

Self-awareness and Affective Intentionality in the Stoic theory of Oikeiōsis

T1: Cicero, *On Ends*, 3.16-17

Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simul atque natum sit animal (hinc enim est ordiendum), ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque quae conservantia sint eius status diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus, quae interitum videantur adferre. Id ita esse sic probant, (P1) quod antequam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, (P2) quod non fieret nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. (P3) Fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid (i.) nisi sensum haberent sui (ii.) eoque se diligerent. (C) Ex quo intellegi debet principium ductum esse a se diligendo.

‘Those whose theory I accept,’ he said, ‘have the following view. Every animal, as soon as it is born (for this is where one should start), feels attached (*conciliari*) towards itself, and is entreated to care (*commendari*) for its own preservation. It shows concern for (*diligo*) its constitution and whatever preserves its constitution, whereas it recoils from its destruction and whatever appears to promote its destruction. In support of this thesis, the Stoics point out (P1) that babies seek what is conducive to their well-being and avoid the opposite before they feel any pleasure or pain. (P2) This would not happen unless they show concern for their own constitution and feared destruction. (P3) But neither could it happen that they would seek anything at all unless they had (i.) self-awareness and thereby (ii.) self-concern. (C) So, one must realise that it is self-concern which provides the starting point. (transl. Woolf, slightly modified, my numbering)

T2: Hierocles, *Elements of Ethics*, IV.44-53

τεινομένη γὰρ ἔξω ἢ ψυχὴ μετ’ ἀφέσεως προσβάλλει πᾶσι τοῦ σώματος τοῖς μέρεσιν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ κέκρται πᾶσι, προσβάλλουσα δὲ ἀντιπροσβάλλεται· ἀντιβατικὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ σῶμα, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ· καὶ τὸ πάθος συνερευσιτικὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀντευρευσιτικὸν ἀποτελεῖται. καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μερῶν τῶν ἄκρων εἴσω νεῦον ἐπὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τοῦ στήθους εἰσαναφέρεται, ὡς ἀντίληψιν γίνεσθαι μερῶν ἀπάντων τῶν τε τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἴσον τῷ τὸ ζῶον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἑαυτοῦ.

For the soul extends outward with an expansion and strikes all parts of the body, since it is also mixed with all of them, and when it strikes them it is struck back in turn. For the body too offers resistance, just like the soul: and the affection ends up being simultaneously characterized by pressure and counterpressure. And tilting inward from the outermost parts, the affection is borne in toward the mind in the chest, so that there is an instinctual grasp of all the parts, both of the body and of the soul: and this is equivalent to the animal’s perceiving itself. (transl. Konstan, slightly modified)

T3: Hierocles, *Elements of Ethics*, VI.28-53

ἢ μέντοι εὐαρεστέϊ τῆ φαντασίᾳ, ἢν ἑαυτοῦ εἴληφεν, ἢ δυσαρεστέϊ ἢ ἀρρεπῶς ἴσχει
... ὅθεν ὁ συλλογισμὸς οὗτος ἀναγκάζει ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῷον, τὴν πρώτην αἰσθησιν
ἑαυτοῦ λαβόν, εὐθύς ὠικειώθη πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σύστασιν.

either the animal is pleased with the impression it has received of itself, or it is displeased, or else it remains indifferent. ... Consequently, this reasoning compels us to agree that an animal, when it has received the first perception of itself, immediately grows attached to itself and to its constitution. (transl. Konstan, slightly modified)

T4: Sen. *Ep.* 121.21

Si tamen exigis, dicam quomodo omne animal perniciose intellegere cogatur. Sentit se carne constare; itaque sentit quid sit quo secari caro, quo uri, quo obteri possit, quae sint animalia armata ad nocendum: horum speciem trahit inimicam et hostilem. Inter se ista coniuncta sunt; simul enim conciliatur saluti suae quidque et iuvatura petit, laesura formidat. Naturales ad utilia impetus, naturales a contrariis aspernationes sunt; sine ulla cogitatione quae hoc dictet, sine consilio fit quidquid natura praecepit.

But if you insist, I will say how every animal is compelled to understand what harms it. It senses that it is made of flesh; so it senses the things by which flesh can be cut, burnt, and crushed, and which animals are armed in such a way as to harm it, and it gets impressions (*species*) of these animals as unfriendly or hostile to it. These processes are connected: each animal is appropriated to its own health and goes for what will help it, while shunning what will harm it. Its impulses for useful things (*impetus ad utilia*) are natural; likewise its ‘repulsions’ from the opposite—and what nature prescribes happens without any thought dictating it or any deliberation (Transl. Brittain slightly modified)

T5: Hierocles, *Elements of Ethics*, VI.1-6

καθόλου γὰρ οὐ συντελεῖται τῶν ἐκτός τινος ἀντίληψις δίχα τῆς ἑαυτῶν αἰσθήσεως.
μετὰ γὰρ τῆς τοῦ λευκοῦ φέρε εἰπεῖν αἰσθήσεως καὶ ἑαυτῶν αἰσθανόμεθα
λευκαινομένων καὶ μετὰ τῆς τοῦ γλυκέως γλυκαζομένων καὶ μετὰ τῆς τοῦ θερμοῦ
θερμαινομένων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰνάλογον.

“For, in general, the grasp of some external thing is not realized without perception of oneself. For, together with the perception of white, we may say, we also perceive ourselves being whitened, and together with that of something sweet, we perceive ourselves sweetened, with that of something hot ourselves heated, and similarly with the rest.” (transl. Konstan)