

E. Husserl

Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins **Third volume: Willing and Action**

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Text Nr. VI

Passivity and spontaneity in the doxastic domain and in the domain of willing¹ (Translation: Michela Summa – for internal use only, please do not circulate)

<§1 Will, drive, tendency, egoic turning-towards and the parallels in the domain of judgment>

Tendency from the sign to the signified (consciousness of sign – consciousness of meaning). Tendency from the indication to what is indicated, from that which reminds of something to that which it reminds of. Free flow of tendencies. Inhibition of tendencies. Tension characters. *All without participation of the ego.*

The ego-striving. The tendencies occurring in the object-sphere and counter-tendencies determine the ego: The ego follows them or resists them. I follow the tendency towards the signified or do not follow it. The sign “attracts” me by itself and not the signified. Allures related to the ego, determining a turning-towards of the ego.

Diversity of turning-towards: relation between the ego and the object that attracts me. Relation between the ego and the act that I “perform”.

Turning-towards as turning-towards in representing, representing of phantasy, perceiving, remembering. Turning-towards as turning-towards in judgment. The ego turns towards the represented and behaves believably (acknowledging), denying, assuming, predicating (comprehending). I have liking and disliking, I wish, I desire, I want or I strive.²

I am already paying attention to an indirectly seen object, and it “stimulates me to the fixation”, to direct “looking at”, and I follow the attraction “involuntarily”, I simply let myself be pulled. Or I feel the pull, but I say “no, I don't want to”. I make the resolution to resist; possibly the looking occurs anyway. I could not resist. Or, after a while, I make the resolution: now I want to go there, I want to follow the pull.

I decide to do (*nehme mir vor*), I perform the will-positing (*Willentthesis*), I do. Now “the tendency can become effective”. But not only that: I execute a volition. I perform a volition, the becoming effective is subject to the will.

Can a will occur without striving? If a volition decides against a striving, is there then another striving, a counter striving?

¹ Probably July 1914 – editor's note.

² In the background: a conflict. I become attentive: the discordance comes to the fore, I perform a consciousness of discordance, go into the one and the other apprehension and realize the appeal for the one and the other. – I always consider the “unconscious” in relation to the “conscious”, the backgrounds in relation to the performances, through which different levels of foregrounds are [constituted M.S.].

Strive: The object exerts the impulse, the pull. The ego follows „blindly“. Starting-point of following. The source point in the ego. The striving doing. Passivity of striving and striving of doing.

Perceiving. Passivity of perceiving. I look, I observe, I go through. Spontaneity of identifying, distinguishing, comparing, of gathering in actual collection, of affirming, of denying, of setting-as-subject-and-thereupon-a-predicate, the presupposing-and-thereupon-setting-a-consequence, etc.

Secondary passivity. The recurrence of judgments in confusion. Possibly the coming of “thoughts” that are immediately taken up, for example during a discussion, such as a recollection or a perception that is acquiesced.

Judging out of drive (triebmäßiges Urteilen). Giving in to the inclination to judge (the appeal [*Anmutung*]) with “sufficient strength”. The unfree judging. The voluntary-suspension-of-judgment. Of course, I cannot affirm or deny voluntarily arbitrary things, but I can voluntarily resist or give in to the drive to judge. Where <there is> no specific inclination or counter inclination to judge, I cannot affirm or deny. Isn’t a yielding judging a judging, a belief? Or shouldn’t we distinguish between belief (and even predicative belief) and “deciding-freely”-on-the-“basis”-of? Isn’t this an essentially new species of act?

How is willing related to driving? I can resist a drive. I can want against the inclination instead of willing with it. *Willing out of inclination - Willing out of obligation.* I want to leave the room because it is cold. Inclination to stay in the room, I’m attracted by the beautiful pictures, etc. “But” it is cold. The coldness could result in a cold, I am afraid of this. Inclination to leave the room. I want to leave the room. Conflict of the two inclinations. Predominant pleasure and inclination to stay. I give in, and the other inclination is still there, still in tension.³ I want to stay, I decide to do so in recognition of the high value etc. I deliberately cross out the other inclination. I could say: The will presumption for this side is put “out of effect”, it is “removed” by rejection.

Thus, I distinguish: 1) the case in which I give in to an inclination, without voluntarily deciding in its sense, namely in the conflict between more inclinations I give in to one, without voluntarily “removing”, crossing out the counter inclination; 2) the contrary case: I want, I freely and deliberately take position – and I take counter position. The one stands what should practically be done, the other as what should not be done. (Although it is not judged as right; it is not the judging consciousness “this is the practically right”; rather, the willing consciousness, in which what is wanted is there as practically approved and therefore supposedly as what should practically be). (If that is correct?)

What is the parallel in the sphere of judgment? – I let myself being driven in believing. What is the higher level? Judging, I get deeper into judging. I freely judge on the basis of reasons. I perform judgments of the level of reason. Possibly I let myself be driven by judgmental tendencies (or by allures, “causes”), which are opposed by other tendencies, which I do not let “have their say”, which are just “weaker”. I don’t actually “let anything have its say”, I do not examine anything etc. I follow the pull of the stronger – I am driven. But I believe, albeit with a bad conscience because of the counter tendencies, which continually pulls to the other side. Now, this can also include: the “resolutely taking party” and the “decisive taking the

³ Here only the following is not taken into consideration: 1) It can be that I make a decision with the will for one inclination and cross out the opposite inclination. 2) It can be that I do not do the latter. But now it is important to add: Isn’t then the deciding for one inclination “*eo ipso*” deciding against the other, crossing it out? That is, it is rationally crossed out. And isn’t it already concerned without the effective crossing out, already out of action, without the need for its own crossing out? There is a question. In order to remove the pull, is its own crossing out necessary, good?

counter party", e.g. in political dispute. I take sides for a party phrase, "I drown out the voice of reason", I do not listen to the dark warnings of the logical conscience. Thus, belief in general, from heterological motives instead of from logical ones, from real reasons of belief, being blindly driven by belief instead of believing with insight, or belief for logical reasons, performing a rational act of belief – not a passivity, but a spontaneity, an act of "freedom".

Yes, this is precisely the difficulty. False theoretical judging is surely a free act and not mere being driven – or is it a mixture? What is the difference between mere drive and theoretical position taking? And what is, in the sphere of feeling (*Gemüt*) and willing, the will as the will of reason, the will that is in accordance with the facts, the values, the norms and decides to act "freely" in accordance with them and in defiance of the blind inclinations, that is not merely a doing out of drive and also not deciding for something that elicits drives (*Triebartiges*) "without reason"? Thus, it is not yet clarified, what differences actually are here in place.

Differences of the original receptivity in the sphere of belief (the representation). Differences in the original passivity of the sphere of willing (drive and doing out of drive). In the former sphere: doxa in receptivity. And the question of what we can really claim to be original receptivity (sensations, perceptions); but then, what spontaneity, the "spiritual acts" (as Pfänder says) require. Passage through the inhibition of "consent"? Is every act here consent? Affirmation and negation. So, the study of the structure of the higher acts and determination of their essence. Likewise in the sphere of will. But the tricky thing is that tendencies already play such a big role in the sphere of representation. And how is tendency related to drive, then drive related to will?

Tendencies in the transition from representation to representation, tendencies in the flow of representations from the sign to the designated (from the consciousness of sign to the consciousness of meaning). Tendencies in series of associations. Everything before turning towards. Inhibition of tendencies. Tendencies that flow freely or flow to some degree and those that experience inhibition. Examples; presentations from reflective and catching reflection, which show that there can be all such things here, that we can fix here types of being, even if incompletely.

There is no talk of allures here. But allures for the turning of the ego?! And can we avoid talking about tendency again? Yet, an essential difference: once tendency of transition from representation to representation; in the correlate: a relation of the represented objects as such, one awakens the other, points to it, draws it into consciousness, etc. The other time tendency of turning toward. A tendency of the transformation of the representation to attentional modification, whereby it (the represented), however, enters into relation to the pure ego. The ego is not the object. But a reflection is possible, which posits the ego itself, but again not grasped through an appearance, not grasped as something like a "content", etc.

So, from the point of view of the transition from representation to representation in the form of the *cogito*: The ego is turned towards – the ego is not turned towards, is attentive – not attentive. The question is whether one can take both in one. Here already, if we take the empirical ego and the consciousness of it. This consciousness enters into a relation with the other consciousness, and indeed into a peculiar one, namely into the following: The ego is turned towards. This is already quite difficult. Likewise turning of the will.

Is it right that in each actual "I want" the ego must be itself object, that an actual "self-consciousness" must be performed (as Pfänder says)?

I want to make a journey. I am thereby obviously co-represented. I can find myself in it. But do I have to posit myself? If we sink into a decision of will: I'm going on the train, I'm boarding the wagon. I make such and such movements. I, the subject, perform this and that processes in the bodily sphere, thereby I further do this and that through them. The body is represented

in a certain way, namely the bodily sphere of action. But the subject of the movements etc. has not become an object. I do not need to make myself into an object, as I make other people into objects. I can want, just as I can judge, without thematically “objectifying” the ego: I do this, however, when I say it, at first, for instance, when I say it to others (as I am then objectively posited for me in the intercourse) or when I say it to myself. But I can also reflect on the pure ego and see it as an empty point of identity of the acts in the form of the *cogito*. I cannot therefore agree with Pfänder on this point, although he has seen things rightly in relation to the centripetal and the centrifugal flow.

The particularity of willing lies, of course, in the involvement of the ego. But first of all, this is something common compared to all “acts” in the distinctive sense. The spiritual “impact” occurs everywhere in a certain analogous way. I affirm, I deny, I love, I hate, I hope, I fear, I want, I don't want. I have different “positings” and “propositions”. And everywhere I have basic positions and modalizations of basic positions. And the “matters” of these positions?

I do not judge when I perceive passively or accept a doxa in the way of receptivity. doxa in the way of receptivity. But I “question” the state of affairs, I disentangle what is meant there, proceed to the rejection and treat the original doxa as a mere imposition, which I now approve out of rational motive (reasons) or against which I take a stand.

<§ 2 Die meaning of the temporal horizon for action>

The tendency from the represented to the represented, from the judged to the judged, from the liked to the liked, from the wanted to the wanted and the correlative connections, the pull from the represented to the represented, from representing to judging, to valuing, and from values to new values, to desiring, and from desiring to wanting, etc. In-depth exemplary analyses <are necessary>.

The ego and the allures on the ego. The “unconscious” and the allures stemming from it. Already “consciousness” and new stimuli. How the ego itself becomes an object in acts. Acts which include a “self-consciousness”. Is it correct that in every actual “I will” the ego itself must become an object?

Striving, drive directed toward a future action. “Actual will” directed to a future doing. What is the role of the present, the now, and the stretch from the present to the starting point of the future striving doing or voluntarily acting? How does the drive begin? We have to distinguish between the pull out of a drive and the “following-of-the-drive”. How is this characterized, especially if it is about the future? Does it include a point of application of the “following”, the point of the triggering, and a character of following for the re-presentation of the whole future doing in its continuity? And how can the whole process look like?

For example, I am tired. The thought of a relaxing trip, yes even just the thought of Switzerland arises, and I follow. Switzerland – a practical appeal that I give in to without further ado. But I have to separate the appeal, the demand, and the following, the saying yes, as it were. And only now, in increasing clarity (let's say, it is generally presented only the word “Switzerland” or “Engadin” etc.) a place or a mountain appears, this as the end point of a “journey”, whereby this being an end point is itself still unclear. It comes to clarity: route of a journey there, arrival from a journey, piece of a journey itself, which terminates in it, then again a piece. Finally starting from the here, but in an indefinite future etc. And all this has the character of yes. All this has the character: “This is how it shall be, I will do this so or almost so, I will do it (in the future)”. Possibly indeterminacies, be it in the execution, be it in the time. But there is a being posited in it, which has to be determined with respect to this very execution etc.

Do I not have to speak of a “resolution”, although of a resolution, which I “follow” instinctively, without rational consideration, by virtue of the “appeal” (follow the inclination) belonging to it? But how, if I am not thereby related to a “future”? In doing I am in a certain way always related to a future, but there is still a big difference to be considered: 1) the protentional horizon, that connects to the now and loses itself in an indeterminate darkness; 2) the reproductive future horizon. The allure can lie in one or the other. Only in the former an immediate reach, an immediately realizing yielding, following through is possible. For only in the former lies the current now and here-now, in which it can “go off”. What we call “present” actually includes the whole first horizon. When say I want to do something in the future, when I talk simply about the “future”, the word refers to a reproductive horizon; it is not a protentional, but rather something conscious as a reproduction, that is, it entails a reproductive present, a “now” with a reproductive protentional horizon.

If now a “resolution” is made (a word that from the outset tends to be related to a reproductive future), then, according to the above, very different things can be clearly imagined and determined: the goal and possibly the ways to the goal. In any case, however, a beginning of the resolved belongs to the resolution, an end, the goal and the connecting way. The beginning can be indeterminate and can be either in the future itself or in the constantly shifting protentional horizon.

The positing of the future and its representation intentionally implies the positing of the present and its horizon, in a peculiar way to be described in more detail. Thus, the positing of what is directed to the future, of the resolute “this should happen”, intentionally entails the positing of a beginning of the event, possibly in the present domain. This is an intentional implication, not a real one. I can follow the intention, fulfill the intention and in the fulfillment find it as necessary included. All this must be elaborated.

So, positing a future positing, that is, to point to a future present position, to posit it implicitly. This posited present position is a self-determination for the future, which is to stage the process of the future action from beginning to end. Thereby it is not essential whether the subject posits (or represents) itself as ego and even as human ego. The “I will” posited set for the future does not exclude that the “I will” does not occur.

Every “I will” can be crossed out by a future inhibition, by a crossing out in the will. Inhibiting by a crossing out in the will. But also differently: it is evident that the “I will” = “I want in the respective now to stage this or that in the future” includes: “I will want in the same now, I will initiate the action in the now of the future, and that ‘in the sense’ of the now conceived resolution; and it is evident that the process from the now can run in such a way that the layer of will breaks off, falls away or does not function currently. Then it does not come to the future wanting, namely not as executing. Thus, a specific construction is intentionally sketched for the future course of consciousness, such a one, that is between future and present, besides the intentional unity of time consciousness also a unity for the consciousness of will – and this must be described precisely. Then we have remarkable open horizons as possibilities, which are horizons of will, which represent possibilities etc.

<§ 3 Whether everything specifically logical comes from the sphere of spontaneity. Tendencies that lie before all volitional turning toward of the ego>

The object “draws the attention to itself”, it excites me to attention, then at the object the color, the shape etc. What is already grasped may hold me fast, as well as it can, and so may the acts or their correlates in a certain way come to coincidence. Isn’t it however something

new, that I spontaneously posit the object as subject and posit it in synthetic unity: the object is red, round etc.? Or that I, while initially following the allures, turn to A and B, but now “actively” posit A and B as a collective refer to it by a plural predicate? Or the object appears to be known and leads me back in its apprehension to a connection of memories, what is presently given as appearance coincides with the remembered. But isn’t it something new, the “This is the same as here X!”? Or “This is red”, and I grasp red as an identical ideal unity, which I can only posit and grasp only in an original spontaneous positing. Does not everything specifically “logical” come from the sphere of “spontaneity”, from “free” acts, from the “sphere of reason”? Already Leibniz: The “activity” on the “clear and distinct”.

What is this “activity”, “spontaneity”? Does the ego creatively produce the set, the state of affairs, the relation, the attribute, the idea, the essence, etc.? There is a “receptivity”, a doxic behavior, which accepts what is passively given and in taking over only grasps. More clearly: an object imposes itself it is imposed on me, I am with it. The actual grasping, seizing, positing as object is already a spontaneity. But objects in general can be constituted for me by spontaneities. Spontaneities are needed so that they are given at all and so that I can grasp them and posit them for their part. And the same objects can be constituted once in spontaneities, the other time in receptivities – even the simple sensible object as an object that imposes itself and is posited. But still differently: a state of affairs as confusedly imposing and accepted in a mere being directed at and the same state of affairs not only grasped, but originally constituted in the performance of the spontaneous acts giving it (constituting its givenness). Accordingly, I distinguish primordial and secondary receptivity. And the latter is the sphere of the actual unreason, of the confused acts of reason, which possibly, if they are explicated and transferred into the actual spontaneity, “explode”.

But here we still need to continue, in order to characterize the specific sphere of “experience” in the proper way. The transcendent intending, the seeing, which can confirm itself, but also leaves open the “otherness”: these are not acts of reason, pretensions of reason, but according to them the reasonable judging “orients” itself to them. Possibilities of explication, of “logical setting” etc. are founded in them, and the truth of the judgments depends on the factual exclusions, which they experience, or also the rejections and on the ontological laws which determine the logic of truth of the sphere of experience. But also immanent givens experience explication, are substrates for logical acts, etc. Then again the already logical givens, finally the givens of lower spheres of reason. (The subject of the acts of reason is the pure ego. It performs them spontaneously, actively, and proceeds rationally, where it does not follow the “blind inclination”, but rather judges in its positings “upon reasons”, and this is to say, seeing or with an insight).

What does spontaneity mean here? The “active” procedure of rational thinking? First of all, a difference: The ego is not merely present as in a pure “affection” (receptivity), it gives its vote from itself. It “thinks”, the decision comes out of itself. So in every “spontaneous” opinion, it is something that springs from the ego. This is a difference, and there are many kinds of “acts” that are in a special sense acts of the ego, springing from the ego.

There is receptivity, there are experiences which hold potentialities of acts in themselves, but which are not “acts”, and which are original receptivities, unless they are secondary receptivities, derived from spontaneities, springing from acts.⁴ In both cases, speaking of fulfillment has a different sense. This is a large and difficult subject.

Furthermore: The pure ego “performs” the act. Acts are not only performed in general, they “orient themselves” towards something; the ego orients itself. But there is a big difference.

⁴ However, the difference is difficult. It seems as if, on the one side, we would only come to sensations. This should be ordered differently.

The ego lets itself be driven, lets itself be determined by something “alien” to it or by something “proper”. If it allows itself to be determined by seeing, and only by seeing, it is determined by something proper to it (as a correlate of its act); if it lets itself be determined blindly, it cannot. But of course, this is a precarious discourse. To let oneself be determined by what is really given, really seen: the thinking spontaneously carried out by the ego is “directed” in faithful “coincidence” according to the given, seen things. The ego-positing has the character of reason: it “hears” what the thing itself, the given thing, says. The thing is given in “seeing”. Seeing is an already active seeing: not merely an approaching, but rather a grasping, and a grasping that is a deepening into and explicating what is really and actually seen, after which the higher “thinking” is directed. This is the freedom of insightful thinking. The unfreedom is just the parable of the chaining by dark determination, by blind inclination. If we have already the sphere of the will, we could say: judgment wants to be, as it were, insightful, it wants to follow things, the will to judge is a free one when it does this. This is its innermost tendency. Otherwise, it is unfree, it misses its goal.

It is best to leave the talk of freedom for the time being and keep to the emphasized differences of the position-taking, which emerges from the ego and is addressed to the things and the pre-givenness of things or the assumed things and to the difference of the active seeing and explicating and of the thinking that directed to it; and again differences of reason and unreason.

How is it with the analogy in the sphere of willing?

1) Before every voluntary turning toward of the ego and before all turning toward in general, we have here the tendencies, drives, and we also have already a driven doing. Allures arouse tendencies and the allures are yielded to, tendencies come to the release. But the pure ego is not present, it does nothing, not even a seeing; therefore the analogue is the “seeing” that takes place in the background, or the appealing as being, or the approaching thoughts, suppositions, judgments stemming from earlier judgments, thoughts, assumptions, judgments etc. Everything without ego-performances.

2) I turn towards them, I follow the tendencies, I go with them and let myself drift. Or I watch their drifting, driven myself. I look at the name that attracts me, I follow the allure, it directs me to the meaning, I follow the allure. It is thinking, I follow the allure to carry out the thinking, I am now spontaneous, I perform an act, following a tendency. And so it can go on from act to act: tendencies lead from one to another. In the acts I am the one who performs. But in the progress from act to act I am not willing and acting in the actual sense, just as little as I am willing this when I follow a running chain of associations, watching step by step what it brings. I behave willingly when I do not passively give in, but actively either resist or say my “free” yes to the driving appeal, the “I want”. This “free” says as much as “I will”, which is something specific in relation to the redeeming of the drive. Now the question is what kinds of will impulses there are, or according to what the will-setting and -rejection, which makes the act of wanting, “orients itself”, and what the analogue of “seeing” is doing here and to what extent a real “seeing” plays a role in it.

What corresponds to the simple experiencing, the perceiving, then the remembering, the certain or seeming remembering, the consciousness of illusion etc.? What corresponds to the confused thoughts that impose themselves the unarticulated judgments, presumptions, etc. that impose themselves? The remarkable thing is that one is inclined to say: I direct myself in the simplest way by certainties of value, yet according to those which refer to non-being. A future stands there as possible and as a certain value. I want. But this is a completely different way of directing oneself.

Correct was nevertheless in my old thoughts the idea of the performance of the perceptions. I bring them to life when I explicate, when I “analyze”. This analytic synthesis unravels what was hidden synthetic synthesis. What presents itself to us as concealed is secondary spontaneity, which has just become receptivity.

The analogue would be the example of playing the piano. The “mechanized” wanting or the passive course of “actions”, that I can activate: I perform them step by step in singular volitions. Or do I renew the deliberation directed to the singularities? The “mechanically” reaching for the glass “in order” to drink, the mechanically lighting the cigarette, bringing it to the mouth, etc. This points to “original volitions”. But what are “original volitions”? What lies ahead? Tendencies, coming off “by themselves”, proceeding in tendency-like doings: turning of the ego – intervening of the ego; progressing and thereby “affirming”, inhibiting – denying. This is what one is finally led back to.⁵ The watching of the process, the settling-in of the ego as “doing-along”, as following the pull by doing, that would be actualizing, transforming into the living act. Interweaving of primary and secondary, interwoven tendencies. Tendency to breathe, but also counter-tendency: with stronger breathing I feel a painful feeling, a striving against the striving proceeding. Actualization: I do not want to go on, I inhibit. In the case of inhibition, a reversal of the tendency into “back”, I want to follow this.

We have a sphere of tendency, which is a sphere of passivity – generally “unconscious”, outside the pure ego and its acts originating from it –, and a sphere of egoic acts, especially of egoic volitions. As far as the tendencies reach and the corresponding interconnections of positive and negative tendencies and the occurrences of self-triggering, self-discharge of the tendencies, so far reaches the sphere of possible acts of will.

Can one say that tendencies run towards all sense fields and their contents, and that the particularly prominent ones have their particular tendencies, directed to the bringing closer, etc.? I can imagine these or that parts of the body etc. and willingly do this or that with them. I think of the hand raised etc. Does every such conception already a tendency and correspondingly a will? Originally every hand movement was movement in the sense of a flowing off, sending out tendency. As soon as I imagine it more or less vividly, the tendency is also excited. And this tendency expires by itself, if it is not balanced by counter-tendencies, etc. But it can also be that I want, out of reasons which do not lie in this tendency itself. I have an impression connected with something that is linked to the execution of this tendency, even if it is only to prove my “I can”. Which, of course, would have to be considered according to its sense. So, I say yes to the represented movement, not representing the yes the representation; rather: in the now an actual tendency towards such a movement arises, and I either give in to this, as often happens when I represent vividly, or I take it as an appeal and allure for the “I will”.

<§ 4> Drive as will in a deeper layer

Determination of the drive, determining tendencies, its directedness. Original bodily movements as drive movements. The drive presupposes dark representations. In the fulfillment of drive tendencies, these representations are fulfilled, they get clear and transform themselves into originally giving representations.

What role do “evaluations” play in this? The fulfillment shows a “pleasantness” of the fulfilling or a decrease in unpleasantness in the case of fulfillment of negative drives. The problem of the intentionality of the original drives: whether it is necessary to say that the drive intention

⁵ Check psychological literature: Meumann, Ebbinghaus, Dürr etc., Messer.

includes representation and evaluation, although in the mode of “dark intention”. Higher level: anticipating representations, and the represented stands as valuable, related to the future.

Deliberation. Affirmation (affirmation of will) or negation. This is preceded – or can be preceded – by the appeal, to which the yes or no (as the fiat) belong. Also, the drive can be unfulfilled or it can be releasing and fulfilling. Is not every release preceded by a stretch of “mere intention”? But is that mere appeal? Or does it correspond (would it correspond) to the intention? No, here deliberation and doing are one and the same. It can only correspond to the appeal. Appeal is, after all, “inclination”.

The participation or lack of participation of the ego. Looking: The drive is triggered, e.g. in eating, playing the piano, etc. I look at. What is there? I have the sheet of music in front of me, I follow with my eyes, I perform the relevant movements. With my thoughts I am completely elsewhere. Now I pay attention to the notes and observe, I look at this being drawn from note to note, this mechanical sequence of finger movements as a doing and not merely a happening, as a “passively following the pull”.

Another thing is the sending of new will-impulses and actively intervening. This is a completely different attitude. For example, I playfully and passively follow the pull. But a “mistake” occurs, now a new one arises: the discomfort about this mistake and a tendency to correct it. I follow it, but here I live in following, in the execution of the new step, and now I am perhaps a bit there with the will, I am attentive, but not just watching, but creating in the will. But now I don’t say: “This happens mechanically”, but instead I want it; I “govern” it with my will. There, too, I have a change of attitude. I do not only do, the happening is not only centrally generated from the ego, but rather, at the same time, a reflective gaze emanates from the ego, which does not remove the process of generating in its own character.

The question now is this: is the conscious fiat (the genuine impulse of will), so to speak, reactivation, and is the mere “release” of a dark impulse “modification”, pointing back to a genuine fiat? Although, of course, not historically. It is the analogous question as with of the performing perception. It is reactivation of an incomplete, pre-giving perception. But the background perception is itself a “modification” of a performed perception. This points back to processes of the original constitution, in which the perceptual givenness originates and in which thus what we call perception of a thing becomes original. This is the case with the perception of a thing. And with this it is said that every actual perception itself “points back” to processes of original constitution, with which such perception arises in the first place. This is difficult to express. Originally giving in a certain sense – and in a natural and good one – is of course every thing-perception. But it has horizons of non-givenness, and, with regard to what it gives, it also gives it “unilaterally”, and also in this there are references. This is connected with the relation of perception to perceptual connections. But here we also have references to an original genesis of perception. Where are these references? We find them in the retrospect of the contexts of “motivation”: eye movements, “if-then”, sensation data, stages of constitution, etc. Must one not then say: classifications in “possible” connections according to serial orders belong to the essence of certain motivational connections, and it belongs to the essence of consciousness in general, that – when freely flowing and available series go together with non-freely flowing series, like sensations of motion with visual data – the if-then motivation is necessarily formed and then a conception originally becomes possible and originates, as it is the conception of transcendence (phantoms, etc.)? What has sprung in this way points back to its origin.

Do we have analogous cases and parallels in the sphere of willing? What is complicated here is that tendencies, drives, release of drives (following) etc. already belong to the constitution

of anything perceptually given, to the origin of transient perceptions and to perception in general (since everywhere a certain unity constitution takes place). The tendencies that are operative in the original proving itself (*Bewährung*) of perception and in the performing of perceiving are tendencies like others, they can be transformed into actual volitions, or (that would be the corresponding question for them) they have arisen out of original volitions, volitions of a lowest level. But there are the problems.

How can we imagine a “originary consciousness”? And can we imagine it at all? We must though, in order to obtain clear essential possibilities. A visual field for instance and “eye movements”. How are these “free movements”?

The problems of the original genesis. Is an original will to be recognized in the drive? There is original drive such as attention. Is that to be regarded as a volition? Is there an original drive to move? Original allures for it, which generate originally related, though little differentiated, movements? Don't we have herewith large fields of original relations of allure and triggering by allure and thus fields of drive activity: on the one hand the spheres of attention, of inner drives and flows of tendencies, e.g. the habitual relations of the acts and of the excitability in this respect, on the other hand the fields of movement, the fields of aesthesiological freedom? As far as the “experience” of drive-activities extends, of allures and the activities that follow them, so far reaches a sphere of original volitions as affirmations and negations; the volitional spontaneity points to, shows a sphere of practical receptivity.

“Associations” of the sensible fields with the originally constituted field of freedom, that of “movements”. Constitution of the systems of “perceptions” of one and the same object as a field of freedom: freedom of viewing the same object from different sides etc. Constitution of the system of “effects” of my body on things. Movements not as activities of adaptation, but as movements of pushing and hitting, of lifting, laying, etc., of avoiding an “impact” from the thing, etc. The processing, shaping, dividing, using of things; the mediation of the effects on the external nature. The given nature and the cultivated nature. Nature as a field of praxis. The animal world as a field of practice. Constitution of the spiritual objects. Other humans in spatio-temporal nature. Allure and reaction to allures in relation to humans close to me and other animals. Willing and doing as influencing others, reacting to their influences, determining them, giving them orders, obeying them, making them promises and receiving promises, etc. The mechanized Willing, its transformation into secondary drives and expressions of drives. Thinking and willing. The arbitrary thinking, the I want to think. I want to think, I want to describe, I want to find a proof etc. Does a wanting live in every actual thinking? Does a will live in every actual value? The intentionality.

Tendencies live in thinking. Not all thinking is an arbitrary activity. It can never be. The real willing. Reason in willing determined by reason in the underlying thinking. Willing, which is supported by insight. Insight that the will is right. Insight that the values determining the will are genuine values. Connection to general insights and insights into the general validity of such values; to general norms of the will, under which the given willing is subordinated and from which it creates ultimate reasonableness and highest value. Evaluating the will. Evaluating thought. Evaluating the evaluating. Thinking insight into the values of willing and the norms of willing. Theoretical insight into the possible values in general, the principles of values, the norms of valuing. Theoretical insight into the possible insights in general, into the principles of logic, into the norms of thinking. Thinking that can be motivated; value and will that can be motivated. Thinking for reasons. The insightful thinking and its insightful reasons. Insightfulness of the grounds. The valuing towards grounds. The “insightful” valuing, the insightful reasoning of values. Does it necessarily involve theoretical insight? Does it necessarily involve thinking about values? The willing towards grounds. Insightful willing,

reasonable willing and conscious of its reasonableness. To what extent does this presuppose the “theoretical”, thought-conform, clarity about values, about value principles, and theoretical clarity about principles of the rightness of will? How is the correct description and the description of the right order in the close interconnection of all acts and modes of reason? Do we have to put valuing first? In scientific thinking: I live in thinking, but I strive for insight and justification, for the insightful “possession” of truths, for their appropriation. Then I value truth positively, falsehood negatively. I find “imperfect” proofs just imperfect, thus, I evaluate. Practical noetics (the theory of thinking and especially the a priori theory) is thus classified under the science of the a priori praxis in general. Sciences – when are they valuable, real sciences? Eidetic consideration of thinking and thought, apart from all questions of value and practical questions. Differences in essence: clarity and unclarity, distinctness and indistinctness. Evidence and its stages. Thinking and thought, noematic structures. Intention and fulfillment. Conditions of the possibility of insight. Laws for truth in general and falsity in general. Laws of the validity of meaning (of the truth of propositions), laws of the essence of insight, etc.

The domain of values. Valuing is itself something under evaluation. Good valuing and bad valuing. Behaving correctly and incorrectly in valuing. This is therefore praiseworthy and blameworthy as an activity of persons. It is to be evaluated also in itself, apart from all persons who show themselves active in it. Similarly to thinking. Of course, thinking is thinking of an ego, valuing is valuing of an ego. And so the ego also appears: the ego, insofar as it evaluates well, has thereby itself a value; the ego that thinks well has itself accordingly a value. Incidentally, exactly the same as above with judging. We can develop an eidetic theory of valuing and of the values or the value-propositions, the value-objects, value-behavior, general laws for values (ontology of values), theory of forms of value propositions, possible categories of values and value behavior, order theory of values, highest and lowest values, etc. Likewise, value consciousness as the grasping of value (*Wertnehmen*), the original value-constituting consciousness, higher value-constituting consciousness, higher levels of “insightful” = originally constituting consciousness etc., everything according to eidetic laws.