Klostermann, Frankfurt 2002; and for the case of a single author, G. PINI, *Can God Create My Thoughts? Scotus's Case against the Causal Account of Intentionality*, «Journal of the History of Philosophy» (forthcoming). Although Pini's article is mainly concerned with the intentionality of cognitive mental acts, Pini emphasizes, rightly in my view, that the conclusions also apply to the intentionality of appetitive acts.