

University of Würzburg

Summer school, June 2021

Panel: *Guiding Directedness? Affectivity and Feeling as (Pre-)Intentional Spheres*

Organisers: Philipp Schmidt and Jörn Müller

Thomas Aquinas on the Passions of the Soul (*passiones animae*) as (Pre-)Intentional Spheres

Excerpts from *Summa theologiae* I-II, questions 22-25

Short guide to reading a medieval question:

- The thesis at the beginning of an article and the **objections** (*argumenta*) which follow and support it are only the opening move of a dialectical battle in which Aquinas usually contradicts and undermines what is said at the start.
- Therefore, the initial thesis and the objections do not express Aquinas's own opinion but only state which "seems to be the case" (*videtur*). They are directly contradicted by a short statement "**But contrary**" (*Sed contra*).
- Aquinas's own considered opinion on the matter at hand is stated afterwards in his **response** (*respondeo*) and bolstered by his **replies** to the aforementioned objections (*ad argumenta*) supporting the initial thesis.
- It is advisable to start with reading the response and then to compare the initial objections (*arg.* 1, 2, 3 ...) one by one with Aquinas's replies (*ad arg.* 1, 2, 3 ...) to them.

The **following texts and translations** are available via these **electronic sources**:

- Latin text: <https://www.corpusthomicum.org/>
(following vol. 6 of the canonical "Editio Leonina", Rome 1891)
- English translation: <https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/TOC.htm>
(by Alfred J. Freddoso, University of Notre Dame)

Thomas Aquinas, *STh* I-II, q.22-25: On the passions of the soul in general

QUESTION 22: Introduction

After this we have to consider the passions of the soul, first in general (questions 22-25) and then in particular (questions 26-48). In the general treatment, there are four things to consider about the passions: first, their subject (question 22); second, the differences among them (question 23); third, their relation to one another (question 24); and, fourth, their badness and goodness (question 25).

[...]

Article 2: Are the passions in the apprehensive part of the soul more than in the appetitive part?

It seems (*videtur*) that the passions are in the apprehensive part of the soul more than in the appetitive part.

[...]

Objection 2: What is more active seems to be less passive, since acting is opposed to being acted upon. But the appetitive part is more active than the apprehensive part. Therefore, it seems that the passions exist more in the apprehensive part.

Objection 3: Just as the sentient appetite is a power in a corporeal organ, so too is the sentient apprehensive power. But the passions of the soul come to exist, properly speaking, through a bodily change (*secundum transmutationem corporalem*). Therefore, it is not the case that they exist in the sentient appetitive part more than in the sentient apprehensive part.

But contrary to this: In *De Civitate Dei* 9 Augustine says, “The movements of our mind—*pathê* in the Greek—are such that some, like Cicero, call them perturbations (*perturbationes*), and some call them affections (*affectiones*) or affects (*affectus*), while others call them—more clearly, as in the Greek—passions (*passiones*).” From this it is clear that the passions of the soul are the same as affections. But affections clearly belong to the appetitive part and not to the apprehensive part. Therefore, the passions are likewise in the appetitive part rather than in the apprehensive part.

I respond: As has already been explained, the name ‘passion’ implies that the thing being acted upon (*patiens*) is drawn toward something that belongs to the agent. Now the soul is drawn toward a thing through its appetitive power rather than through its apprehensive power. For it is through its appetitive power that the soul is ordered toward the things themselves insofar as they exist in themselves. Hence, in *Metaphysics* 6 the Philosopher says that “the good and the bad”—i.e., the objects of the appetitive power—“exist in the things themselves.” By contrast, the apprehensive power is not drawn to things insofar as they exist in themselves; rather, it has cognition of a thing in accord with the thing’s intention (*secundum intentionem rei*), which it has or receives within itself in its own mode. Hence, in the same place the Philosopher says that “the true and the false”—which pertain to cognition—“exist in the mind and not in the things.” Hence, it is clear that the character of a passion is found in the appetitive part more than in the apprehensive part.

[...]

Reply to objection 2: The appetitive power is said to be more active because it is more of a source (*principium*) for the exterior act. It has this feature from the very fact in virtue of which it is more passive, viz., that it has an ordering toward a thing insofar as that thing exists in itself. For it is through the exterior act that we arrive at the attainment of things.

Reply to objection 3: As was explained in the First Part (*STh* I, q. 78, a. 3), there are two ways in which an organ of the soul can be changed:

(a) by a spiritual change (*transmutatione spirituali*), insofar as it receives the intention of a thing (*recipit intentionem rei*). This sort of change exists per se in the act of the sentient apprehensive power; for instance, the eye is changed by the visible thing not in such a way that it becomes colored, but in such a way that it receives the intention of color.

(b) by a separate natural change in the organ, insofar as the organ is changed with respect to its natural condition—e.g., becoming hot or cold or being changed in some similar way. This sort of change is related *per accidens* to the act of the sentient apprehensive power—as, for instance, when the eye is fatigued by an intent gaze or weakened by the intensity of a visible thing. However, a change of this sort is ordered per se toward an act of the sentient appetite. This is why a natural change in an organ is posited materially in the definition of movements of the appetitive part—as, for instance, when it is said that anger is the heating of the blood around the heart.

Hence, it is clear that the character of a passion is found more in the act of sentient appetitive power than in the act of the sentient apprehensive power, even though both are acts of a corporeal organ

QUESTION 23

Article 1: Do the same passions exist in the irascible and concupiscible powers?

It seems that the same passions exist in the irascible and concupiscible powers.

Objection 1: In *Ethics* 2 the Philosopher says that the passions of the soul are “the ones that joy (*gaudium*) and sadness (*tristitia*) follow upon.” But joy and sadness exist in the concupiscible power. Therefore, all the passions exist in the concupiscible power. Therefore, the passions that exist in the irascible power are not different from the ones that exist in the concupiscible power.

[...]

Objection 3: Passions, as well as actions, differ in species from one another according to their objects. But the objects of the passions of the irascible power are the same as the objects of the passions of the concupiscible power. Therefore, the same passions belong to the irascible and concupiscible powers.

But contrary to this: The acts of diverse powers, e.g., seeing and hearing, are diverse in species. But as was established in the First Part (*STh* I, q. 81, a. 2), the irascible and the concupiscible are two powers that divide the sentient appetite. Therefore, since, as was explained above (q. 22, a. 3), the passions are movements of the sentient appetite, it follows that the passions that exist in the irascible power differ in species from the passions that exist in the concupiscible power.

I respond: The passions that exist in the irascible power and the passions that exist in the concupiscible power differ from one another in species. For since, as was explained in the First Part (*STh* I, q. 77, a. 3), diverse powers have diverse objects, it is necessary for the passions of diverse powers to be directed toward diverse objects. Hence, a fortiori, the passions of the diverse powers differ in species, since a greater difference in the objects is required for a diversity of species among powers than for a diversity of species among the passions or actions of those powers. For just as, among natural things, a diversity of genus follows upon a diversity in the potentiality of the matter, whereas a diversity of species follows upon a diversity of form in the same matter, so too, among the acts of the soul, acts belonging to diverse powers are diverse not only in species but also in genus, whereas the acts or passions that are directed toward diverse specific objects that fall under the common object of a single power differ as species of the same genus. Therefore, in order to discern which passions exist in the irascible power and which exist in the concupiscible power, one must take the object of each of these powers.

Now in the First Part (*STh* I, q. 81, a. 2) it was explained that the object of the concupiscible power is the sensible good or the sensible bad taken absolutely (*bonum vel malum sensibile simpliciter acceptum*), i.e., the pleasurable (*delectabile*) or the painful (*dolorosum*). However, because it is necessary for the soul to suffer sometimes from difficulties and opposition in attaining a good of this sort or in avoiding something bad, and to the extent that attaining the good or avoiding the bad is in some sense elevated beyond the animal's easily exercised power, it follows that the object of the irascible power is the good or the bad insofar as it has the character of being arduous or difficult (*secundum quod habet rationem ardui vel difficilis*).

Therefore, if a passion is directed toward the good or the bad absolutely speaking—e.g., joy (*gaudium*), sadness (*tristitia*), love (*amor*), hatred (*odium*)—then it belongs to the concupiscible power. By contrast, if a passion is directed toward the good or the bad under the notion arduous, i.e., insofar as it is attainable or avoidable with some difficulty—e.g., daring (*audacia*), fear (*timor*), hope (*spes*), etc.—then it belongs to the irascible power.

Reply to objection 1: As was explained in the First Part (*STh* I, q. 81, a. 2), the irascible power was given to animals in order that the obstacles might be removed by which the concupiscible power is prevented from tending toward its object—either because of the difficulty involved in attaining a good or because of the difficulty involved in overcoming an evil. And this is why the irascible passions are all terminated in the concupiscible passions. Accordingly, joy and sadness, which exist in the concupiscible power, follow upon even those passions that exist in the irascible power.

[...]

Reply to objection 3: It is the good insofar as it is pleasurable (*bonum in quantum est delectabile*) that moves the concupiscible power. But if a good is such that there is a difficulty involved in attaining it, then by that very fact the good in question has something that is contrary to the concupiscible power. And so it was necessary for there to be another power that would tend toward that good; and the same line of reasoning applies to bad things. The power in question is the irascible power. Hence, it is because of this that the passions of the concupiscible power differ in species from the passions of the irascible power.

Article 4

I respond: The passions differ in accord with the agents that are the objects of the passions of the soul. And there are two possible ways to think of the differences among the agents:

- (a) with respect to the species or natures of the agents themselves, and
- (b) with respect to their diverse active powers.

The diversity of agents or movers with respect to the power of effecting movement can be applied to the passions in accord with a likeness to natural agents. For everything that effects movement either draws the patient toward itself in some way or repels it away from itself. When it draws it toward itself, it effects three things in it.

First, the agent gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend toward it, as when a lightweight body located in a high place (*quod est sursum*) gives to a generated body a lightness through which it has an inclination toward or aptitude for being in a high place. Second, if the generated body is located outside its proper place, the agent gives it movement toward that place.

Third, the agent gives it rest when it arrives at that place, since something comes to rest in a place in virtue of the same cause by which it is moved to that place. And one should think along similar lines of a repelling cause.

Now in the movements of the appetitive part of the soul, the good has, as it were, the power to attract, whereas the bad has the power to repel. Thus, first of all, the good causes in the appetitive power a certain inclination toward, or aptitude for, or connaturality with the good (*inclinacionem seu aptitudinem seu connaturalitatem ad bonum*). This pertains to the passion of love (*amor*); and corresponding to it, as its contrary on the side of the bad, is hatred (*odium*). Second, if the good has not yet been attained, it gives the appetitive power a movement toward acquiring the good that is loved, and this pertains to the passion of desire (*desiderium*) or sentient desire. And contrary to this, on the part of the bad, is withdrawal or aversion.

Third, when the good has been attained, it gives the appetite a certain sort of rest in the good that has been attained, and this pertains to pleasure or joy. And the opposite of this on the part of the bad is pain or sadness.

Now in the case of the passions of the irascible power, what is presupposed is an aptitude for or inclination toward pursuing the good and withdrawing from the bad on the part of the concupiscible power, which has to do with the good and the bad absolutely speaking. With respect to a good that has not yet been attained, there is hope and despair. With respect to something bad that has not yet occurred, there is fear and daring. With respect to a good that has already been attained, there is no passion in the irascible power, since, as was explained above (a. 3), such a good no longer has the character of something arduous. However, the passion of anger (*ira*) follows upon something bad that has already occurred.

So, then, it is clear that in the concupiscible power there are three groups of passions, viz., (a) love and hatred, (b) desire and withdrawal, and (c) joy and sadness. Similarly, in the irascible power there are three groups, viz., (a) hope and despair, (b) fear and daring, and (c) anger, which has no passion opposed to it. Therefore, the passions that differ in species number eleven in all—six in the concupiscible power and five in the irascible power. All the passions of the soul are contained under these.

QUESTION 25

Article 2: Is love the first among the passions of the concupiscible power?

It seems that love (*amor*) is not the first among the passions of the concupiscible power.

Objection 1: The concupiscible power is named from sentient desire (*concupiscentia*), which is the same passion as desire (*desiderium*). But as *De Anima* 2 says, a thing is named from what is most important. Therefore, sentient desire is more important than love.

Objection 2: Love implies a certain union, since, as Dionysius says in *De Divinis Nominibus*, chap. 4, it is “a unitive and consolidating force”. But sentient desire or desire is a movement toward union with a thing that is longed for or desired. Therefore, sentient desire is prior to love.

Objection 3: A cause is prior to its effect. But pleasure sometimes a cause of love; for as *Ethics* 8 says, some individuals love for the sake of pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is prior to love. Therefore, love is not the first among the passions of the concupiscible power.

[...]

I respond: The objects of the concupiscible power are the good and the bad. But the good is prior to the bad, since the bad is a privation of the good. Hence, all the passions whose object is the good are naturally prior to the passions whose object is the bad. More specifically, each such passion is prior to its opposite; for the reason why the opposed evil is being rejected is that the good is being sought. Now the good has the character of an end, which is prior in its being intended but posterior in its being attained (*est prior in intentione sed est posterior in consecutione*). Therefore, the ordering of the passions of the concupiscible power can be thought of either (a) in accord with good’s being intended or (b) in accord with the good’s being attained.

As regards its being attained, what is prior is what first comes to exist in that which tends toward the end. But it is clear that everything that tends toward an end has, first of all, a readiness for or proportion to the end (*aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem*); for nothing tends toward an end that is disproportionate to it. Second, it is moved toward the end. Third, it comes to rest in the end after the end has been attained. Now the appetite’s very readiness for or proportion to the good is love, which is nothing other than being pleased with the good. On the other hand, the movement toward the good is desire or sentient desire, whereas rest in the good is joy or pleasure. And so in accord with this ordering, love precedes desire and desire precedes pleasure.

By contrast, in the order of the good’s being intended, the reverse holds. For intended pleasure causes desire and love, since pleasure is the enjoyment of the good (*fruitio boni*), and, as was explained above (q. 11, a. 3), it is in some sense the end, just as the good itself is.

Reply to objection 1: A thing is named in accord with what is known to us, since, according to the Philosopher, spoken words are signs of acts of understanding. And in most cases we know a cause through its effect. Now when a thing that is loved is itself possessed, the effect of love is pleasure, whereas when it is not possessed, the effect of love is desire or sentient desire. But as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 9, “Love is felt more strongly when a lack [of the good] produces it.” Hence, among all the passions of the concupiscible power, the one that is most felt is sentient desire (*concupiscentia*). And it because of this that the concupiscible power (*concupiscibilis*) is named from it.

Reply to objection 2: There are two types of union between the lover and the loved. One type is a real union, viz., the conjoining of the lover to the thing itself. And this type of union involves joy or pleasure, which follows upon desire. The second is an affective union, which has to do with the readiness or proportion—namely, in the sense that something already participates in some way in another by the fact that it has a readiness for and inclination toward that other. And it is in this sense that love implies a union. And this is the union that precedes the movement of desire.

Reply to objection 3: Pleasure is a cause of love in the sense that it is prior to love in intention.

Article 3

I respond [...]: And if we want to know the ordering of all the passions along the way of generation, the first to occur are love and hatred; second, desire and withdrawal; third, hope and despair; fourth, fear and daring; fifth, anger; and sixth, and last, joy and sadness, which, as *Ethics 2* says, follow upon all the passions. Yet, as can be inferred from what has been said, this is so in such a way that love is prior to hatred, desire is prior to withdrawal, hope is prior to despair, fear is prior to daring, and joy is prior to sadness.

Article 4: Are the four principal passions joy and sadness, hope and fear?

It seems not to be the case that the four principal passions are joy (*gaudium*) and sadness (*tristitia*), hope (*spes*) and fear (*timor*).

[...]

Objection 2: There are two orderings among the passions of the soul, viz., the order of intention and the order of attainment or generation. Therefore, either (a) the principal passions are taken from the order of intention, in which case only joy and sadness, which are ending passions (*passiones finales*) will be principal passions, or (b) the principal passions are taken from the order of attainment or generation, in which case love will be the principal passion. Therefore, there is no way in which one should claim that the four principal passions are these four: joy and sadness, hope and fear.

[...]

I respond: The four passions in question are commonly said to be the principal passions. Two of them, viz., joy and sadness, are called principal passions because they are, absolutely speaking, culminating and final (*completivae et finales*) with respect to all the passions and so, as *Ethics 2* says, they follow upon all the passions. On the other hand, fear and hope are principal passions not in the sense that they are culminating absolutely speaking, but rather in the sense that they are culminating in the genus appetitive movement toward something. For with respect to the good, the movement begins in love (*amor*), continues in desire (*desiderium*), and terminates in hope (*spes*), whereas with respect to the bad, the movement begins in hatred (*odium*), continues in withdrawal (*fuga*), and terminates in fear (*timor*).

And so the enumeration of these four passions is usually taken in accord with the differences present and future. For a movement has to do with the future, whereas rest is in something present. Therefore, (a) with respect to a present good there is joy; (b) with respect to a present

evil there is sadness; (c) with respect to a future good there is hope; and (d) with respect to a future evil there is fear. Now all the other passions that have to do with a good or an evil that is present or future are traced back to these four as their culmination. Hence, some writers call the four passions in question ‘principal passions’ because they are general. And, to be sure, this is true as long as ‘hope’ and ‘fear’ designate any appetitive movement that tends in general toward something that is to be desired or avoided.

[...]

Reply to objection 2: The passions in question are called the principal passions in accord with the order of intention and completion. And even though fear and hope are not the last passions absolutely speaking, they are nonetheless last in the genus passions tending toward another as something future. The only possible counterexample is anger (*ira*). But anger cannot be posited as a principal passion, since it is a certain effect of daring, which, as will be explained in a moment, cannot be a principal passion.

Thomas de Aquino, *STh* I-II, q. 22-25:

De passionibus animae in generali

QUAESTIO 22: Prooemium

Post hoc considerandum est de passionibus animae, et primo, in generali; secundo, in speciali. In generali autem, quatuor occurrunt circa eas considerata, primo quidem, de subiecto earum; secundo, de differentia earum; tertio, de comparatione earum ad invicem; quarto, de malitia et bonitate ipsarum.

[...]

Articulus 2: Utrum passio magis sit in parte appetitiva quam in apprehensiva

Videtur quod passio magis sit in parte animae apprehensiva quam in parte appetitiva. [...]

[**Arg. 2**] Praeterea, quod est magis activum, videtur esse minus passivum, actio enim passioni opponitur. Sed pars appetitiva est magis activa quam pars apprehensiva. Ergo videtur quod in parte apprehensiva magis sit passio.

[**Arg. 3**] Praeterea, sicut appetitus sensitivus est virtus in organo corporali, ita et vis apprehensiva sensitiva. Sed passio animae fit, proprie loquendo, secundum transmutationem corporalem. Ergo non magis est passio in parte appetitiva sensitiva quam in apprehensiva sensitiva.

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in IX de Civ. Dei, quod *motus animi, quos Graeci pathe, nostri autem quidam, sicut Cicero, perturbationes, quidam affectiones vel affectus, quidam vero, sicut in Graeco habetur, expressius passiones vocant*. Ex quo patet quod passiones animae sunt idem quod affectiones. Sed affectiones manifeste pertinent ad partem appetitivam, et non ad apprehensivam. Ergo et passiones magis sunt in appetitiva quam in apprehensiva.

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, in nomine passionis importatur quod patiens trahatur ad id quod est agentis. Magis autem trahitur anima ad rem per vim appetitivam quam per vim apprehensivam. Nam per vim appetitivam anima habet ordinem ad ipsas res, prout in seipsis sunt, unde philosophus dicit, in VI Metaphys., quod bonum et malum, quae sunt obiecta appetitivae potentiae, sunt in ipsis rebus. Vis autem apprehensiva non trahitur ad rem, secundum quod in seipsa est; sed cognoscit eam secundum intentionem rei, quam in se habet vel recipit secundum proprium modum. Unde et ibidem dicitur quod verum et falsum, quae ad cognitionem pertinent, non sunt in rebus, sed in mente. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis invenitur in parte appetitiva quam in parte apprehensiva.

[...]

[**Ad arg. 2**] Ad secundum dicendum quod vis appetitiva dicitur esse magis activa, quia est magis principium exterioris actus. Et hoc habet ex hoc ipso ex quo habet quod sit magis passiva, scilicet ex hoc quod habet ordinem ad rem ut est in seipsa, per actionem enim exterioriorem pervenimus ad consequendas res.

[**Ad arg. 3**] Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, dupliciter organum animae potest transmutari. Uno modo, transmutatione spirituali, secundum quod recipit intentionem rei. Et hoc per se invenitur in actu apprehensivae virtutis sensitivae, sicut oculus immutatur a visibili, non ita quod coloretur, sed ita quod recipiat intentionem coloris. Est autem alia naturalis transmutatio organi, prout organum transmutatur quantum ad suam naturalem dispositionem, puta quod calefit aut infrigidatur, vel alio simili modo transmutatur. Et huiusmodi transmutatio per accidens se habet ad actum apprehensivae virtutis sensitivae, puta cum oculus fatigatur ex forti intuitu, vel dissolvitur ex vehementia visibilis. Sed ad actum appetitus sensitivi per se ordinatur huiusmodi transmutatio, unde in definitione motuum appetitivae partis, materialiter ponitur aliqua naturalis transmutatio organi; sicut dicitur quod ira est accensio sanguinis circa cor. Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis invenitur in actu sensitivae virtutis appetitivae, quam in actu sensitivae virtutis apprehensivae, licet utraque sit actus organi corporalis.

QUAESTIO 23

Articulus 1: Utrum passiones quae sunt in concupiscibili sint diversae ab his quae sunt in irascibili

Videtur quod passiones eadem sint in irascibili et in concupiscibili.

[**Arg. 1**] Dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod passiones animae sunt quas sequitur gaudium et tristitia. Sed gaudium et tristitia sunt in concupiscibili. Ergo omnes passiones sunt in concupiscibili. Non ergo sunt aliae in irascibili, et aliae in concupiscibili.

[...]

[**Arg. 3**] Praeterea, passiones et actus differunt specie secundum obiecta. Sed passionum irascibilis et concupiscibilis eadem obiecta sunt, scilicet bonum et malum. Ergo eadem sunt passiones irascibilis et concupiscibilis.

Sed contra, diversarum potentiarum actus sunt specie diversi, sicut videre et audire. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt duae potentiae dividentes appetitum sensitivum, ut in primo dictum est. Ergo, cum passiones sint motus appetitus sensitivi, ut supra dictum est, passiones quae sunt in irascibili, erunt aliae secundum speciem a passionibus quae sunt in concupiscibili.

Respondeo dicendum quod passiones quae sunt in irascibili et in concupiscibili, differunt specie. Cum enim diversae potentiae habeant diversa obiecta, ut in primo dictum est, necesse est quod passiones diversarum potentiarum ad diversa obiecta referantur. Unde multo magis passiones diversarum potentiarum specie differunt, maior enim differentia obiecti requiritur ad diversificandam speciem potentiarum, quam ad diversificandam speciem passionum vel actuum. Sicut enim in naturalibus diversitas generis consequitur diversitatem potentiae materiae, diversitas autem speciei diversitatem formae in eadem materia; ita in actibus animae, actus ad diversas potentias pertinentes, sunt non solum specie, sed etiam genere diversi; actus autem vel passiones respicientes diversa obiecta specialia comprehensa sub uno communi obiecto unius potentiae, differunt sicut species illius generis. Ad cognoscendum ergo quae passiones sint in irascibili, et quae in concupiscibili, oportet assumere obiectum utriusque potentiae. Dictum est autem in primo quod obiectum potentiae concupiscibilis est bonum vel malum sensibile simpliciter acceptum, quod est delectabile vel dolorosum. Sed quia necesse est quod interdum anima difficultatem vel pugnam patiat in adipiscendo aliquod huiusmodi

bonum, vel fugiendo aliquod huiusmodi malum, in quantum hoc est quodammodo elevatum supra facilem potestatem animalis; ideo ipsum bonum vel malum, secundum quod habet rationem ardui vel difficilis, est obiectum irascibilis. Quaecumque ergo passiones respiciunt absolute bonum vel malum, pertinent ad concupiscibilem; ut gaudium, tristitia, amor, odium, et similia. Quaecumque vero passiones respiciunt bonum vel malum sub ratione ardui, prout est aliquid adipiscibile vel fugibile cum aliqua difficultate, pertinent ad irascibilem; ut audacia, timor, spes, et huiusmodi.

[**Ad arg. 1**] Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, ad hoc vis irascibilis data est animalibus, ut tollantur impedimenta quibus concupiscibilis in suum obiectum tendere prohibetur, vel propter difficultatem boni adipiscendi, vel propter difficultatem mali superandi. Et ideo passiones irascibilis omnes terminantur ad passiones concupiscibilis. Et secundum hoc, etiam passiones quae sunt in irascibili, consequitur gaudium et tristitia, quae sunt in concupiscibili.

[...]

[**Ad arg. 3**] Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum in quantum est delectabile, movet concupiscibilem. Sed si bonum habeat quandam difficultatem ad adipiscendum, ex hoc ipso habet aliquid repugnans concupiscibili. Et ideo necessarium fuit esse aliam potentiam quae in id tenderet. Et eadem ratio est de malis. Et haec potentia est irascibilis. Unde ex consequenti passiones concupiscibilis et irascibilis specie differunt.

Articulus 4

Respondeo dicendum quod passiones differunt secundum activa, quae sunt obiecta passionum animae. Differentia autem activorum potest attendi dupliciter, uno modo, secundum speciem vel naturam ipsorum activorum, sicut ignis differt ab aqua; alio modo, secundum diversam virtutem activam. Diversitas autem activi vel motivi quantum ad virtutem movendi, potest accipi in passionibus animae secundum similitudinem agentium naturalium. Omne enim movens trahit quodammodo ad se patiens, vel a se repellit. Trahendo quidem ad se, tria facit in ipso. Nam primo quidem, dat ei inclinationem vel aptitudinem ut in ipsum tendat, sicut cum corpus leve, quod est sursum, dat levitatem corpori generato, per quam habet inclinationem vel aptitudinem ad hoc quod sit sursum. Secundo, si corpus generatum est extra locum proprium, dat ei moveri ad locum. Tertio, dat ei quiescere, in locum cum pervenerit, quia ex eadem causa aliquid quiescit in loco, per quam movebatur ad locum. Et similiter intelligendum est de causa repulsionis. In motibus autem appetitivae partis, bonum habet quasi virtutem attractivam, malum autem virtutem repulsivam. Bonum ergo primo quidem in potentia appetitiva causat quandam inclinationem, seu aptitudinem, seu connaturalitatem ad bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem amoris. Cui per contrarium respondet odium, ex parte mali. Secundo, si bonum sit nondum habitum, dat ei motum ad assequendum bonum amatum, et hoc pertinet ad passionem desiderii vel concupiscentiae. Et ex opposito, ex parte mali, est fuga vel abominatio. Tertio, cum adeptum fuerit bonum, dat appetitus quietationem quandam in ipso bono adepti, et hoc pertinet ad delectationem vel gaudium. Cui opponitur ex parte mali dolor vel tristitia. In passionibus autem irascibilis, praesupponitur quidem aptitudo vel inclinatio ad prosequendum bonum vel fugiendum malum, ex concupiscibili, quae absolute respicit bonum vel malum. Et respectu boni nondum adepti, est spes et desperatio. Respectu autem mali nondum iniacentis,

est timor et audacia. Respectu autem boni adepti, non est aliqua passio in irascibili, quia iam non habet rationem ardui, ut supra dictum est. Sed ex malo iam iniacenti, sequitur passio irae. Sic igitur patet quod in concupiscibili sunt tres coniugationes passionum, scilicet amor et odium, desiderium et fuga gaudium et tristitia. Similiter in irascibili sunt tres, scilicet spes et desperatio, timor et audacia, et ira, cui nulla passio opponitur. Sunt ergo omnes passionum speciem differentes undecim, sex quidem in concupiscibili, et quinque in irascibili; sub quibus omnes animae passionum continentur.

QUAESTIO 25

Articulus 2: Utrum amor sit prima passionum concupiscibilis

Videtur quod amor non sit prima passionum concupiscibilis.

[Arg. 1] Vis enim concupiscibilis a concupiscentia denominatur, quae est eadem passio cum desiderio. Sed denominatio fit a potiori, ut dicitur in II de anima. Ergo concupiscentia est potior amore.

[Arg. 2] Praeterea, amor unionem quandam importat, est enim vis unitiva et concretiva, ut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed concupiscentia vel desiderium est motus ad unionem rei concupitae vel desideratae. Ergo concupiscentia est prior amore.

[Arg. 3] Praeterea, causa est prior effectu. Sed delectatio est quandoque causa amoris, quidam enim propter delectationem amant, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Ergo delectatio est prior amore. Non ergo prima inter passionum concupiscibilis est amor.

[...]

Respondeo dicendum quod obiectum concupiscibilis sunt bonum et malum. Naturaliter autem est prius bonum malo, eo quod malum est privatio boni. Unde et omnes passionum quarum obiectum est bonum, naturaliter sunt priores passionibus quarum obiectum est malum, unaquaeque scilicet sua opposita, quia enim bonum quaeritur, ideo refutatur oppositum malum. Bonum autem habet rationem finis, qui quidem est prior in intentione, sed est posterior in consecutione. Potest ergo ordo passionum concupiscibilis attendi vel secundum intentionem, vel secundum consecutionem. Secundum quidem consecutionem, illud est prius quod primo fit in eo quod tendit ad finem. Manifestum est autem quod omne quod tendit ad finem aliquem, primo quidem habet aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem, nihil enim tendit in finem non proportionatum; secundo, movetur ad finem; tertio, quiescit in fine post eius consecutionem. Ipsa autem aptitudo sive proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor, qui nihil aliud est quam complacentia boni; motus autem ad bonum est desiderium vel concupiscentia; quies autem in bono est gaudium vel delectatio. Et ideo secundum hunc ordinem, amor praecedit desiderium, et desiderium praecedit delectationem. Sed secundum ordinem intentionis, est e converso, nam delectatio intenta causat desiderium et amorem. Delectatio enim est fruitio boni, quae quodammodo est finis sicut et ipsum bonum, ut supra dictum est.

[Ad arg. 1] Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc modo nominatur aliquid, secundum quod nobis innotescit, voces enim sunt signa intellectuum, secundum philosophum. Nos autem, ut plurimum, per effectum cognoscimus causam. Effectus autem amoris, quando quidem habetur ipsum amatum, est delectatio, quando vero non habetur, est desiderium vel concupiscentia. Ut

autem Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., *amor magis sentitur, cum eum prodit indigentia*. Unde inter omnes passiones concupiscibilis, magis sensibilis est concupiscentia. Et propter hoc, ab ea denominatur potentia.

[**Ad arg. 2**] Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est unio amati ad amantem. Una quidem realis, secundum scilicet coniunctionem ad rem ipsam. Et talis unio pertinet ad gaudium vel delectationem, quae sequitur desiderium. Alia autem est unio affectiva, quae est secundum aptitudinem vel proportionem, prout scilicet ex hoc quod aliquid habet aptitudinem ad alterum et inclinationem, iam participat aliquid eius. Et sic amor unionem importat. Quae quidem unio praecedat motum desiderii.

[**Ad arg. 3**] Ad tertium dicendum quod delectatio causat amorem, secundum quod est prior in intentione.

Articulus 3

Respondeo [...] Et si ordinem omnium passionum secundum viam generationis, scire velimus, primo occurrunt amor et odium; secundo, desiderium et fuga; tertio, spes et desperatio; quarto, timor et audacia; quinto, ira; sexto et ultimo, gaudium et tristitia, quae consequuntur ad omnes passiones, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ita tamen quod amor est prior odio, et desiderium fuga, et spes desperatione, et timor audacia, et gaudium quam tristitia, ut ex praedictis colligi potest. [...]

Articulus 4: Utrum istae sint quatuor principales passiones, gaudium, tristitia, spes et timor

Videtur quod non sint istae quatuor principales passiones, gaudium et tristitia, spes et timor.

[...]

[**Arg. 2**] Praeterea, in passionibus animae est duplex ordo, scilicet intentionis, et consecutionis seu generationis. Aut ergo principales passiones accipiuntur secundum ordinem intentionis, et sic tantum gaudium et tristitia, quae sunt finales, erunt principales passiones. Aut secundum ordinem consecutionis seu generationis, et sic amor erit principalis passio. Nullo ergo modo debent dici quatuor principales passiones istae quatuor, gaudium et tristitia, spes et timor.

[...]

Respondeo dicendum quod hae quatuor passiones communiter principales esse dicuntur. Quarum duae, scilicet gaudium et tristitia, principales dicuntur, quia sunt completivae et finales simpliciter respectu omnium passionum, unde ad omnes passiones consequuntur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Timor autem et spes sunt principales, non quidem quasi completivae simpliciter, sed quia sunt completivae in genere motus appetitivi ad aliquid, nam respectu boni, incipit motus in amore, et procedit in desiderium, et terminatur in spe; respectu vero mali, incipit in odio, et procedit ad fugam, et terminatur in timore. Et ideo solet harum quatuor passionum numerus accipi secundum differentiam praesentis et futuri, motus enim respicit futurum, sed quies est in aliquo praesenti. De bono igitur praesenti est gaudium; de malo praesenti est tristitia; de bono vero futuro est spes; de malo futuro est timor. Omnes autem aliae passiones, quae sunt de bono

vel de malo praesenti vel futuro, ad has complete reducuntur. Unde etiam a quibusdam dicuntur principales hae praedictae quatuor passiones, quia sunt generales. Quod quidem verum est, si spes et timor designant motum appetitus communiter tendentem in aliquid appetendum vel fugiendum.

[...]

[Ad arg. 2] Ad secundum dicendum quod passiones istae dicuntur principales, secundum ordinem intentionis et complementi. Et quamvis timor et spes non sint ultimae passiones simpliciter, tamen sunt ultimae in genere passionum tendentium in aliud quasi in futurum. Nec potest esse instantia nisi de ira. Quae tamen non potest poni principalis passio, quia est quidam effectus audaciae, quae non potest esse passio principalis, ut infra dicetur.