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PHENOMENOLOGY
of
FEELING

*An Essay on the
Phenomena of the Heart*

Stephan Strasser

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Heart and Feeling

1. STATE OF MIND AS THYMIC MEDIUM OF EXPERIENCE¹

Let us take our point of departure from Krueger's claim that "the experiential qualities of this gathered whole are matters of feeling" and compare it with Stern's position that feeling is that psychic region in which life first crosses over into experience.² If we ask ourselves to which phenomena these statements properly apply, then it becomes clear to us that "feelings" in the ordinary sense can in no way be what is meant. Such experiences indeed have no relation to total-experience. Suppose that I attend a performance of "Othello." The feelings which the figure of Iago arouses in me are other than those which Desdemona awakens in me. While I detest Iago, I simultaneously experience inner sympathy with Desdemona. There can be no question here of that breadth of feeling that fills one's consciousness. It is also very significant that in certain cases we speak of "mixed feelings." Perhaps I look forward to a journey with mixed feelings, since the end pleases me but the travelling companions do not. One asks himself where we find here the relationship of feeling to the whole experience.

Still, it is certain that in their theoretical statements Krueger and Stern have a definite phenomenon in mind. What shall we call this twilight consciousness wherein life becomes experience? Shall we call it feeling, but say that it excludes all division into a plurality of feelings? Shall we say that it is formless, but that it aids everything which has form to achieve its form? In our prescientific life we call this phenomenon "disposition" (*Stimmung*).

Returning to the example of the performance of "Othello," one can say that I am directed to Iago with other intentional feelings than to Desdemona, but that both intentional strands come from a common source: the tragic disposition which animates me. Here we discover something basic: the medium and ground of all experiential life is formed by a simple, undifferentiated "being-in-a-mood" (*Zumutesein*) which changes only qualitatively and which precedes everything that has the character of an act. The intentional acts with their directedness and attunement to their objects stem from this dispositional subsoil. Insofar as they adjust themselves in different ways to their objects, they estrange themselves from their source and ground; but still, they always preserve something of their primordial tone. My sympathy with Desdemona is tragic interest. All my perceptions, evaluations, judgements and intentional feelings are colored and permeated by my tragic "being-in-a-mood." Of disposition – and of it alone – can it be said that it displays that breadth which fills one's consciousness.

This already shows that it is disposition, and not perception, which constitutes the elementary foundation of experience.³ Perception minimally presupposes a structural relation to its environment: for example, a figure which is contrasted with a ground, or a tone which is distinguishable from the preceding silence, and so forth. Perception occurs when I relate to "this" as other than "that." I fix upon the figure, but do not notice the ground; I perceive the tone, while the silence does not attract my attention at all, etc. Perception is the most basic form of self-direction-toward-another; it is necessarily perceiving consciousness *of something*, whereas disposition points to no intentional pole. Liveliness, for example, is not liveliness *of something*; and even less do depression, emptiness, cheerfulness or vigor refer to determinate objects. This is not to deny that depression has its causes – which must always be inductively determined. The condition of my central nervous system, which is perhaps the natural scientific *causa* of my being downcast, does not become a phenomenon for me. It is distinctly possible that I have a rational grasp of the causal connections that lie at the basis of my depression without thereby being able to be free

of my downcast condition. As is well known, the same is true of anguish (as distinguished from fear). One can *ad oculos demonstrare* the causes of his condition to one suffering from anguish without freeing him from his affliction. In analogous fashion, it is impossible to eliminate the condition of euphoric elevation through "counter-arguments." Disposition is too fundamental, it stands too close to life to be influenced by abstract knowledge without the mediation of feeling. It is a different matter where feelings appear in the mediating role: irritation can "spoil one's disposition"; a happy event "contributes to elevating one's disposition," and so forth.

Still, many also consider "happiness" and "irritation" as dispositions. Caution is required here since everyday terminology is not only inexact, but also inconsistent. If, as theoreticians, we distinguish the dispositional state of mind from everything that has an act-character, then we are partially deviating from the pre-scientific usage of language. We must therefore distinguish more carefully than usual between an irritated, angry, happy or anguished disposition on the one hand, and being irritated, angry, happy *about* something, being anxious *over* something on the other. In the first case, the irritation is "in the air" without the conscious apprehension of any motive for irritation. In the second case, we are directed, in the mode of feeling irritation, toward something: being irritated here has an object that is intentionally "meant."⁴ (The same is the case analogously with anger, happiness or anguish.) All these cases are characterized in everyday usage as "dispositions." It is clear that this is a mistake. In what follows we shall understand by disposition only a felt state of mind, pure being-in-a-mood. Krueger's statements about this notion of disposition are perfectly correct: disposition must be carefully distinguished from directed feelings.

Disposition in this narrower sense is always present. It is perfectly true that we perform technical tasks, mental operations and routine activities for the most part in a largely neutral state of feeling. When we are in this neutral state, we devote ourselves to the pole of our technical or scientific world with no feeling-intentions.

Yet this practical or theoretical behavior rests upon a quiet and sure being-in-a-mood which is also to be considered a disposition. Absent from, and unanticipated by such a state of mind are extreme levels of feeling and sudden shifts in the balance of feeling. This condition makes it easy for a man to turn himself to things, facts, states of affairs and objective results. Experiences of impulse and attraction play an extremely narrow role in this "setting." The man at the counter in the post office, for example, pays attention to the parcel delivery without giving place to any feelings of sympathy or antipathy. But here again, a fine distinction is necessary: we have, on the one hand, the "gray everyday disposition," free of all extremes and variations, and, on the other, the factual-technical attitude which nips in the bud anything like attraction, an attitude which grows from the everyday and, in any event, becomes habitual as the professional attitude. Only the first-named phenomenon can be considered disposition in our sense of the term.

But how is this related to the "indisposition" (*Ungestimmtheit*) of which Martin Heidegger speaks? What is that "often lasting, evenly balanced and pale indisposition" in which "Being-There (*Da-Sein*—roughly, human existence) becomes bored with itself"?⁵ Here, as Otto Friedrich Bollnow rightly recognized,⁶ we must distinguish two different notions of disposition. By disposition "in the usual sense" one perhaps characterizes a certain balance of feeling which can of course be completely destroyed by ill-humor (*Verstimmung*). Yet Heidegger speaks of a primordial being-disposed (*Gestimmtsein*) in which the There of Being-There becomes a phenomenon: as burden, as liberation, as boredom, as nausea, etc. Disposition in this sense has nothing to do with inner balance. It is an a priori essential feature of human Being-There of, in Heidegger's terminology: an existential.

Now what is the relation between primordial being-in-a-mood and the acts of striving, knowing, evaluating and feeling which are directed to the world and the environment?

First, there is a dynamic relation. Krueger's expressions "matrix" and "fertile culture-medium" shed light on one side of this relation. From the thymic source spring acts of a determinate na-

ture which reveal what slumbers in the depths of intimate being-in-a-mood. Perhaps out of an irritated disposition "grow" sullen, aggressive modes of behavior; a happy disposition expresses itself in intimate, playful, open behavior, etc.

But on the other hand, all that "pushes toward" us in our becoming aware of the world and in our intimacy with the world, can move us and resonate in our innermost center. Stirring, shaming, exalting events, successes, defeats, harmonious or inharmonious forms of coexistence — they all have their dispositional reverberations. The echo of our state of mind should not, of course, be confused with explicit acts of attending. Whatever is noticed, recognized, evaluated, striven for, avoided, etc., is always an object of intentional acts. But ultimately everything lived through and experienced condenses itself into the form of a no longer intentional being-in-a-mood. Perhaps for a long time we have been "miserable over" the death of a beloved relative. Now, when we are less often mindful of the sorrowful loss, we are still only "sadly disposed." The miserable event scarcely "appears" anymore as a thematic object, but the "sad mood" functions as the non-intentional residue of what we have intentionally lived through.

If we accept Krueger's description of feeling as "the fertile culture-medium," we interpret this image in a double way: feeling is, on the one hand, the ground which allows various living things to grow out of itself; it is, on the other hand, the fruitful earth which, unnoticed, takes into itself the decaying and withering parts of the plants — and, concurrently, all kinds of seed for further new life. This "pure feeling" is, as we have seen, identifiable with the dispositional state of mind. It is the enviroing aspect of psychic life, as Stern recognized. Inherent in it is the tendency to obliterate all distinctions, to blend all differences in an experience of the whole, to let the various intentional poles dissolve in a single dispositional being-in-a-mood.

Even the so-called "lucid disposition," which sometimes appears in intoxicating and ecstatic situations, only apparently furnishes an exception to this rule. One understands by "lucid disposition" the state of inner elevation which appears to give wings

to the power of knowing, to insight, to the power of thought. Here we must carefully distinguish between the situation of increasing, intensive spiritual life and the acts of knowing – actual or supposed – which grow therefrom. Insights themselves lack the character of being states of mind. However, the consciousness of ease, of keenness of hearing and of exultation with which the human spirit seems to triumph over all obstacles, is dispositional. So it is that this same ecstatic exultation can often form the maternal-soil for genuine and ingenious intuitions, and often for pseudo-disclosures as well. As a case in point, one can take Nietzsche's ecstatic exaltation in which he believed he possessed "divination, the power of understanding with only the slightest aid, with any least suggestion."⁷ To the class of pseudo-disclosures belong the numerous phenomena attributable to poison, intoxication or pathological conditions of which physicians, psychiatrists and psychologists inform us.⁸ Typical here is the absence of critical sense, the lack of inner coherence which characterize many of these results achieved in the condition of exaltation.⁹ In every case the feeling of being illumined, as a disposition, offers no proof of the authenticity of the intellectual and artistic illumination which proceeds from it. It is what it is. Spiritual intuitions, on the contrary, are sometimes real intuitions, sometimes mere illusions. Such illusions originate in the winged, intoxicated, triumphal disposition.

The tendency toward division is prominent, above all, in intentional performances, which grow out of a being-directed-to-this and a turning-oneself-to-that. Thus multiplicity of directions, division, differentiation and relative independence of one act from another already appear. The intentional performances separate themselves both from the thymic subsoil and from one another.

In order to clarify the essential relations that govern this whole area, let us have recourse to a simile.¹⁰ One can take as a theoretical model the image of a fountain. The water in the basin forms a unitary, undifferentiated mass; it would be comparable to the formless state of mind. The fluid is then divided into jets and ejected in different directions; the jets are – in Husserl, Scheler

and Pfänder – an image of the separate and directed intentional performances. The finely atomized drops of water sink back unnoticed into the basin: this process would be comparable to the self-mixing, self-obliterating and self-canceling of experience.¹¹ Finally, all the drops are again dissolved into the water of the basin, enclosed by and united within a single mass: this is reminiscent of the process of reimmersion. But the basin is the medium from which everything originates and in which all is finally united; it "gives and takes at the same time," like Conrad Ferdinand Meyer's Roman fountain. This again can also be taken as a symbol of the "medium" of life and experience. Disposition is both the active-receptive center of experience and the mediator between Bios, Pathos and Logos.

2. TRANSOBJECTIVITY AND TRANSUBJECTIVITY OF DISPOSITION

For the most part we can trace the dominant error in the older psychological literature to a failure to distinguish between the phenomena of disposition and those of feeling. Does an objectivating role belong to "feeling" or is feeling "purely subjective?" Is it dependent on a knowledge "element" or can it also appear apart from that? All these questions one can answer with a "no" or a "yes" according to whether it is a matter of a state of mind or of being-directed in a felt manner. Perhaps Theodor Lipps' characterization of "the felt" as "an immediately lived condition of mine,"¹² applies to many forms of thymic being-in-a-mood. But it is not true of the felt act of conviction [*Gesinnung*] which Alexander Pfänder makes the point of departure of his investigations.¹³ A scientific discussion of the life of feeling evidently can first produce fruitful results when its object has been clearly delineated phenomenologically.

Still, apart from that, talk about the "pure subjectivity of feeling" urgently needs to be tested. Even if we take Lipps'¹⁴ aforementioned statement with respect to purely thymic feeling

inner and outer reality in primordial unity. And precisely as a result of the accord between outer and inner occurrences, he is able with a few plain words, to conjure up the parting-mood.

Here the essence of disposition manifests itself: disposition is not "purely subjective"; it is transsubjective, and trans-objective as well. It precedes the subject-object dichotomy which our knowing, evaluating, striving, intending, and opining consciousness usually produces. Disposition is feeling for the All – that is, it is a feeling in which all, even oneself, is co-felt, empathetically understood. For proof, invert the statement. The more a feeling takes on the characteristics of a feeling of the All, the more dispositional character it will display. If religious reality becomes All for me, then I am religiously disposed. If I see in all things only one terrible danger, then I find myself in a panic disposition. In disposition the prepredicative, preintentional unity of subject and object becomes a matter of living experience.

3. FEELING OF THE ALL AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF BEING

The discovery that the thymic experience in its dull formlessness appears to realize the goal which attracts the human spirit at the highest levels of metaphysical meditation, a consciousness encompassing the opposition between subject and object – this discovery will at first seem astonishing. Precisely on that account we ought not to draw hasty conclusions. First of all, we must point out that the unity of what is dispositionally experienced bears the stamp of primitivity. It excludes the thematic prominence of a single object pole; it refers only to the diffuse, undifferentiated totality. The fact that in disposition the boundaries between I and World disappear has nothing immediately to do with transcendental infinity. That which, at the level of the Logos, is spoken of as "Being," appears at the thymic level simply as the "All," as unison of I and Cosmos, I and society, I and world. The human Logos grasps – if only in a rudimentary fashion – the transcendental unity of Being. The Logos knows why the All is an All; it possesses understanding of Being. Disposition, on the contrary, lives the All-Encompassing,

without being able to grasp it. The expression "feeling of oneness" [*Einsföhlung*] which Scheler has employed¹⁷ would be well suited to characterize the thymic phenomenon.

Still, the question persists whether there is only an external similarity between the primitive experience of the Whole and the transcendental openness of the human spirit. Might it really be a question here of an accidental similarity? Are we not here concerned with a *coincidentia oppositorum*, with a completely non-accidental agreement of the first beginning and end-result of an immanent process? How can this be if the process of human consciousness proceeds from undifferentiated unity through differentiated plurality to differentiated plurality-in-unity? If it leads upwards from a dumb, formless state of mind, beyond multiply-oriented, world-directed intentions, to an enlightened transcendental view?

Whoever questions the relation between two extremes will seek the connecting middle term. The middle term in the actual-genetic and onto-genetic development of human consciousness would be, as we have already said, the acts of world-perception and world-concern. We believe we know these acts in their everydayness very well. We are also prepared to ascribe to them immediately an ultimate unity. Still, it is extremely difficult to say something philosophically valid about this. What is the status of the unity of our "dwelling in the pregiven world" (Husserl) by way of knowing, evaluating, striving, desiring, and so forth? Why is "the" world pregiven as a world? Why is the I always and necessarily directed to a content in the mode of "knownness" [*Bewußtheit*], and why does this knownness form a unity (Natorp)? Why is the basis [*Woraufhin*] of the encounterability [*Begegnenlassens*] of a being (Heidegger) always understood as the same basis?

One thing is certain: to this question a philosophy which is merely a philosophy of intentionality or of consciousness will give us no answer.¹⁸ If consciousness is apriori subjective consciousness of an object, on what preestablished harmony rests this peculiar directedness of subject to object and vice-versa? But if consciousness is world-constituting spirit, how do we explain the relation of

constituting to constituted? And why is the world always already pre-given?

Without going into the ontological aspects of this set of problems here, we will content ourselves with casting doubt upon the correctness of the presuppositions at the base of a philosophy of intentionality and consciousness. Phenomenological analysis shows that there is consciousness which is not consciousness of an object, which knows nothing of the "confrontation" of the object — of its *objekt*: it is consciousness at the level of disposition. For the ontologist this contains a significant clue. The split of being into being-subject and being-object, into intending-being and being-intended, into constituting-being and being-constituted apparently does not belong to the fundamental structure of reality as it makes its appearance. Philosophical anthropology will have to ask itself, above all in this connection, whether the primordial being-disposed which encompasses me and my world does not constitute the elementary presupposition for all my world-perception and world-concern.

It seems desirable to refer to the results of our investigations into the experience of attraction. Whatever is known by way of feeling — as we saw — is the individual-concrete being in a global sense. Now, one's own I is one pole of concrete individuality which is first brought into relief in I-feeling, self-feeling, feeling of particularity, and so forth.¹⁹ On the other hand, the world is a massive, concrete and individual object to which the I is necessarily related in its struggle for self-realization. This, too, is first revealed in feeling, and, indeed, in so-called world-feeling. World-feeling is the dispositional horizon of our commerce with the world. As Lersch strikingly remarks, it is "a pervasive disposedness of human existence by which we are always already related to the world as the region of meaning [*Sinnbestand*]."²⁰ But the absolute concretion must then lie in that unity which sustains, makes possible and holds together me and my world as beings. In the grasp of this ultimate unity all understanding of the pre-givenness of the world and of the puzzling "basis of the encounterability of a being" must also be grounded. According to Sartre, "the concrete is man

in the world with that special oneness of man with the world."²¹ If, now, the individual-concrete in its global character is primordially apprehended in a felt manner, why should it be any different in the case of the absolutely individual and concrete?

In addition, there is the following consideration: It is evident that a certain receptiveness for Being must be proper to human existence from the very beginning. Any contrary interpretation meets the same objection which we have already made in our criticism of Sartre and in the analysis of the human act.²² Of course, if the understanding of Being came from without, from whence should it stem? Why should it surface precisely in this — actual-genetic or ontogenetic — phase of development? Why would it be related precisely to that individual object? Further: how could it be added without being "*ac-cidens*," that which occurs to, that which "plays-along-with" [*Bei-spielenden*]? Because it is actually at the foundation, penetrating consciousness from the very beginning like a leaven and urging it towards development?

So there remains only the assumption that the understanding of Being is not realized in the primitive feeling of the All, but dwells in it as an ideal-possibility. The unfolding of this primordial openness, then, would ensue through the laborious path of clarification, differentiation, setting-in-relation — in short, through the objectivating development of consciousness. The concept of *on ē on* would be the final crown of a step-by-step process where each level of knowing would constitute the basis for the following. But the primordial experience of the unity of being would be the basic foundation of every differentiation and unfolding of meaning.

Our manner of treating the problem contains, at the same time, a clear rejection of the trichotomous position. By trichotomy we understand that doctrine, very influential in philosophical anthropology since Kant, according to which feeling would be a principle of spiritual receptivity and efficacy alongside knowing and striving (desiring). In recent times, Theodore Haecker²³ and John Macmurray,²⁴ among others, have been eloquent advocates of this position. Our objections against the trichotomous anthropology can be summarized as follows: What we mean by the spirit-

ual in man is the same as what we understand by the double form of being as being-true and being-valuable. Such a transcendental understanding is foreign to feeling. The phenomenology of pure feeling – of dispositions – shows precisely that proper to feeling there is indeed a certain openness for Being, but not a grasp of Being. To be sure, a continuing immanent development can lead from the felt apprehension of the All to authentic transcendental insights. Still, one ought not fail to note how feeling forms the necessary, but not the sufficient condition of this ascending process. In none of its forms can spiritual operation be “explained” by feeling.

4. THE PHENOMENON AND CONCEPT OF THE HEART

One's state of mind can become a phenomenon in two distinct forms: as pure disposition or as the being-disposed of the whole experience and behavior of a moment. The psychologist will consider the occurrence of a pure disposition as a relatively rare event. He finds it only where experience, after a certain stagnation, begins to organize itself basically anew, as, for example, in waking from a deep sleep, from unconsciousness, from anaesthesia, and so forth; further, in those rare moments of complete “absence of mind” and dim awareness. – Think of the simple, familiar process of waking from sleep. One awakens “in a good mood” or “ill-humored,” “anxious” or “irritated.” The actual state of mind forms, as it were, a psychic seed from which the series of intentional acts grows – acts which do not disavow their origin and its peculiar qualities. The behavior of one awaking in the condition of anxiety will be significantly different from that of one who awakes in a good mood. Likewise the notion is very widespread that one who “gets out of bed with his left foot” remains ill-humored, irritable and unruly for the rest of the day. In everyday life we therefore take into account the fact that disposition forms the point of departure and of contact for a certain mode of behavior.

Thus it is clear how pure disposition relates to that being-disposed which finds expression in living experience and activity.

Here it is a question of the same reality which manifests itself at one time immediately and at another time in a mediate manner. For example, “groundless” maldisposition as a phenomenon first rules the field. Later disposition as such no longer appears. Irritated, angry, aggressive acts come to the fore. No longer is it “the” world that is grasped by the subject, but beings in the world – however, in such a way that they remain permeated by the inharmonious state of mind: men then appear offensive, their modes of behaviour grotesque and churlish; indeed, even lifeless things turn out to be evil monsters, etc. What gives the “irritated” perception and concern for the world its inner unity and form is the ill-humor expressed therein assuming this or that quality. It forms the substratum of all that occurs on the higher levels. From the point of view of actual-genesis, one would have to maintain there is a development: if, in its first phase, disposition is preintentional lived-experience, in the following stages, as being-disposed, it is the nourishing ground for intentional lived-experience.

For psychological theory it would now be important to have a concept at one's disposal (1) which characterized disposition in its dual role: as pure disposition and as the being-disposed of living experience; (2) which marks this disposition or being-disposed in its – actual or essentially possible – relation to spiritual processes. The term “heart” [*Gemüt*] seems to answer to this need. We must distinguish “heart” thus used from the loose and ambiguous usage of the term in modern society and in philosophic language – with Kant, “*Gemüt*” is practically a synonym for soul. We must fix it in one of its many meanings and thereby change it into an expression of philosophical-psychological art. This change is the less objectionable since in our time many words – e.g. “experience,” “form,” “structure” – have undergone a similar change.

For the inquiries necessary here into the notion of “heart” we can make use of the analyses of Phillip Lersch.²⁵ Lersch distinguishes essentially three different areas of meaning:

(1) First, one can signify by “heart” the essential kernel of that “which is wholly or partially involved in relations like respect for others, altruism, devotion, charity, community feeling.” Lersch

The Preintentional Level

1. ELEMENTARY STRUCTURE OF THE SIMPLE PERFORMANCES

Let us start out from the position that every act has its beginning and its end. From this assertion, which sounds so self-evident, important consequences follow. In order to see this it is certainly necessary to become acquainted with the notions "its beginning" and "its end." It appears advisable to us to consider in this connection the conception of Paul Guillaume, who is thoroughly imbued with the approach of positive science. According to Guillaume, for an act to tend towards its end means that the performance of the act is the sole possibility for removing the tension which lies at the base of the act. If a hungry animal seeks food, this activity forms an actual unity. "It is one act which has a beginning and an end and whose consequences react upon their causes according to definite laws."¹ Whether this conception is so completely free from metaphysical implications as Guillaume thinks, we will leave undecided. We limit ourselves, first of all, to the more modest position that if the same tension lies at the base of an act, and if the end of this tension influences its beginning according to definite laws, the act in question has its beginning and its end. In other words, this means that the act does not begin somehow and somehow end, but that *it begins in order to end*. Whether in this way the state of tension must be ascribed to the individual organism or to the organism in its implication with its environment; whether the organism experiences in a conscious manner or runs its course

without consciousness; whether the end is anticipated notionally or not; all these are secondary problems which can only be solved through empirical means. For us only one thing is significant: that the act is brought into play in order to be "per-fected" ["voll-zogen"].

Now it appears to us that such performances constitute an essential feature of life. Processes which occur in lifeless material do not display this anticipation of the end in the beginning. Electrons circle about an atomic nucleus or planets about a sun on the basis of a definite constellation. If the constellation changes, the processes likewise change. They have no beginning and no end as far as they themselves are concerned. They are caused by an event in the physical world and last as long as this cause operates. The beginning and the end of the process are externally induced; they have the character of an accident. The end does not react upon the beginning. Thus the process does not bear the ground of its unity in itself.

Already in the region of vegetative life things are different. In the growth of a plant as a whole, but likewise in the various phases of its development of which each has its beginning and its end, a peculiar rhythm is manifest which is not exclusively imposed from without. The development and its temporal course cannot be completely explained on the basis of the causal influence of the environment. Thus in this connection we speak of *performances* or *Vollzügen*. In German this expression indicates a "move" [*Zug*], a *motus*, which, setting out from its beginning, tends to its end, and, indeed, up to the time the move is completed [*der Zug voll ist*].

Thus already we have named the three moments appearing in the act: the tending, its beginning and its end, each requiring clarification. In order in this way to keep firm phenomenological ground under foot, we begin with our analysis of impulsive activity.²

a. The Experience of One's Own Neediness

I become aware of my hunger, thirst, freezing, and so forth. If it is a matter of real pressure-activity, I cannot immediately af-

firm that I simultaneously "suspect" or even "know" that there is something which quiets my hunger, relieves my thirst, etc. On the contrary, I can say with certainty that everything occurs as if I possess such a presentiment. The situation which can obtain the end to my uneasiness is always "there for me" as an ideal-possibility. In what way it is there for me, whether or not I anticipate it instinctively, in imagination or in awareness of it as a goal can only be determined through research in empirical psychology. In every case, the end-situation already lies hidden in the beginning of the performance. From the tension between my factual neediness and the possible enrichment of my being arises a positive attending which expresses itself first of all in the form of unrest, searching, groping, testing and so forth.

This holds analogously for aversion. I somehow experience my vulnerability, my being threatened, my being in distress. Simultaneously the possibility of avoiding destruction, of escaping danger, of averting hostility is present to me. Once more we must affirm that it need not be a matter of psychic anticipation of the *finis*. The end that is present can likewise simply lie in the direction of a vital tendency. In which of my "levels" my elementary receptivity for the idea of self-assertion makes its case, a negative experience of impulse, which leads to flight or defence, arises from the contest between my factually being-threatened and my ideal-possible self-preservation.

Let us call the first phase of performance *the inchoative phase*. It is characterized on the one hand by a positive or negative impulse — an *inclinatio ad accessum vel recessum*; on the other hand, by a determinate temporal structure. My prospective comportment corresponds to the inchoative phase of my activity. Through my being directed toward that which is to come, the future enrichment or preservation of my being is "there" for me. Thus the end of the performance is already seminally prefigured in its beginning.

b. The Experience of Being-Underway

It is clear that the performance of the act does not coincide with the beginning of the motion. The meaningful possibility toward which I tend indeed always has the form of goods or constellations of goods. These goods are partially material, partially accessible only through the mediation of matter (for example, speech, mime, symbolization, gesture). The goods to which we are drawn are found at some time and in some place. Between us and them a spatio-temporal or temporal distance yawns. If we are needy, then we must "seek" and "search for" something; that means, we must come to know the where and when of this something, betake ourselves to a determinate place at a definite time, take possession of this something, and so forth. Likewise in flight or in resistance against a concrete evil, spatio-temporal or temporal relations play a role. In short, the traversal of a definite way follows on positive as well as negative impulse. Indeed, being-underway is an essential feature of the "move" or *motus*.

Talk about the "way" is, of course, image-talk; in no case need it be interpreted in the spatio-temporal or physicalist sense. For the philosopher everything is a way which leads to ideal-meaningful realization. He treats everything as *ea quae sunt ad finem*, things which contribute to the realization of the idea. Likewise in the case of so-called "purely immanent" acts, we must traverse a "distance" in this sense. Assume that we have to solve a mathematical problem. To that end we must perform a series of mental operations of which one is always grounded in the results of the others. These partial activities are quite appropriately called the "steps" of our discursive thinking. While we perform them we are spiritually underway, and indeed, up to the time we have discovered the solution of our problem. The difference from the first example is to be seen simply in this, that our thoughtful progress occurs in time and not in space-time.³

There is still a third essential form of "the way" in which the familiar picture generally leaves us in the lurch. In this neither the spatio-temporal nor the temporal distance plays a role. It is a

matter of performances which have already partially attained meaning. Here being-underway lies in the tendency of lessening the "partiality" and finally reducing it to nothing. We shall explain later wherein this most primitive form of the way consists and to which levels of life it corresponds.⁴

What now are the essential features of the phase of being-underway? First, it is characterized by a continuance of positive or negative directedness. Of course, a significant distinction must be made here. Approaching the desired good brings with it a heightening of the impulse. The prey that is almost captured, the piece of work that is almost completed, the truth that is almost discovered exercise a powerful incentive toward the completion of the act. On the other hand, the power of a negative impulse diminishes with the increasing distantiation from the evil to be avoided. If we are somewhat removed from something dangerous or repulsive, if we have gotten rid of an oppressor, then we relax, we become apathetic, and careless.

As far as the temporal structure of the second phase is concerned, we must hold to a double orientation of the subject: he is directed to the future as well as to the past. This characteristic finds its explanation in the nature of the phenomenon itself. Being-underway means being *no longer* at the point of departure and *not yet* at the end-point. Accordingly, the experience of being in motion, of *motus*, means that we are aware of coming from somewhere and tending towards somewhere else. Such awareness, which ought not be identified with goal-consciousness, governs pressure-activity as well. In this way both poles of the dialectical tension are joined and held apart in one consciousness at the same time. From the factual situation of the beginning, what had been a partially unrealized fact occurs, while the imminent possibility of the end shines before us as a fact not yet fully realized. The "no longer" and the "not yet" are present at the same time. Accordingly, the temporal structure of this phase of experience is retrospective as well as prospective. To be sure, the distinction just indicated holds here likewise insofar as the prospective line of sight dominates in the positive impulse, and the retrospective in the negative.

In tending toward something the anticipation of the future end-state predominates; in tending away from something, the recall of the past beginning-state predominates. Yet in spite of the predominance of one line of vision, the other is also present, so that the tension which constitutes the driving power of the act continues.

c. The Experience of Termination

However else the result of the act may turn out, awareness that it has been performed as this act inevitably presents itself. The desired good will be attained or lost, the work perfected or bungled, the solution of the problem found by the method adopted or not. Thus the act ends. (The essential possibility that in one act a second, indeed an interconnected series of acts, are included must be explored later; they do not belong to the elementary structure of the act.) What phenomenologically characterizes being-completed as such is a certain — at least inward — inactivity, a resting, a lingering with the result. The result of the act fills us completely for a moment. As L. Vander Kerken noted, for a moment it is "everything" for us.⁵ This tarrying is made possible through the power of the impulse setting out towards the attainment of the end-point. In consequence of this, for a moment there is no more striving, but rather rest, no more seeking but rather having-found, no more working but rather contemplation.

Of course there are essential distinctions that follow here from the fact that the result of the act can be positive or negative. The result can be a happy or a sad "All" for us. The possession of the desired good, the successful completion of a work, the discovery of the truth sought fill us with "satisfaction". That means that for a moment we "tarry in tranquility" after traversing the way. No distance separates us anymore from what we longed for. The tension between facticity and ideal-possibility is removed. We can devote ourselves to contemplation, meditation, enjoyment, without being driven by the goad of unrest.

If we turn to the experience of negative termination, another picture presents itself. The awareness of conclusively losing the

desired good, of completely ruining our work, of definitively missing the truth sought by the method adopted, totally fills us. Here also an important moment presents itself; but this time it is a matter of considering the complete separation from one another of facticity and ideal-possibility. The tension is removed, not through a convergence, but through a separation between fact and idea. It is clear that this termination will show itself in terms of sorrow, sadness and grief.

The temporal structure of the end-phase is the same in both cases. We live completely in the exulting or depressing present. No distance breaks the moment of termination into various temporal ecstasies. Employing Husserl's terminology, one could say: it is completely present tarrying, contemplating, being permeated. The experience of termination is thus neither prospective nor retrospective: it consists in the perfectly pure and undiluted assimilation to oneself of what is present.

2. GOVERNANCE BY FEELING IN THE SIMPLE PERFORMANCE

We will begin with the fact that at the level of Pathos the human act is governed by feelings. This fact, which is emphasized by many psychologists — even overemphasized by many — cannot be doubted. It is, of course, true that in real decisions and in the solution of objective problems we set to work rationally, pass reasonable judgments, draw logical conclusions, form motives and weigh them against one another. On the other hand, it is likewise certain that we carry out most of the concrete activities of our lives according to a schema that is fixed in its broad outlines. Still, the automation and technicizing of life itself within the framework of our modern civilization has its limits. In every moment of our existence we receive impressions not foreseen within the plan of our life, of which many slip away unnoticed by us; but many others give rise to "intuitive," "spontaneous," "instinctive" activity. Further, finding and weighing motives is not accomplished exclusively according to the rules of formal logic. Likewise, we do not

have charts at our disposal on which we have simply to read off the value of each and every concrete good. The concrete is indeed, by reason of its concreteness, unique and thus never fully comparable. In short, there is a certain "stratum" of human behavior where governance by feeling has great importance. We might not go as far as Pierre Janet who characterized feelings without further qualification as "regulations of activity."⁶ Maurice Pradines likewise exaggerates when he characterizes the life of feeling as the dynamic aspect of the life of perception.⁷ Both men see that human feelings are normally called upon to prepare for spiritual acts and to complement them. We simply maintain that in ontogenesis and in actual-genesis there is a stage of primitive turning-towards-the-world whose meaningful course is secured by felt-impulses. Within this sphere and on this level one can speak of feeling as governing human acts.

It is further evident that such regulative experiences must be characterized as feelings in the narrower sense of the term.⁸ Indeed, a certain being-directed to concrete good or evil, to situations that promise or threaten values is proper to them. Thus the question lies at hand whether from this position a preliminary overview of the directed feelings might not be undertaken. The basic notion which lies at the base of such an attempt would be this, that acts governed by feeling do not simply explode into the "outer world" from an affectively laden "inner world"; that they rather represent the self-engagement of a subject with the world and that such a self-engagement displays a typology that is to be apprehended eidetically. It would then be methodologically significant to investigate feelings first of all from the standpoint of their possible roles in the governance of the elementary performances.

That there are typical phases and modes of felt self-direction-towards . . . we have already convinced ourselves. Now it is no longer difficult to show wherein the regulative operation of feeling consists in connection with the eidetic of the phases. The performances get started through experiences of impulse; they are led further through the experience of being-underway, up to the point

where a result occurs; finally they are ended through terminating experience. This basic conception is to be connected with the other similarly elementary notion that impulse can be rooted in the experience of one's own neediness or one's own vulnerability. Accordingly, from the felt impulse a turning-towards or a turning-away-from develops. Both notions are thus to be taken in a very broad sense. It is then clear that the tendency toward taking something to oneself and assimilating it is also to be treated as turning-toward, while that towards expulsion and resistance should be considered as turning-away-from.⁹ Finally, the terminating experience climaxes in an awareness of enrichment and elevation, or in the awareness of impoverishment and injury to one's own existence.

If we consider these notions together, we can represent the governance by feeling of the simple performances in the form of the following scheme:

Inchoative Experience, Experience of Impulse, <i>prospective</i>	Experience of <i>motus</i> , Lived Being-underway, <i>Prospective and retro- spective</i>	Terminating Experience Lived Termination, <i>presential</i>
Lived Neediness	Lived Tending-toward and Absorption; Lived Turning-toward	Lived Elevation of One's Being
Lived Vulnerability	Lived Tending-Away- From, Expulsion, Resistance, Lived Turning-Away	Lived Injury to One's Being ¹⁰

It is now evident that what we have called the governance by feeling of the simple performances is prefigured in Thomistic philosophy under the heading *passiones concupiscibiles*. These *pas-*

siones are, according to Thomas, those which release, guide and bring to rest the *actus sensitivae virtutis appetitivae* – of course, only when the object of the act constitutes *bonum vel malum sensibile simpliciter acceptum*.¹¹ Thus Aquinas arrives at the following order of the primary felt-governances:¹²

<i>Inclinatio</i>	<i>Motus</i> (<i>accessus vel recessus</i>)	<i>Quietatio</i>
<i>Amor</i>	<i>desiderium vel concupiscentia</i>	<i>delectatio vel gaudium</i>
<i>Odium</i>	<i>fuga vel abominatio</i>	<i>dolor vel tristitia</i>

3. THE PREINTENTIONAL LIFE

Are there actually human acts whose regulation by feeling rests upon such a simple mechanism? This question cannot be answered by a “yes” or a “no” without further qualification. What we have presented until now was the model of a simple performance. The elementary structure of a releasing, governing and terminating dynamism of feeling was laid bare. This elementary structure, of course, lies at the base of human activity as well, yet it is brought to light from essential grounds different than the form thusfar described.¹³ Our insight into the presence and nature of the basic structure we owe solely to indirect inferences and analyses of certain boundary phenomena of which we shall still speak.¹⁴ We must therefore establish that the concrete, specifically human acts in no way correspond to our schema.

To show this is not difficult. The governance of an act which we have thusfar sketched is characterized by automaton-like inflexibility. It involves everything “good” being unreservedly desired

and incorporated, everything “bad” unconditionally resisted or expelled. Turning from a *bonum* and turning to a *malum* is indeed excluded on the basis of the impulses described up to this point. From this it follows likewise that an active choice of the greater good or of the lesser evil does not come into question. Just as little can a being for which the elementary governance so described suffices, tend towards a lesser good for the sake of one more valuable or accept a lesser evil in order to avoid a destructive evil. For such a being there is a “way” only in the sense of the not-yet-good or the no-longer-evil. This being could not apprehend the fact that the way itself is valuable since it leads to what is desired or leads away from what is dangerous. In short, it could experience no situations. It could not live in a milieu but only in *its* milieu.

But now the further question arises whether to every act of noticing, perceiving, striving and operating belongs the essential possibility of turning to or away from an object, be it good or bad. Perceptual awareness is indeed, as we know today, not comparable to a universal mirror in which reality is automatically reflected. Rather, perception can only be ascribed to the living being which inwardly takes possession of certain aspects of reality in acts of becoming aware, of knowledge by acquaintance and of experience. But for this is required a spontaneous self-directing – likewise to something dangerous – and self-averting – likewise from something life-dispensing. The living being which, for example, wants to become aware of the distinction between a good and an evil, must in principle be able to turn itself away from the first and toward the latter. But this would be impossible within the framework of elementary governance. The being whose performance we have thusfar described adheres in a certain way to the valuable elements of its milieu and sensitively draws back from the harmful. From this we can see that *the simple performances are functions of life and not of experience*. Acts of noticing, perceiving, striving, operating – in short, any and all conscious acts – do not belong in this category.

If we ask for what level the simple performances are characteristic, we will point with great clarity to the vegetative level of

life. We find these life-forms appear most clearly in the plants. The plant is, indeed, a being of contact. The desired contact will be secured in every way through leaf-surface, root-system, filaments, pistils, respiration, suction, scattering of seeds or spores, and so forth; undesired contact is avoided with the help of thorns, spikes, fuzz, nettles, closing of pores, turning or shedding leaves and so forth. Thus the plant remains in the most intimate possible contact with the materials from which it lives; thus it tends away from the harmful elements of its environment.

Here, of course, we encounter a serious objection. Do we then find in the vegetative realm the typology of phases we have sketched? Is the plant not always already in possession of vital goods? Is this continuity of possession not actually a condition for the possibility of its being? Is it not like the giant Antaeus who would immediately die if he had to be without life-dispensing contact with Mother Earth?

Here it is clear that talk of "phases" must ultimately be considered as metaphorical. One must not necessarily think of temporally sequential stages such as can be observed in human and animal activity. The "phases" can also appear simultaneously. Now, this simultaneity is quite characteristic of vegetative organisms. While certain parts of the Plant are separated from vital goods through an extreme mass of intermediaries, others stand in indirect contact with them, and again others in immediate contact. These static assertions can be completed by a dynamic consideration: while many functions have a consuming [*Verbrauch*] character so that in a conscious entity the experience of lack is produced, there are others devoted to carrying and distributing — corresponding to a turning towards and away from, and again others are devoted to retention — which would be experienced by a conscious entity as an enhancement of its own being. The plant, therefore, in each moment of its being simultaneously combines inchoative, attracting-or-repelling and terminating forms of performance. One could likewise say that it always begins, always is underway and always partially completes itself. Only what appears in an animal environment as a spatio-temporal path is given for the plant with the dis-

tance of the parts. Accordingly, the vegetative organism tends to increase indefinitely those of its surfaces which stand in direct contact with vital goods and to reduce toward nothingness those separated from them. It is thus entirely possible to see in this tending a meaningful *appetitus*. Yet the notion of an intentional object-pole for vegetative performances is completely untenable.

In summary, we maintain that there can be no consciousness, no intention, no noticing and striving on the vegetative level. Goals in the proper sense, that is, goods which must be attained by traversing a medium that is not good-in-itself, are inconceivable in the realm of vegetative life. We find here indeed a being-underway, but no way in the narrow sense; a *tendere*, but no *intendere*. We therefore characterize this level of life as *preintentional*.

4. PRINCIPLE OF RESULT AND PRINCIPLE OF FUNCTION

Let us return to the elementary structure of the human act and its governance by feeling. Let us assume that the tone of this feeling can be described by the twin categories of pleasure and displeasure.¹⁶ Let us ask how pleasure and displeasure must be distributed over the various phases of the simple performance. It is then clear that the discovery of one's own neediness or vulnerability would in every case be colored by displeasure; that, in being-underway toward a good, prospective pleasure would predominate; in the flight from a threatening evil, retrospective displeasure; but that only the undisturbed possession of the good or security from all dangers could provide actual enjoyment. All this has reference to the successfully accomplished act. Here real pleasure first occurs with the result of the act. The act is, as we will maintain from now on, structured according to the *principle of result*.

Let us now perform a thought-experiment. Let us imagine a vegetative organism which would be capable of the feelings of pleasure and displeasure. In this case there would be no talk of a feeling-tone which changes with the rhythm of the phases. In the vegetative realm stratified contemporaneous functions correspond to the temporal division of human and animal acts. The pleasure-

displeasure impulses described therefore do not come into question in the governance of vegetative performances. But a still more primitive governance by feeling is conceivable. It would simply consist in increasing pleasure appearing in the better outcome, progressive displeasure in the worse outcome of the performance. In other words, the pleasure of our imaginary plant would be wholly and simply *pleasure of an organ* [*Organlust*]. (In opposition to the sensualist conception, by this we understand, among instances of the pleasure of an organ, the experience of the heightening of life which develops with the successful functioning of the organs.) It would likewise not be difficult to say wherein the success must consist on the vegetative levels in an optimal contact with the life-dispensing aspects of the milieu. Miscarriages would, accordingly, be equivalent to a diminished contact with "suitable" elements of the milieu or an increased contact with the harmful, life-obstructing elements.

So much for our thought-experiment. But there is the question whether that which we have described here is only a thought-construction; whether no experiential reality corresponds to it. It is indeed established that in our own life, too, certain performances are similar to these plant-like functions. First of all, we have in mind those functions which physiology justifiably describes as vegetative. Performances such as, for example, digestion, blood-circulation, respiration, glandular secretion, and so forth, characteristically proceed involuntarily, for the most part also unnoticed, and in any case, independent of our theoretical and practical awareness. It therefore appears as if we can say nothing of them from the phenomenological point of view. Yet the preintentional level borders on the intentional; it even extends into it in places; it intersects directly with intentional manifestations of life, and is occasionally completed by consciousness.

Here not only the large region of sicknesses and disturbances would be considered. It is of course significant that deficient contact of the respiratory, circulatory and digestive organs with the media suitable to them makes itself manifest in the form of specific feelings of displeasure, while the restored contact is experienced as

pleasurable. Still we might draw no very comprehensive conclusions from pathological manifestations. Consider first of all the normal functions of the skin and the mucous membrane and the familiar experiences connected therewith. Here we find organ-displeasure and pleasure in their most primitive form. This organ-pleasure originates totally and simply from contact with what is "suitable," which, according to circumstances, can be the warm, the dry, the fresh, the cool, the moist, the wet, the rough, the smooth, etc. Thus we must maintain that insofar as we are beings with skin we behave basically like vegetative organisms: we "involuntarily" seek to diminish that area of the surface of the body which stands in contact with an inadequate milieu by wrapping our limbs around one another and covering ourselves. On the other hand, we increase those areas of the skin which come into contact with those aspects that are suitable through stretching and uncovering. All this naturally has its significance for sexual performance. But one would likewise have to consider the self-extension and stretching of the man comfortably sunning himself. The style of his behavior is falsely termed "animalistic"; one must characterize it as plant-like.

Furthermore, in the human realm there are areas where organ-pleasure in the broader sense of the term plays a role. We understand by this any pleasure which arises with the successful active employment of the organ. Characteristic of the activities that come into question here is the fact that for them pleasure-anticipating conceptions of a goal or a purpose are not controlling factors. Enjoyment stems exclusively from functioning here and now. This mode of pleasure Karl Bühler describes, as is well known, as *pleasure in functioning*, and distinguishes it from every sort of pleasure in the result — from enjoyment as well as from the satisfaction of attainment. The appearance of the first phenomenon depends upon "a specific relation of pleasure to activity."¹⁷ Pleasure in functioning does not attract as the pleasure in result does (Bühler says: pleasure in satisfaction [*Befriedigungslust*]), namely as *finis* of the performance, but it appears during the experience of performing. It is clear that such a performance obeys some thing other than

the principle of result; we will call it, following Karl Bühler, the *principle of function*.¹⁸ Now it is easy to show that the principle of function also plays a certain role in human life. Bühler himself cites the babbling, kicking and playing of the infant, and further, the activities of drawing and dancing. But pleasure of function is doubtless present likewise in one who participates in outdoor games, in bodily exercise and in the sport of the adult. It is indeed characteristic that the learning of a new bodily exercise affords little joy. It is the successful use of the organs and bodily parts that first creates a mode of satisfaction which is independent of all joy in one's own achievements, records and victories.

Bühler's analysis of the child's first attempts at drawing contain — at least implicitly — still another valuable notion; it shows us the *pleasurable character of expressive activity as such*. For example, what makes us happy in mime, gesture, dance and song is the success of the expressive movements. It satisfies because it is executed independent of the understanding, approval, and admiration of eventual viewers and listeners. "The song which rushes from one's throat, reward most richly giveth." ["*Das Lied, das aus der Kehle dringt, ist Lohn, der reichlich lohnet.*"] The result of expression does not count for the artist; it is rather the delight in successful performance that counts. One can likewise speak, in the case of expressivity, of a "distance" or a "way." But this does not lead through a valueless medium to a valuable goal, but from the more imperfect feeling to the perfect feeling of the one who is expressing himself through the expressive form. The success or failure of this contact is achieved in every moment. The principle of function is, as Bühler notes, a "productive principle of presence" [*produktives Gegenwartsprinzip*].¹⁹

We must content ourselves with these brief hints. Perhaps they suffice to show that the preintentional functioning of man ought not be compared with a concealed, buried geological layer. It reaches into the sphere of experience, it intersects with the intentions, it colors itself with feelings in this sphere. The preintentional life is, on the one hand, more primitive than the intentional — this must be affirmed in opposition to Bühler; but, on the other

hand, it rests upon the forms of functioning which likewise show themselves receptive to higher contents. Precisely for this reason it is not absurd to think that there are preintentional modes of behavior which belong to the specific possibilities of human existence.

psychic powers of resistance that can be applied to heightened opposition and new deeds. The one who is unjustly treated will say that, for the time being, he must take the humiliation, but that he intends basically to change the situation as soon as the opportunity presents itself. This sort of anticipated, preconceived, imagined, planned or actually achieved *reactio* is typical for the experience of double-valued failure, defeat, misfortune and so forth. The act does not end with a contemplative dwelling on the happy or unhappy ending, but produces unrest and new tensions. According to the situation, these can always take on the character of moderate dissatisfaction, disillusionment, discontent, embitterment, grief, resentment, anger or the impulse to retaliate. All these forms of felt "not-keeping-peace-with. . ." we include under the category of *being-provoked*. The notion is to be conceived of in a very broad sense.¹⁰ Accordingly, under being-provoked we understand, essentially and universally, the experience of an environmentally double-valued harm to one's being which, by reason of its double value, "provokes" a reparatory counter-action. Thus we have described a third form of governance by feeling which would be inconceivable in the vegetative realm: an actual harm gives rise to heightened activity, which has as its object the evil that brings harm.

The theoretical significance of this category can likewise be seen from the fact that it first offers a general explanation for the essential possibility of binding acts together with one another. On the basis of the primary governance by feeling, either each performance must be completely independent of others, or the life of the being in question must appear in a dynamic respect as a single — perhaps complicately divided — performance. It is the result that is not fully completed in the positive or negative sense which first affords starting points for further acts. These acts can represent a completion, improvement, change or revocation of previous activity. Thus those act-complexes and act-wholes first occur which we term *behavior*. Only animal entities exhibit behavior since only they are stimulated by the result of their performances to continually wider ranges of activity. At the vegetative level there is nothing to parallel this.

What about the temporal structure of the secondary experiences of impulse? Since the secondary impulses pertain to the experience of being-underway, they are essentially directed to the future. In them the phenomenon of anticipation appears with special clarity. Hope is contemplation of a future possibility of success, resignation the apprehension of the corresponding impossibility. "Timidity" relates to a future overpowering evil, aggression to an evil which is to be rendered harmless in the future. In all these cases, the prospective line of sight is characteristic.

It is different in the case of terminating feeling, which "intends" a double-valued result. It is a feeling of result, and, as such, has an actual result as its object. To that extent, it is rooted in the present as much as the experience of completion as such. Still, in experience itself indications of possible future completions, improvements, changes and so forth lie hidden. Precisely for that reason the result stimulates one to further action. The experience of the double-valued terminus is therefore not only directed to the present, but also, at the same time, to the future. It is not simply a tarrying with that which has been attained; rather, in this tarrying, new dialectical tensions are prepared which demand adjustment. Thus it happens that the felt-impression of being-provoked turns into the hyphen between the act that is relatively completed at present and the future act meaningfully bound up with it.

3. THE TOTALITY-CHARACTER OF GOVERNANCE BY FEELING

Governance by feeling operates partially on the preintentional level, partially on the intentional level. We are thus confronted with the question how we must conceive of the cooperation between both strata. How does governance by feeling constitute a dynamic totality? How are vertical connections possible in this region?

One can form the following image of the cooperation between the two modes of regulation by feeling: the primordial being-drawn by goods and repelled by evils would be due solely to

the primary impulses. As blind powers, they would bring about *accessus* or *recessus*. All real governance would be ascribed to the secondary experiences to which is assigned the discovery of the means, the avoidance of dangers, the surmounting of obstacles and so forth. Secondary experience would then be equivalent to the pilot of a vessel propelled by the motor of the primary impulses. Thus we could explain the cooperation between both strata, while preserving their eidetic autonomy.

Against this way of representing governance by feeling there is no objection from the logical point of view; but there is from the phenomenological perspective. Things in reality do not occur like one would be inclined to think on the basis of this simple explanation. We do not rush blindly to the desired object in a first stage in order then, in a second phase, to recollect and notice that we are separated from it by an insuperable obstacle. Rather, an unattainable good is, according to its very essence, "no good for me." In other words, already in its character as good-for-me, it is primordially put into question. This is already the case in the animal realm, as the examples of Aquinas and Lafontaines teach.¹¹ Thus the moral man apprehends another's property already at the prepredicative level as a good which gives rise to no impulses to possess. The river which flows along within its banks will awaken no timidity in him. All this is immediately apprehended in the global experience of the situation, not subsequently, as a second phase, in a more refined attitude.

The error of the above conception is to be sought in the fact that one first treats the strata individually and then combines them synthetically at the level of spirit. For example, one notices the ways in which the vegetative performances are regulated and believes these must be found again unchanged where the preintentional level is "overlain" by an intentional level. This interpretation is completely misguided. As we have taken pains to show in our basic reflections on the problems of strata-theory, the origination of a new level is always an achievement of the whole stratified entity. This achievement, corresponding to the hierarchical relationship, consists in the old strata being subordinated to those

being newly formed.¹² The older strata do not change their own proper principles; but, within the context of their norms, everything occurs so that the origin, existence and functioning of the new stratum becomes possible. The peculiarity of the lower levels is not distorted, but *elevated* or *assumed*. Hence it is a gross error to assume that, for example, the vegetative life operates in the same manner in men, animals and plants and that the typology of vegetative processes is found again, in essentially the same forms, at the animal level — only as "infrastructure."

Now, it would be in place to show in detail how, thanks to the principle of assumption, the wholeness of the governance by feeling is theoretically explicable. Assume, for example, that we are confronted with an unattainable good. From the phenomenological point of view, we must first establish a primary experience of value: the *bonum* releases the felt-response of *amor*, however the situation might be additionally articulated. But this *amor* is stamped by the environment from the very beginning — and not first by reason of a subsequent correction. This expresses itself *in casu* through the fact that dedication to the value does not occur in spite of the inchoative experience of value. Likewise, the evil that has been rendered harmless is as much an evil as ever. We encounter it primarily with *odium*, that is, with a negative attitude, grounded in the awareness of one's own vulnerability. But this negative experience is already relativized at its root by our prepredicative knowledge that the evil in question represents "no danger for us." Thus we can explain the fact that we treat lions in a cage with equanimity, yet we do not encounter lions in the open without impulses of "timidity."

Thus governance by feeling has the character of a totality. In every case it shows a total *Gestalt* in which intentional feelings and preintentional feelings that are directed to the level of intentionality share in equal fashion.

After these basic observations, we believe our exposition on the elementary structure of the governing feelings can be supplemented, without giving rise to misunderstandings, by the following schema:

THE SELF-REALIZATION OF THE HUMAN SPIRIT

SECONDARY EXPERIENCES		PRIMARY EXPERIENCES	
[Negative impulses stemming from primary experience]	[Positive impulses stemming from primary experience]	Experienced vulnerability	Experienced neediness
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;">In relation to a double-valued environ-mental evil</div> Experienced possibility of overcoming an evil: <i>Aggression</i> Experienced impossibility of resisting and evading evil: <i>Timidity</i>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;">In relation to a double-valued environ-mental good</div> Experienced possibility of success: <i>Hope</i> Experienced impossibility of success: <i>Resignation</i>	Experienced striving-away-from, expelling, resistance	Experienced striving-toward and absorbing
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;">In relation to the double-valued environ-mental result</div> Being-provoked		Experienced harm to one's being	Experienced enhancement of one's being
			INCHOATIVE EXPERIENCE Impulsive experience DIRECTED EXPERIENCE Experienced being-underway TERMINATING EXPERIENCE Experienced completion

THE INTENTIONAL LEVEL

It will not escape one who knows Scholastic philosophy that our conception of the governance of an act by feeling is nothing new. Rather it rests upon a modern and free interpretation of the Thomistic *Tractatus de Passionibus*.¹³ In Thomas Aquinas, the following notions correspond to our technical terms:

INCLINATIO	MOTUS	QUIETATIO
amor	desiderium	delectatio
odium	fuga	tristitia
	spes <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;">bonum arduum futurum</div> ————— desperatio	
	timor <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;">malum arduum imminens</div> ————— audacia	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;">malum difficile iam injacens</div> ira ¹⁴

Many things might still be said concerning the interpretation of each of the Thomistic notions. Here we will only raise a question of principle: *Wherein does the philosophical-anthropological significance of the "Tractatus de Passionibus" consist?* The answer to this question, in our opinion, can scarcely be in doubt. The treatise does not present a system of "instincts," even less an inven-

tory of all the experientially determinable "driving forces." It is generally not possible to install the Thomistic categories into the region of scientific empiricism. We will show this in only a few cases: Thomistic *amor* is in no way simply "love" in the psychological sense. In the doctrinal structure of Aquinas, it plays the role of an operative basis for every meaningful dynamism, for every tendency, every *complacentia appetibilis*.¹⁵ But is this a notion with which the experimenter, the observer, the statistician, and so forth can work? We doubt it, and doubt in general the possibility of translating the truths of the treatise, on the basis of a few parallels and agreements, into the language of empirical psychology. This impossibility has its deeper grounds. The treatise on the *passiones* affords, not descriptions of acts and modes of behavior observable in the environment, as much as the apriori presupposition of such acts. Aquinas shows us not *id quod res est*, but he penetrates *id quo res est id quod est*. He tells us what must be universally and necessarily assumed in order that the performances of those levels which men and animals, within certain limits, have in common, can be thought. In other words, he develops *the material apriori of environmentally conditioned life-forms*. As a philosophy of intentional behavior, the treatise has its importance for the theoreticians of psychology, since it encompasses the basic foundation of all that the empirical researcher observes, finds, discovers at this level. Thomas Aquinas has laid bare the structure of environmental governance by feeling and thus a principle of order psychological theory ought not carelessly pass over.

4. THE DOUBLE ROLE OF "SENTIRE"

In our considerations we have proceeded from the distinction between pure feeling and directed feelings. The former we have characterized as thymic state-of-mind or disposition, the latter as intentional felt-response.

We are now no longer satisfied with this distinction. Within directed feelings a further differentiation is to be made: an unqualified objectivating feeling is contrasted here with a feeling

which has as its object merely a total impression. The psychologist terms the former sensation, the latter attraction.

Now, it does not appear to be difficult to determine the difference between both sorts of phenomena: sensations are finely differentiated, specialized and articulated feelings. They do not relate, like experiences of attraction, to the total individuality of situations, persons or societies. They possess a special analytical power. The situation is dissected into objects, and the objects into objective aspects. Forms, magnitudes, pressures, colors, temperatures, smells, tastes, and so forth, are apprehended as different "sides" of the object. That means that they do not constitute a throng of impressions, but are joined and separated within the framework of an identity-synthesis.¹⁶ Sensation inclines more to the objective characteristics of objects than does feeling. Thus perception – the sole phenomenologically apprehensible synthesis of sensations – presents a much more exact, fuller and more differentiated picture of reality than attraction.

Still there are difficulties with this new distinction. Reality is rich in appearances which seem to fit neither the one nor the other category. Consider idioms that we frequently use in everyday life: "I feel tired," "I feel a storm coming," "I feel as though father were angry." In view of this, one cannot say that the word "feel" would be only an empty flourish. Precisely the opposite: it points to a definite phenomenon. The idiomatic character of so many languages likewise confirms this: *αἰσθάνομαι*, *sentire*, *föhlen*, *voelen*, *to feel*, *sentir* – all these expressions mean both to become aware as well as to feel in the narrower sense. That is no accident. The word as a sign is ambiguous, since that which it signifies appears in two diverse forms.

The difficulty we run into here is considerable. Simply reflect upon the simple case of feeling tired. It is not clear whether to employ the notion of disposition, of attraction or of sensation for this phenomenon. Arguments can be offered for all three notions. On the one hand, tiredness is a typical state-of-mind. No intentional meaning lies hidden within it. Tiredness is rather being-in-a-mood in which the objects lose their "invitation-character," melt

NOTES

Chapter 7

¹ On the notion of the thymic, cf. p. 200.

² Cf. pp. 89 and 93.

³ We will give little attention to sensations in what follows, since they are only attained by hypothetical reconstruction, but not by phenomenological demonstration. Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty's profound critique of the notion of sensation in *The Phenomenology of Perception*, trans., Colin Smith, Humanities Press, New York 1962.

⁴ In a similar way Lersch distinguishes between "grief over something" and "sadness." *Person*, p. 246.

⁵ *Being and Time*, trans., J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Harper & Row, New York 1962, p. 173. Henceforth it will be referred to as *B. T.*

⁶ *Das Wesen der Stimmungen*, Frankfurt a. M., 1941, pp. 32–33 – henceforth referred to as *W. S.* Bollnow likewise consistently distinguishes between "feelings in the proper sense of the term" and dispositions, pp. 18 ff.

⁷ *The Will to Power*, trans., Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, Random House, New York 1967, Aphor. 800. – henceforth referred to as *W. P.*

⁸ While Bollnow offers an interesting selection from recent literature – *W. S.*, pp. 131 ff – one can find the sources of previous data for the most part in Janet's comprehensive *De l'Angoisse à l'Extase*, especially vol. II, pp. 380 ff and 497 ff; also in W. Mayer, "Zur Phänomenologie abnormer Glücksgefühle" in *Zeitschrift für Pathopsychologie*, 2 (1914), pp. 588 ff. Cf. also Karl Jaspers, *Psychopath.*, p. 140; and H. C. Rümke, *Phänomenologische en klinisch-psychiatrische Studie over Geluksgevoel*, Diss., Leiden, 1923.

⁹ Cf., Janet, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 443.

¹⁰ Our analogy naturally limps – like all analogies. Particularly we should call attention to the fact that our image only takes into account the dynamic processes, but not the qualitative processes.

¹¹ Cf. Part Two, Ch. 5, sec. 2.

¹² *Leitfaden der Psychologie*, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1909, p. 316.

¹³ *Zur Psychologie der Gesinnungen*, in *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, vol. I, Halle a. S., 1913, pp. 1 ff. The *Jahrbuch* will henceforth be referred to as *JPPF*.

¹⁴ Cf. also his definition: "We call emotion precisely that state where I immediately and primordially find 'myself' or have or experience myself, in short, where I 'feel' myself." *Das Selbstbewußtsein, Empfindung und Gefühl*, Wiesbaden, 1901, p. 13.

¹⁵ *W. S.*, p. 22. L. van der Horst also claims that "disposition reveals to man that and how he finds himself in the world." *Anthropologische Psychiatrie*, Part I, Amsterdam, 1946, p. 175.

¹⁶ In this connection it should be pointed out that, according to the research of Heinz Werner, "the primitive personality . . . compared to that of advanced people is much 'more complex' in its structure: the opposition between the I-person and the other persons of the society and between the I and the world of objects is the less sharply expressed the more primitive the region of early man one explores." Werner also maintains the same "blurring," "diffuse," "complex" character of the I-person in the case of the personality of the child. *Einführung in die Entwicklungspsychologie*, 3rd ed., München, 1953, pp. 317 ff and 331 ff. We will refer to this work henceforth as *Einf.*

¹⁷ *Symp.*, p. 18f.

¹⁸ We consider it evident that Heidegger's ontological philosophy is not to be considered an example of this kind of philosophy.

¹⁹ With regard to the older psychological literature on this notion, cf. Konstantin Oesterreich, *Die Phänomenologie des Ich in ihren Grundproblemen*, vol. I, Leipzig, 1910, pp. 11 ff; recent points of view can be found in Lersch, *Person*, pp. 279ff. Among the more recent philosophical investigations the article by Louis Lavelle, "Le Sentiment Voie d'Accès au Réel." Lavelle affirms that "in feeling there occurs . . . an immediate grasp [immédiation] of the being which we are," *Supplément philosophique de Recherches à Débats*, 2 (1949), p. 4.

²⁰ *Person*, p. 248. ²¹ *B. N.*, p. 3.

²² Part One, Ch. 2, sec. 2a, and Part Two, Ch. 4, sec. 3.

²³ *Metaphysik des Fühlens, Eine nachgelassene Schrift*, München, 1950.

²⁴ *Reason and Emotion*, New York, 1962.

²⁵ *Person*, pp. 233 ff.

²⁶ That this may be the meaning intended by Lersch becomes apparent when we consider that he discusses the notion of the heart in the context of his exposition of the endothymic phenomena.

²⁷ Cf. Part two, Ch. 5, sec. 2.

²⁸ Cf. Ludwig Binswanger, *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins*, Zürich, 1942, and Gabriel Marcel, *The Metaphysical Journal*, trans., Bernard Wall, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago 1952, pp. 132 ff. and 157 f.

²⁹ It reminds us of the English "mood," which means temper, disposition, frame

of mind. In the older French one thinks of "courage," which basically signifies bravery, disposition, emotion, heart.

³⁰ *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, edited by Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm, vol. IV/1, Leipzig, 1897, column 3293ff. The following references are taken from this article. Cf. also Mathias Lexner, *Mittelhochdeutsches Handwörterbuch*, Leipzig, 1872, vol. I, p. 847. For the Dutch "gemoed," whose development does not run fully parallel, cf. *Woordenboek der Nederlandsche Taal*, vol. IV, The Haag-Leiden, 1889, column 1429 ff.

³¹ So Luther, for example: "Of which Mary also says in the Magnificat . . . he has put down those who are conceited in their heart of hearts (*im gemüt ired herzen*)."

³² Thus, for example, Bodmer: "Such a man disappears from the common crowd into his heart."

³³ This really first occurs since the age of Classicism and Romanticism, for example, in Schiller:

"And what has no sense for the man who is smart
Does simply the man who is childlike at heart."

("Und was kein Verstand der Verständigen sieht,
Das übet in Einfalt ein kindlich Gemüt.")

³⁴ In this regard, cf., among others, Karl Jaspers, *Psychopath.*, p. 439; Kurt Schneider, *Psychopathologie der Gefühle und Triebe*, Leipzig, 1935, pp. 15ff. — One might also compare H. C. Rümke's exposition in "Het Kernsymptoom der Schizophrenie en het 'Praecoxgevoel,'" in *Studies en Voordrachten over Psychiatrie*, Amsterdam, 1943, pp. 55 ff. All the symptoms which were included in the critical discussion, whether they be described as confusion of thought, split personality, numbing of affective movement, lack of feeling in experience, reduction of vital contact with the environment, experience of world-collapse, derangement of the "proximity instinct," absence of expressive gestures that follow from contact, failure of affectivity in exchange with others — all point in this direction: they are symptoms of a disturbance and reduction of the life of the heart.

Chapter 8

¹ *La Psychologie animale*, Paris, 1940, p. 145.

² Cf. pp. 119 ff.

³ We are not saying that the notion of purely immanent act is to be rejected, but only that this purity is not demonstrable in the concrete acts of man.

⁴ Cf. p. 214-215.

⁵ *Het mensijk Geluk*, Antwerp-Amsterdam, 1952, pp. 5ff. — henceforth *Geluk*.

⁶ *Angoisse*, vol. II, p. 588.

⁷ *Traité*, vol. I, p. 663. ⁸ Cf. p. 183.

⁹ Gustav Kafka characterizes these "primordial attitudes" in the following words: 1. Come to me! 2. You get away from me! 3. I'm getting away from you! 4. I'm coming

by you! ("Über Uraffekte" in *Acta Psychologica*, 7, 1950, pp. 256ff.) We would be inclined to treat the first and fourth cases as *turning-toward*, the second and third as *turning-away*.

¹⁰ The schematic clarification leaves much to be desired because, although lived neediness must lead to a turning-toward and lived vulnerability to a turning-away, *no* necessary connection exists between turning-toward and the experience of the elevation of one's being, or between turning-away and injury to one's being. Rather, an unsuccessful tending-toward is experienced as injury to oneself, while a successful tending-away is felt as an elevation of one's being.

¹¹ *S. T.*, I-II, q. 22, a. 2; q. 23, a. 1.

¹² Cf. *S. T.*, I-II, q. 22-25; *Ver.*, q. 26, a. 3 and 4.

¹³ Cf. p. 229-230 ¹⁴ Cf. pp. 215 ff.

¹⁵ F. J. J. Buytendijk sees in discontinuity a feature of animal movement, insofar as the discontinuity consists in a change, not from rest to movement, but from a turning-to to a turning-from. *Grandproblemen van het dierlijk Leven*, Antwerp-Brussels-Niemege-Utrecht, 1938, p. 199.

¹⁶ We reject completely the coarsening and levelling effect of alhedonism. But we likewise have to show that governance by pleasure-displeasure has only a completely subordinate significance for concrete human behavior. Cf. pp. 331 ff. Yet here it is a question of the working out of certain principles; only to this end do we temporarily make use of the schematic black-and-white position.

¹⁷ *Die Krise der Psychologie*, 2nd. ed., Jena, 1929, p. 157 — henceforth *Krise*. Cf. likewise *Die geistige Entwicklung des Kindes*, 6th ed., Jena, 1930, #35, 36, pp. 353ff — henceforth referred to as *G. E. K.* — and "Displeasure and Pleasure in Relation to Activity," in *Feelings and Emotions*, The Wittenburg Symposium, Worcester, Mass, 1928, pp. 195 ff.

¹⁸ Bühler is misleading when he incidentally binds functional pleasure to the will-to-form (*Krise*, p.210). The will is always consciously directed prospectively to a goal — *in casu* not to the forming, but to the formed. One can see into what contradictions Bühler thereby implicates himself from the fact that ultimately he is compelled to speak of a "principle of presence" "which points to the future," (*Krise*, p. 212).

¹⁹ *Krise*, p. 208.

Chapter 9

¹ *Em.*, p. 62.

² *Dementia praecox oder Gruppe der Schizophrenien*, Leipzig-Vienna, 1911, pp. 305 and 306 — henceforth *Schiz.*

³ Cf. Heimuth Plessner, *L. W.*, p. 97.

⁴ Cf., *inter alia*, *Schiz.*, p. 358 as well as Hans Kunz, *Die Aggressivität und die Zärtlichkeit, Zwei psychologische Studien*, Bern 1946.

⁵ Cf. H. Plessner, *L. W.*, pp. 185 ff.

⁶ The possible abnormality lies in the incapacity to unite and to distinguish both value-aspects at the same time. Bleuler appears to suspect something of this sort when he writes: "The rose has its thorns. But in 99 out of 100 cases, the normal person reaches the sum by subtracting negative from positive values." (*Schiz.*, p. 305). As unphenomenological as the notion of subtractive computation seems in this context, so correct is that of a value-referring act.

⁷ We might explicitly point out in this regard that we employ the expressions "primary" and "secondary" in another sense than Janet, Heymans, E. D. Wiersma and others.

⁸ *S. T.*, I-II, q. 40, a. 1. "Ad hoc ergo quod aliquis speret, requiretur quod obiectum spei proponatur ei ut possibile," says Thomas in another context. ("In order that someone might hope, it is required that the object of hope be proposed to him as something possible.") *S. T.*, II-II, q. 17, a. 7.

⁹ *S. T.*, I-II, q. 40, a. 3.

¹⁰ Only the purely physiological notion of "stimulation" is to be basically distinguished from this notion of being-provoked.

¹¹ Cf. p. 225. ¹² Cf. pp. 159 ff.

¹³ *S. T.*, I-II, q. 22-48.

¹⁴ Both of these outlines are misleading insofar as between the notions given in the first and second columns, universal and necessary relations hold, while in the passage from the second to the third column, the categories of success, failure and relative failure, which are not taken into account in the schema, do play a role. The felt response to a double-valued good in the environment will display the character of hope or of resignation. But the aggressive felt response, after the start of the act, can terminate in an experience of the elevation of one's being, in an experience of being harmed, or in being provoked.

¹⁵ *S. T.*, I-II, q. 26, a. 1 and 2.

¹⁶ Cf. Husserl's extraordinarily rich "Dingvorlesung" of 1907, F I 13 of the Husserl Archives in Louvain.

¹⁷ Cf. "Über Gefühlsempfindungen" and "Apologie der Gefühlsempfindungen" in *Zeitschrift f. d. Psych. u. Physiol. der Sinnesorgane*, 44 (1907) and 75 (1916).

¹⁸ *Person*, p. 297.

¹⁹ *Über den Schmerz*, Bern, 1948, p. 25.

²⁰ On the other hand, in the case of primitives and children, "diffuse" perception is predominant, as Heinz Werner has shown. Cf. *Einf.*, pp. 80ff and 85 ff. Likewise Heinz Rempelin affirms that in early childhood "feeling will simultaneously be appealed to in perceiving" and the child will be captured by the "physiognomic" character of the total impression.

²¹ This process of differentiation appears ontogenetically at the beginning of late

childhood. "Perceiving and feeling, which interpenetrated up to this point, separate from one another," Rempelin affirms; the "physiognomic" world-picture recedes in favor of the factual. *Entw.*, p. 154.

²² With both of the last-mentioned phenomena we already touch the realm of emotional behavior. Cf. pp. 264 ff.

²³ Cf. W. Luypen's definition: "Boredom is the affective reaction of the I to the remaining-unsatisfied of one or more aspiration." *De psychologie van de Verveling*, Diss., Amsterdam, 1951, p. 116. Cf. also the following description of W. J. Revers: "Since therefore excessive energy cannot be released, since it cannot discharge itself upon something interesting, since the child can contribute nothing toward discovering something interesting, the time of waiting, of being filled with drive but lacking concrete hope of realizing it becomes long for him. Here we have a case of boredom." *Die Psychologie der Langeweile*, Meisenheim, a. G., 1949, p. 39.

²⁴ Cf. pp. 224 ff.

²⁵ In this way our phenomenological conception is basically distinguished from the causal-mechanistic conception. One might compare, for example, the description of *admiratio* in Descartes (*The Passions of the Soul, The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, trans. Elizabeth S. Holdane and G. R. T. Ross, Cambridge University Press, London 1967, vol I, Art. 53, 70-72) and in Spinoza (*Ethics* III, prop. 52.) with our exposition of surprise. The author also refers to his basic point of view on this problem in *Objectiviteit en Objectivisme*, Nijmegen-Utrecht, 1947 and "Wesen und Grenzen des Schöpferischen im Menschen," in *Jahrbuch für Psychologie und Psychotherapie*, 1 (1952), pp. 46 ff.

²⁶ This "interest as such" would be comparable with the Thomistic *amor* in its most fundamental meaning, Aquinas says of it: "Omnes alii motus appetivi praesupponunt amorem quasi primam radicem." ("All other appetitive movements presuppose love as their primary root.") *S. T.*, I, q. 20, a. 1.

Chapter 10

¹ *The Structure of Behavior*, trans., Alden L. Fisher, Beacon Press, Boston 1963, p. 181. Cf. likewise Heidegger's sharp criticism in *The Letter on Humanism Philosophy in the 20th Century*, trans., Edgar Lohner, ed., W. Barrett and H. Aiken, Random House, New York 1962.

² Cf. pp. 167 ff.

³ Cf. William Stern, *A. P.*, p. 12; cf. also *Person und Sache*, vol. I *Ableitung und Grundlehre des Kritischen Personalismus*, vol. II, *Die menschliche Persönlichkeit*, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1923.

⁴ Cf. *New Ways of Ontology*, trans., Reinhard C. Kuhn, H. Regnery Co., Chicago 1953, p. 79 ff.

⁵ *Ver.*, q. 25, a. 2.

⁶ Categorical insights correspond to the "ordering principles" which, according to